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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation addresses three questions concerning the economics of geographical 
indications (GIs) and the role of intellectual property (IP) protection in the provision of 
quality in food and agricultural markets. The first essay compares and contrasts different 
instruments (i.e., alternative certification schemes and trademarks) used to provide IP 
protection for GIs. From a policy perspective, this essay offers recommendations with regard 
to the most desirable type of IP protection instrument for GIs. The model indicates that a sui 
generis scheme based on appellations is preferable to standard instruments, such as 
certification marks, that are currently used in many important markets including the United 
States, because appellations improve the collective reputation of certified products and 
reduce the total cost (i.e., the sum of production and information costs) of providing quality 
compared to standard instruments. 
The second essay investigates whether consumers recognize and value the 
informational content of a variety of nested geographical origin labels from foreign countries. 
This study disentangles three types of geographical origin labels with different levels of 
geographical differentiation: country-of-origin labels and two types of GIs, protected 
designations of origin (PDO) and protected geographical indications (PGI). Consumer data 
show that, within the context of a high-quality value-added commodity such as extra virgin 
olive oil, consumers’ willingness to pay for oils from different countries varies, ceteris 
paribus, across countries, and that within a country consumers have a greater willingness to 
pay for GI-labeled than non-GI-labeled products. We also find evidence that consumers 
value PDOs more than PGIs.  
  
x
The third essay investigates the incentives of GI-exporting and GI-importing 
countries to strengthen the current TRIPS provisions for GIs. This essay explicitly considers 
the role of promotion in expanding market demand when consumers lack information 
regarding either the existence or the features of the GI and GI-like products. The model 
highlights the diverging interests of GI-exporting and GI-importing countries with regard to 
GI provisions in international markets and provides a key to interpret the current controversy 
over GIs among WTO members.   
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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The overarching topic of this dissertation concerns the economics of geographically-
differentiated food and agricultural products and the role of intellectual property (IP) 
protection in the provision of quality in food and agricultural markets. Recent years have 
been characterized by a surging interest of consumers in regional cuisines, the discovery 
of a socio-cultural status associated with authentic food and culinary heritage and, more 
generally, by an increased attention to food quality. These trends provide new 
opportunities for the food sector but also present significant challenges. The provision of 
quality in food markets is, in fact, fraught with difficulties under asymmetric information 
and moral hazard problems. A possible solution to these problems has emphasized the 
role of firms’ private reputation as conveyed via private brands (e.g., trademarks). In the 
case of geographically-differentiated products, firms – in addition to using private 
trademarks – have the option to signal their quality through the use of collective brands 
indicating the geographic origin of production. An instance of such collective brands is 
represented by geographical indications (GIs), a distinct form of intellectual property 
rights. 
GIs are names of places or regions used to brand goods with a distinct 
geographical connotation. Many GIs pertain to wines (e.g., Champagne and Burgundy), 
and agricultural and food products (e.g., Boseong’ green tea and Parmigiano-Reggiano 
cheese). The characterizing feature of GI products is that some quality attribute of interest 
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to consumers is considered to be inherently linked to, or determined by, the nature of the 
geographic environment in which production takes place (e.g., climate conditions, soil 
composition, local knowledge, etc.) – i.e., to the notion of “terroir” (Josling 2006).  
GIs are similar to trademarks in that they identify the origin or the source of the 
good and help differentiate individual products among similar goods by communicating 
the specific qualities that are due to the geographical origin. As a result of these important 
economic functions, GIs have gained recognition as a distinct form of intellectual 
property rights in the TRIPS agreement of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
However, while trademarks protection is well established and relatively harmonized 
across countries, the protection of GIs varies to a large degree and its implementation is a 
topic of intense disagreement in the ongoing negotiations at the WTO. In particular, a 
source of tension among WTO member countries relates to the fact that the legal 
instruments (e.g., certification systems) used to provide IP protection for GIs differ across 
countries. The European Union, for example, employs a so-called sui generis system 
based on appellations, while the United States uses a system based on certification marks.  
A second source of tension among WTO member countries concerns the TRIPS 
agreement’s built-in agenda that commits WTO members to “enter into negotiations 
aimed at increasing the protection of individual geographical indications” (Art. 24.1). 
Some countries, predominantly those with large stocks of GI products, are in favor of 
more stringent IP policies for GIs. In particular, these countries have put forward a 
proposal (hereafter the extension proposal) to extend the so-called “high level” of 
protection which is currently reserved only for wines to all GI products. If implemented, 
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the extension proposal would grant producers in GI regions exclusive rights over the use 
of a GI name in any labeling context (i.e., the use in commerce of geographic names for 
“non-genuine” products would be prohibited even if the true origin of the good were 
specified). Countries in opposition, including the United States, have made efforts to 
block measures to strengthen IP provisions for GIs. 
The objective of this dissertation is to contribute to the understanding of the 
economic implications of IP protection for GIs and to shed light on the current debate on 
GIs at the WTO and on the ongoing product quality policy reform within the European 
Union. Specifically, the contribution of this dissertation to the economics literature on 
GIs is threefold. First, it provides the first analysis of the economic implications of 
different IP instruments currently in use for protecting GIs. Second, it offers a first 
investigation of how North American consumers perceive European GIs with different 
degrees of geographical differentiation. Third, it formalizes the open economy 
implications of strengthening current IP provisions for GIs in international markets.  
The first essay (Chapter 3) studies firm reputation as a mechanism to assure 
product quality in perfectly competitive markets in a context in which both certification 
and trademarks are available. The proposed model extends the pioneering work of 
Shapiro (1983) on the role of firm reputation to reflect both collective and firm-specific 
reputation in competitive markets. The objective of this essay is twofold. First, it aims to 
understand how the alternative IP instruments used for geographically-differentiated 
products (e.g., trademarks, sui generis certification) can alter the degree of the 
informational problem and the efficiency in markets with asymmetric information 
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regarding food quality. Second, it attempts to provide policy recommendations 
concerning the IP instruments for geographically-differentiated products. Our model 
yields two primary results. First, in markets with asymmetric information and moral 
hazard problems, credible certification schemes reduce the cost of establishing reputation 
and lead to welfare gains compared to a situation in which only private trademarks are 
available. Hence, certification improves the ability of reputation to operate as a 
mechanism for assuring quality. Second, the actual design of the certification scheme 
plays an important role in mitigating informational problems. From a policy perspective, 
with regard to the instrument of choice to provide IP protection for GI products, the 
model favors a sui generis scheme based on appellations over certification marks.  
The second essay (Chapter 4) consists of an empirical investigation of consumers’ 
preferences for food products with geographical origin labels. This is the first 
investigation of how North American consumers perceive European GIs with different 
degrees of geographical differentiation. I investigate whether consumers recognize and 
value the informational content of a variety of nested geographical origin labels. In 
particular, this study disentangles and assesses three types of geographical origin labels 
with different levels of geographical differentiation: country-of-origin labels and two 
types of GIs, protected designations of origin (PDO) and protected geographical 
indications (PGI). Consumer data indicates that, within the context of a high quality 
value-added commodity such as extra virgin olive oil, consumers’ willingness to pay for 
oils from different countries varies, ceteris paribus, across countries, and that within a 
country consumers have a greater willingness to pay for GI-labeled than non-GI labeled 
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products. I also find evidence that consumers have a greater willingness to pay for PDO-
labeled than non-PDO labeled products. 
The third essay (Chapter 5) represents the first formal analysis of the open 
economy implications of IP protection for GIs. Specifically, the aim of this essay is to 
shed light on the current controversy over GIs among WTO members by investigating the 
incentives of GI-exporting and GI-importing countries to strengthen the current TRIPS 
provisions for GIs. This essay contributes to fill the void left by existing literature on GIs 
which exclusively focuses on the specific case in which GIs are either afforded full IP 
protection or no protection at all. This essay shifts the emphasis to the “strength” of IP 
protection by allowing for intermediate (or partial) degrees of IP protection. It is precisely 
this generalization that facilitates an analysis of the ongoing WTO debate on GIs that 
primarily focuses on how much protection to provide to GIs (rather than on whether or 
not to provide protection at all).  
This essay complements and adds to existing studies in this area by considering 
the role of promotion in expanding market demand when consumers lack information 
regarding either the existence or the features of the GI and GI-like products. Specifically, 
I analyze how the strength of IP protection afforded to GIs in international markets 
affects the incentives of producers to provide information to consumers and, in turn, how 
it affects the distribution of welfare among producer groups and consumers, and across 
international markets. The main findings are as follows. Countries that are net-exporters 
of GIs would benefit from a strengthening of current GI provisions. Stronger IP 
provisions for GIs, in fact, favor the ability of GI producers and their associations to 
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extract rents from the presence of scarce factors owned by producers within the GI area. 
GI-importing countries, on the other hand, stand to lose from a strengthening of current 
IP provisions. The model shows that, for importing countries, the majority of the gains 
from IP protection for GIs are achieved by granting a minimum level of protection that 
provides sufficient incentives to induce GI producers to export. Finally, the analysis also 
shows that domestic consumers in GI-importing countries might have little to gain from a 
further strengthening of current GI policies, especially when the domestic sector has 
limited market power. 
 
1.2 Dissertation organization 
The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides background information 
about GIs, a review of the institutional framework and a brief review of the economic 
literature on GIs. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 include three separate and self-contained essays. All 
the background information, institutional framework and literature review that is relevant 
for the specific question addressed by each essay is included in the respective chapter. 
Inevitably, some of the material discussed in chapter 2 is duplicated in the chapters that 
follow. Chapter 5 summarizes some general conclusions.   
 
1.3 References 
Josling T. (2006) “The War on Terroir: Geographical Indications as a Transatlantic Trade 
Conflict” Journal of Agricultural Economics 57:337-363.  
 
Shapiro C. (1983) “Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations” The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(4):659-680. 
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CHAPTER 2: INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Historical overview of GIs 
In this section, I provide an overview of the evolution of the concept of GIs from the 
earlier days to 1994, when GIs received international recognition as a distinct form of 
intellectual property (IP) with the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS). The most rudimental, and historically the first form of GIs 
consisted of a word, a phrase or a symbol used to indicate the geographical origin of a 
good. As early as the Middle Ages, so-called guild marks were used to indicate the 
geographical location of products, such as Murano glass from the island of Murano near 
Venice (Merges 2004). 
 The first laws protecting GIs, introduced in France, Portugal and Tuscany, date 
back to the 14th and 15th centuries (Oskary 2006). These first laws, meant to prevent 
misrepresentation of the geographical origin of goods, paved the way for the 
development of today laws against unfair competition and “passing off.” 
 A first step in the evolution of the concept of GIs into what today are known as 
appellations of origin (AOs) took place in France during the Phyllossera outbreak of the 
19th century (WIPO 2001). At that time, to protect wine producers from the regions of 
Bordeaux and Champagne from fraudulent competition from low quality wines, the 
French government enacted laws delimiting the areas in which Bordeaux and Champagne 
wines could be produced. No quality requirements were included in these first laws 
(WIPO 2001). France saw the official birth of the concept of AO as a form of collective 
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IP in 1919, when it became possible for producers to register geographic names as AOs 
(O’Connnor 2004). But, it is only with the introduction of the system of Controlled 
Appellations of Origin (AOC) for wines and spirits in 1935 that the concept of AOs was 
fully developed. The AOC, in fact, introduced specific quality and production 
requirements for AOs, a feature that is critical for the concept of AO. Such quality and 
production requirements are supervised by the French National Institution of 
Appellations of Origin for Wines and Spirits (O’Connnor 2004). Over time, similar 
systems were introduced in other Roman law countries for wines and other products 
including cheese (OECD 2000).  
The aforementioned French laws from the 1900s played a major role in shaping 
the features of the GI system that is currently in use in the European Union. In the 
common law jurisdictions (Australia, Canada, the United States), instead, the protection 
of GIs has evolved together with the laws against unfair competition. In these 
jurisdictions, GIs are primarily protected in the form of certification or collective marks 
under trademark law (OECD 2000; WIPO 2001). 
Internationally, the earlier attempts to protect GIs date back to the end of the 19th 
century, when the following multilateral agreements were signed: the Paris Convention 
for the Protection of Industrial Property (hereafter Paris Convention), the Madrid 
Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications of Source on Goods 
(hereafter Madrid Agreement) and the Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of 
Appellations of Origin (hereafter Lisbon Agreement). 
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The Paris Convention (signed in 1883) is one of the first treaties on IP and, with 
over 170 contracting members, one of the most widely adopted treaties. This treaty 
prohibits the importation of goods with “direct or indirect use of a false indication of the 
source of the goods or the identity of the producer, manufacturer or merchant.” Whereas 
the original text of the Paris Convention has a limited scope, successive revisions extend 
the prohibition of all false indications of source and appellations of origin (independently 
of the concomitant use of false trade names) (WIPO 2007).  
Remarkably, the Paris Convention applies to false indications of source but not to 
indications that are merely misleading. Protection against “deceptive” indications of 
source, (i.e., indications that are literally true but nevertheless misleading), was later 
introduced with the Madrid Agreement in 1891 (WIPO 2007). Limited membership 
(originally signed by 8 countries, today it counts 35 members), however, makes the 
Madrid Agreement of little practical significance (WIPO 2007). With the Madrid 
Agreement, whether a given indication is misleading is determined in the country in 
which protection is sought (i.e., according to the principle of “territoriality”). Finally, the 
“products of vine” are given special protection. Specifically, article 4 prohibits member 
countries from treating GIs related to wines as “generic.”  
The Lisbon Agreement (1958) extends the concept of AOs to international 
markets. For the purpose of the Lisbon Agreement, AOs are defined as names of a 
country, region, or locality, which designate the quality or characteristics that are 
“exclusively or essentially due to the geographical environment, including natural and 
human factors.” The Lisbon Agreement facilitates the attainment of protection in 
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international markets (e.g., one single registration procedure suffices to receive protection 
of a given AO in all member countries), but, unlike the Paris and Madrid treaties, the 
Lisbon Agreement restricts protection to one class of GIs, AOs only.  
Though restricted to AOs, the protection offered by the Lisbon Agreement goes 
beyond that provided by previous treaties (WIPO 2007). First, it expands protection 
against any imitation, even when the true origin of the product is indicated, when the 
appellation is used in translation or is accompanied qualifiers such as “kind,” “type,” 
“imitation” etc. (Art.3). Second, it extends the protection against “genericization” (earlier 
reserved by the Madrid Agreement to wines) to all types of products. Finally, it requires 
the phase out of existing trademarks conflicting with more recently registered GIs (Art. 
5(6)).  
As for the Madrid Agreement, a major limitation of the Lisbon Agreement is the 
limited membership. Currently, the Lisbon Agreement counts 26 signatories, including 
several but not all European Union's member countries (Italy, France, Portugal, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary).  
The next opportunity that presented itself to GI advocates to extend protection to 
a much larger number of countries occurred in the early 1980s, when the United States 
started to push for a multilateral trade round that included intellectual properties. In that 
occasion, the European Union and Switzerland pushed for and obtained the presence of 
GIs on the multilateral trade round agenda (Josling 2006). 
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2.2 Terminology 
The terminology used in the economics and legal literature on GIs is rich and diverse. As 
is becoming increasingly common in the economics literature, in this dissertation I use 
the expression “geographical indications” (or GIs for short) to refer to any type of 
geographically-based indications. Furthermore, only when relevant to distinguish 
between different “types” of GIs, I will use more specific terminology (e.g., appellation, 
PDO, PGI etc). 
Consistently with existing literature and “technical” documentation on GIs, I will 
use the expression “appellations” (as opposed to marks) to distinguish the GIs protected 
under a sui generis European-style GI system from the GIs protected under the trademark 
system. In what follows, I list the most important types of geographically-based 
indications and report their official definitions.  
 
Indication of source 
An indication of source is understood as an indication referring to a country, or a place in 
a country, as being the origin of a product. A formal definition does not exist, but this 
terminology is used in both the Paris and the Madrid Agreement. An indication of source 
merely refers to the geographical origin and does not imply the presence of any 
characteristic, quality or reputation about the good (WIPO 2007). The most common 
example of an indication of source is “Made in country x.” 
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Appellation of origin 
The Lisbon Agreement defines appellations of origin as the “geographical name of a 
country, region, or locality, which serves to designate a product originating therein, the 
quality and characteristics of which are due exclusively or essentially to the geographical 
environment, including natural and human factors.” Examples of Appellations of Origin 
registered under the Lisbon Agreement are “Bordeaux” for wine, “Noix de Grenoble” for 
nuts and “Tequila” for spirit drinks (WIPO 2007). The concept of appellation of origin is 
virtually identical to that of protected designations of origin (PDO). 
 
Protected designation of origin 
Protected designations of origin are one of the two types of GIs protected within the 
framework of the European Union’s system through regulation 510/2006. Art. 2(1)a of 
regulation 510/2006 defines a PDO as “the name of a region, a specific place or, in 
exceptional cases, a country, used to describe an agricultural product or a foodstuff 
originating in that region, specific place or country, the quality or characteristics of which 
are essentially or exclusively due to a particular geographical environment with its 
inherent natural and human factors, and the production, processing and preparation of 
which take place in the defined geographical area.” 
 
Protected geographical indication  
Protected geographical indications (PGI) are the second type of GIs protected within the 
European Union’s framework. Art. 2(1)b of regulation 510/2006 defines a PGI as “the 
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name of a region, a specific place or, in exceptional cases, a country, used to describe an 
agricultural product or a foodstuff originating in that region, specific place or country, 
and which possesses a specific quality, reputation or other characteristics attributable to 
that geographical origin, and the production and/or processing and/or preparation of 
which take place in the defined geographical area.” As conveyed by the definition, the 
link between quality and geography characterizing a PGI is weaker than the link 
characterizing a PDO. 
 
Geographical indications 
The most recent international definition of GIs is given by the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights of 1994 which defines geographical 
indications as “...indications which identify a good as originating in the territory of a 
Member [of the World Trade Organization], or a region or locality in that territory, where 
a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to 
its geographical origin.” This definition encompasses AO, PDO and PGI. 
 
2.3 Domestic framework for the protection of GIs 
GIs can be protected with a variety of legal concepts which originated over time in 
different legal traditions and are characterized by different implications regarding 
conditions, scope and entitlement to protection (Oskary 2006). Two similar yet distinct 
legal notions, appellations of origin and marks, are considered the main tools used to 
protect GIs (OECD 2000). The primary difference between the two forms of protection is 
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that in order for a GI to qualify for protection as an appellation, evidence must be 
provided that there exists a special tie between the characteristics of the product and its 
geographical origin, while in the case of a mark no such relation is needed. Appellations 
of origin have historically been used in the Roman law countries (France, Italy, Spain, 
and Portugal) and more recently in the European Union, while marks have been utilized 
in the Common law countries (Australia, Canada, and the United States) (OECD 2000). 
 
2.3.1 Sui generis system of appellations 
Protection of GIs has a long tradition in some European countries with a history dating 
back to the nineteenth century. In 1992, as a component of the Common Agricultural 
Policy reform initiative, the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EEC) 2081/92 
(hereafter regulation 2081/92) which establishes for all member countries a harmonized 
system of protection of GIs for agricultural products and foodstuffs (but excludes wines 
and spirits). The European system of protection of GIs is often referred to in the literature 
as the sui generis GI system. 
The aim of regulation 2081/92 is to support and bolster the development of 
agricultural and food products, whose quality derives from a geographical origin or from 
a traditional method of production, by enabling differentiation through geographical 
labels. In 2006, regulation 2018/92 was replaced by Council Regulation (EC) 510/2006 
(hereafter regulation 510/2006). Whereas the two regulations, 2081/92 and 510/2006, are 
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similar in their essence, regulation 2081/92 was replaced because not in compliance with 
some of the provisions of the TRIPS agreement.1 
Regulation 510/2006 distinguishes between two types of GIs, protected 
designations of origin (PDO) and protected geographical indications (PGI). The 
distinction between the two types of GIs is based upon how closely a product is linked to 
a specific geographical area of origin (Art. 2). Of the two types, protection under a PDO 
mandates the more stringent association between a product attributes and the geographic 
environment. To be eligible for protection as a PDO, a product must meet the following 
two conditions: (1) the quality or characteristics of the product must be essentially or 
exclusively due to the natural and human factors (e.g. climate, soil quality, local 
production knowledge) characterizing the geographical area or origin and (2) the entire 
production process, including the production and processing of raw materials, must occur 
within the defined geographical area of origin.  In contrast, the less restrictive form of 
GIs, PGI, merely require a portion of a designated product’s characteristics and 
production be attributable and occur within the specific geographical area (Art. 2). In the 
literature, PDO and PGI are generally referred to as appellations. 
                                                 
1
 Regulation 510/2006 modifies regulation 2081/92 without changing the essence. 
Modifications, introduced to comply with the TRIPS agreements, concern (1) the 
abrogation of the “reciprocity principle” and (2) simplification of the bureaucratic 
procedure for application. With regard to the reciprocity principle, regulation 2081/92 
was applicable to agricultural products from third party countries only on the condition 
that the third party country would accord same protection as offered by the European 
Community to corresponding EU products. Regulation 510/2006 abolishes this 
requirement. The bureaucratic simplifications introduced by Regulation 510/2006 regard 
(1) the introduction of a unique document for application which includes all key 
information (which will therefore be accessible more promptly for opposition), (2) the 
possibility offered to third party countries to apply for registration and to pursue 
opposition against the registration of a certain GI directly to the Commission.  
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 According to the regulation 510/2006, protection can be obtained by an 
association of producers and/or processors working with the same agricultural product or 
foodstuff. To obtain protection, the association, which can also include other actors in the 
supply chain, must initiate and manage the application process for registration (Art. 5). 
The application process requires the submission of a code of rules, commonly referred to 
in the literature as the specifications, which define the requisites that the product must 
meet to bear the geographical label, including all the characteristics of the product, the 
production method and the geographical area of production (Art. 5). The code of rule is 
typically the result of negotiations among the actors in the supply chain under the 
supervision of national or regional authorities, and is subject to approval of national and 
European Union’s institutions (Belletti et al., 2005). In addition to submitting detailed 
information regarding the code of rules, the association seeking protection must designate 
a third-party inspection body in charge of certification and inspection along the entire 
supply chain (Art. 4). Certification and inspection activities are meant to ensure that 
products carrying PDO or PGI labels comply with specifications. 
Whereas differentiation of products through labeling is relevant and beneficial for 
consumers due to the information asymmetry that exists between consumers and 
producers, a label is effective only if consumers perceive the information embodied by 
the label to be true. Independent inspection envisioned by the European regulation, is 
crucial for ensuring that the information conveyed via labeling is verifiable and gives 
credibility to the GIs system. For each product, the inspection activities are defined in a 
control plan, an operational document that describes the entire control system (Belletti et 
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al. 2005). Either a designated inspection authority or an approved private body can be 
appointed as inspection bodies as long as they comply with certain requirements set forth 
by the regulator including a guarantee of objectivity, impartiality, expertise, and 
sufficient financial resources as stipulated in the UNI CEI EN 45011 international 
standards (Art. 10).  
It is critical to note that once a product is registered, all producers within the 
geographical region who comply with the product specifications, regardless of whether 
they are a member of the association that originally applied for the registration, are 
entitled to use the PDO or PGI label on their product (Art. 8).  
Wine and spirits are excluded from regulation 510/2006 and, until recently, while 
the Common Market Organization for wine of the European Union only provided a 
generic common framework for protection, Member States were largely autonomous in 
determining how to classify their respective wines. This led to a proliferation of different 
GI labels and GI classifications for wines within the Union. The recent reform of the 
Common Market Organization for wine (Regulation (EU) 479/2008) in April of 2008 
achieved harmonization of all GI-labels in the European Union, and now also wines with 
geographical indications are classifies as PDOs or PGIs. 
Over the past few years several Asian, North and Latin America’s countries have 
introduced sui generis GI systems (WIPO 2007b).2  
 
 
                                                 
2
 Including China, Mongolia, Thailand, the Republic of Korea, Vietnam, Colombia, 
Venezuela, Cuba, Costa Rica among others. 
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2.3.2 Certification marks 
Where a sui generis system of protection for GIs does not exist, the trademark system 
provides the legal framework for the protection of GIs. In the United States, certification 
marks, individual and collective marks can be used to protect GIs, both domestic and 
foreign (OECD 2000). Whereas appellations are specifically meant to certify the origin of 
a product, certification marks can be used to certify any aspect of a good or service 
(OECD 2000). For example, certification marks can be used to certify quality, mode of 
manufacture and the origin of the product. Certification marks differ substantially from 
appellations. First, certification marks are privately owned whereas appellations are not. 
Second, differently from appellations, certification marks do not require the existence of 
any special tie between the quality of the products and its geographical origin. It is up to 
the owner of the certification mark to establish what characteristics of the product are 
certified, including (if desired) the existence of a special tie between the quality of a 
product and its geographical origin. Finally, as for the sui generis system, the product that 
is labeled with a certification mark is subject to inspection. Inspection activities are in the 
case of a certification mark the responsibility of the mark’s owner and not of a third party 
inspection body (USPTO 2007). Independence between producer and inspector is 
nevertheless maintained because the owner of the mark does not directly conduct 
industrial or commercial activity in the specific product but rather concedes the use of the 
mark to independent producers.  
Where GIs are protected through marks, protection is based on the law of unfair 
competition. Essentially, the use of a GI on products originating outside of the relevant 
  
 
19
area is regarded as an act of passing off, i.e., as in the case of trademark infringement, as 
an attempt to capitalize on the goodwill and/or reputation of some other producers. 
 
2.4 International framework for the protection of GIs 
Whereas GIs play a relevant economic role in the agricultural sector of several EU 
member countries and Switzerland, in other counties including the United States, 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada and New Zealand, the presence of domestic GIs is 
sporadic (with the exception of wines) and few of the GIs are of real economic 
significance. This difference in the relative importance of GIs across countries has 
contributes to create a divergence across countries with regard to their interest in 
strengthening the IP provisions for GIs in international markets.  
The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations and the signing of the Agreement on 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in 1994 represent an 
important milestone for the protection of GIs internationally.  The TRIPS agreement is of 
great importance for GIs, not only because GIs were recognized as a distinct form of IP, 
but above all because TRIPS transformed GIs into a multilateral issue (Josling 2006). The 
provisions of TRIPS, in fact, apply to all WTO members (today 149 member countries). 
This resolves the low participation problem that plagued the Madrid and Lisbon 
Agreements. Moreover, TRIPS's provisions are supported by the dispute-resolution 
mechanisms of the WTO, which represents the currently available most effective way to 
enforcing rules internationally.  
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TRIPS builds on earlier IP treaties and sets minimum requirements for protection of IP, 
including GIs. Compared to the Lisbon Agreement, TRIPS protects a broader class of 
GIs. But, the level of protection guaranteed by TRIPS is not as extensive as that provided 
by the Lisbon Agreement and not all provisions included in the Lisbon Agreement were 
incorporated in TRIPS.  
For the purpose of the TRIPS Agreement GIs are defined as “…indications which 
identify a good as originating in the territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that 
territory, where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is 
essentially attributable to its geographical origin.” For TRIPS, a GI can be any word or 
phrase, not necessarily a geographical name, or even a symbol, that identifies a product 
with its geographic origin. In addition, according to the TRIPS definition, for a product to 
qualify as a GI, it is sufficient that a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the 
good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin. With AOs, instead, reputation is 
not a sufficient condition for a product to be considered a GI. AOs require that quality 
and other characteristics of the product are exclusively or essentially due to its 
geographical origin. 
TRIPS maintains the Madrid Agreement’ dichotomy between the level of IP 
protection reserved to wines and to all other products. A minimum level of protection is 
provided for all products, while additional protection is reserved for wines and spirits. 
For all products, TRIPS prohibits the use of false or misleading indications, as well as 
any use of such indications which represents an act of unfair competition in the meaning 
of Article 10bis of the Paris Convention. The additional protection reserved for wines and 
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spirits is independent of whether or not consumers are misled or confused by the use of 
geographical indications on goods that originate outside the area indicated by the GI. 
WTO member countries must provide the legal means to interested parties to prevent the 
use of a GI on products not originating in the place indicated by the geographical 
indication, even where (1) the true origin of the goods is indicated, (2) the geographical 
indication is used in translation or (3) is accompanied by expressions such as “imitation,” 
“kind,” “style,” “type” (Art. 23.1). The additional level of protection for wines and spirits 
also include two additional elements: (a) Members must refuse or invalidate the 
registration of trademarks for wines or spirits which contain or consist of geographical 
indications (Art. 23.2); and (b) Members are committed to “enter into negotiations aimed 
at increasing the protection of individual geographical indication” (Art. 24.1). 
For wines only (but not spirits), articles 23.3 and 23.4 provide additional 
protection. Article 23.3 mandates that, in the case of homonymous indications, each 
geographical indication needs to be protected. Finally, article 23.4 calls for the 
introduction of a multilateral system of notification and registration of geographical 
indications for wines eligible for protection in all countries participating in the system. 
The introduction of such a notification and registration system is part of the unresolved 
debate on GIs and an issue, as is explained later, that has created intense disagreement 
among countries. 
The protection of GIs is subject to exceptions as defined in article 24. 
Specifically, member countries are exempted from protecting GIs that (1) are not 
protected in the GI's country of origin, (2) have become generic in their own markets, (3) 
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have been in use or registered in good faith as trademarks before a conflicting GI was 
granted protection. Finally, a critical feature of the TRIPS agreement is that, whereas it 
mandates that all member countries ought to provide legal means to prevent the use of 
GIs from unauthorized parties, it does not specify the form or tools that a country should 
use for protection.  
 
2.5 Current debate on GIs  
Whereas the signing of the TRIPS agreement represents a success for GI advocates and 
for the protection of GIs, several issues remain to be addressed. The TRIPS agreement 
itself has a built-in agenda that commits members to “enter into negotiations aimed at 
increasing the protection of individual geographical indication” (Art. 24.1) and calls for 
discussion over the introduction of a multilateral system of notification and registration of 
geographical indications for wines (Art. 23.4).  
With regard to the system of notification and registration, two main proposals 
have been put forward. The European Union’s proposal calls for a system with voluntary 
membership and compulsory notification (i.e. countries that choose to participate must 
notify all the GIs protected in their own jurisdiction) and a legally binding effect (i.e., the 
registration of a GI implies that the term is protected in the WTO members). The United 
States supports a voluntary system (i.e., voluntary participation and voluntary 
notification) based on the creation of an international data base used for consultation 
purposes. 
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Besides the issues included in the TRIPS, the European Union is pushing its own 
agenda. In particular, the European Union is promoting GIs in two directions. First, the 
European Union supports the extension of the “additional level” of protection currently 
reserved for wines to all products. If the additional protection were granted to all 
products, the use of geographical indications on products originating outside the 
geographic area would be prohibited independently of whether or not consumers are 
confused or mislead as regard to the origin of the good. This could have significant 
consequences for GI producers because it would eliminate the need to provide evidence 
that competing products or imitations actually confuse the public in order to receive 
protection.   
The other major issue supported by the European Union regards the (several) 
European GIs that are exempt from protection in the framework of the TRIPS agreement. 
Exemption stems from the fact that these GIs have, over time, become generic in foreign 
markets. Familiar examples are parmesan for the Italian Parmigiano-Reggiano, feta for 
the Greek Feta cheese or champagne, which in the Unites States generically refers to 
sparkling wines. With regard to this issue, the European Union has put forward a request, 
known as “claw-back”, to reserve 41 geographical indications that are either generic 
terms or trade marks outside the Union for the exclusive use of EU's producers. This list 
includes Bordeaux, Chablis, Champagne, Chianti, Grappa, Asiago, Feta, Gorgonzola, 
Parmigiano-Reggiano, Prosciutto di Parma and Prosciutto San Daniele. 
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2.5.1 System of notification and registration 
One of the most controversial topics of debate in the TRIPS Council under the Doha 
mandate on international protection of GIs regards the introduction of a multilateral 
system of notification and registration for wines and spirits (hereafter “system”). This is 
part of the built-in agenda of the TRIPS agreement. Article 23.4 mandates that, in order 
to facilitate GI protection, negotiations should take place within the TRIPS Council 
regarding the introduction of a multilateral system of notification and registration for 
wines. Three proposals have been put forward so far.  
In 2005, the EU, together with Switzerland and a number of other European 
Countries and Sri Lanka, presented a proposal that calls for an amendment of the TRIPS 
agreement to include a compulsory system of notification and registration with voluntary 
membership (WTO 2005). This means that a country can elect to participate in the 
system (i.e., voluntary participation), and that all participating countries must notify (i.e., 
provide a list of) all the GIs protected in their own jurisdiction (i.e., compulsory 
notification). 
Another group of countries, lead by the United States and including Canada, 
Australia, Argentina, Japan, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, EL 
Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, New Zealand and Chinese Taipei, proposed a voluntary 
system (i.e., voluntary participation and voluntary notification) in which notified GIs 
would be registered in a freely accessible database meant for consultation purposes 
(WTO 2008). Concretely, with the US proposal WTO members would have the option to 
“look up” a list of all GIs currently protected in other countries during the process of 
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granting protection to a trademark or a GI in their own jurisdiction. Based on the US 
proposal, countries are free to choose to notify or not to notify any GI. A third proposal, 
presented by Hong Kong and China, consists of a compromise between the European and 
American proposal (WTO 2003). 
Even though with the EU proposal the eligibility requirements for registration of a 
GI are substantively the same as those currently imposed by TRIPS, the system proposed 
by the EU would shift the burden of the application procedure from the party that seeks 
protection to the party that grants protection (Goebel 2003). A single notification would 
suffice to receive protection for a GIs in all WTO member countries. It would be up to 
each of the other WTO members to lodge a reservation (within an 18-month timeline) 
against those GIs that do not satisfy the eligibility conditions in their own jurisdiction.  
 
2.5.2 Claw back and bilateral agreements 
The claw-back issue has been pushed by the European Union through bilateral 
agreements. The European Union has requested the phasing out of the generic use of GIs 
in exchange for concessions related to improved market access. Such agreements have 
been signed between the European Union and Australia in 1993, between the European 
Union and Canada in 2003, and between the European Union and the United States in 
2005. From Canada, the European Union has obtained the phase out of the use as generic 
or semi-generic terms of all the wines included in the claw-back list. From the United 
States, the European Union has obtained a phase out of some European wine names that 
are currently considered semi-generics in the American market. In exchange the 
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European Union pledged to recognize US wine-making practices, facilitating access of 
US wines in the European market. 
 
2.6 Related economics literature 
A standard economic justification for the desirability of food labeling relates to the 
presence of market failures associated with the supply of high-quality goods in markets 
with asymmetric information. If producers of the good in question are unable to credibly 
signal the quality of their products, the predicament of Akerlof’s (1970) lemons problem 
leads to pooling equilibria with lowered quality and reduced size (e.g., only low-quality 
goods might be transacted).  
The presence of information asymmetries is common in agricultural markets 
where product characteristics, including overall quality, are often not ascertainable by 
consumers prior to purchase and/or after consumption. This is particularly true for 
differentiated agricultural products such as GIs that are to a large degree experience and 
credence goods (Nelson 1970; Darby and Karni 1973). With regard to GIs, it is presumed 
that some quality attributes of interest to consumers are linked to the specific geographic 
origin of the good and/or particular production methods used in that region, and that such 
attributes cannot be determined through inspection by the consumer prior to purchase the 
good or even after consumption. Since quality is typically costly to produce, in addition 
to the adverse selection issue described by Akerlof (1970), the market for GIs is also 
characterized by moral hazard problems. As in the case of adverse selection, market 
failures are typically characterized by suboptimal provisions of quality.  
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These types of market failures related to adverse selection and/or moral hazard 
can be ameliorated if firms develop reputation for quality. The notion of reputation in 
markets in the presence of moral hazard has been developed by Shapiro (1983). In 
Shapiro’s model, an initial investment via the production of a high-quality product is 
necessary for a seller to gain reputation and, during the investment period, the product is 
sold at no more than cost. Once gained, reputation persists until the firm cheats by cutting 
its quality. In this context reputation plays the role of an implicit contract between the 
reputable firm and its customers. The former agrees to provide the promised quality and 
the latter agree to pay for quality.  
Brand names, specifically private trademarks, are tools commonly used by firms 
to convey reputation to consumers. When trademarks are credible, consumers easily 
identify products with respect to the source, learn to expect a given quality from a given 
source and, at the same time, have a tool to retaliate against firms if quality does not meet 
expectations. GIs work in a way similar to trademarks by conveying information about a 
firm’s reputation. However, while a trademark identifies a single entity as the source of a 
product, a GI identifies the source only up to a group of producers. A GI, and hence its 
reputation, is in fact shared by many firms. As is the case with other common resources, 
each single producer in the group has the private incentive to free ride on the group 
reputation by supplying a quality below the average quality of the group.  
Winfree and McCluskey (2005) illustrate this point by considering the quality 
choice of a profit maximizing firm operating in an industry with a fixed number of 
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identical firms (and no entry or exit) that shares a common reputation.3 Winfree and 
McCluskey show that the quality provided in a steady-state symmetric equilibrium is 
below the quality that is Pareto optimal for the industry (i.e., the monopolist profit-
maximizing quality). Winfree and McCluskey also find that the larger the industry, the 
lower the quality provided in equilibrium. 
The free riding problem described by Winfree and McCluskey can be partially 
alleviated by introducing minimum quality standards, a feature that also plays an 
important role for GIs. With the European style sui generis GI system, the identification 
of quality standards is a prerequisite for a product to be eligible for protection as a GI. 
The US system instead does not require the definition of minimum quality standards. In 
the United States, where GIs are protected primarily as certification marks, the only 
attribute subject to certification is the origin of the good.4 This leaves ground for free 
riding, as illustrated by the Washington Apples example provided by Winfree and 
McCluskey.5 Vidalia Onions represent another example. Until 2002, the location of 
production was the only requirement on producers for use of the Vidalia Onion mark. 
                                                 
3
 In their model, collective reputation, which determines the position of the demand 
curve, evolves as a Markovian process of average past quality. 
 
4
 The patent office does not scrutinize applications based on the characteristics to be 
certified. When a certification mark includes a geographic name it is understood that the 
only attribute to be certified is the origin of the good (“…the USPTO does not care what 
the certification standards are…,” Hughes 2003 p. 16). 
 
5
 The “Washington Apple” logo only signal origin and does not reflect specific quality or 
production standard or “eating quality.” (Winfree and McCluskey 2005 p.212). 
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Only after 2002, as a provision of the Federal Marketing Order, a minimum quality 
standard was put in place (Clemens 2002).6   
To properly function, trademark- and GI-systems must be credible, i.e., 
counterfeiting must be avoided or contained. If such systems are not credible, free riders 
can, at negligible costs, duplicate reputable brands and profit, at least in the short run, on 
consumers’ willingness to pay for the extra-quality expected from the authentic product. 
When consumers learn that brands are not credible their willingness to pay drops. Hence, 
when brands are copied, their informational content and social value vanish (Landes and 
Posner 2003)  
The fact that reputable brands sell at a premium above costs also provides the ex 
ante incentives for firms to invest in reputation in much the same way as profits 
originating from the monopolistic control of innovations provide the ex ante incentives 
for firms to invest in R&D. But contrary to innovations, whose social benefit is not 
destroyed by unauthorized copies, the social value of trademarks is lost when trademarks 
are copied. This is why, contrary to other IP instruments such as patents which have an 
expiration date, trademarks are guaranteed protection until they fulfill the purpose of 
communicating the source of the product to consumers. The same holds true for GIs. 
Anania and Nisticó (2004) study the effect of a non-fully credible certification on 
the welfare of price-taking producers. Producers are exogenously divided into high and 
low quality types. The certification mechanism that Anania and Nisticó envision, based 
                                                 
6
 U.S. #1 grade, size, pack and maturity standards. 
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on an inspection probability and a fine and with an error-free auditing procedure,7 is not 
fully credible because it allows some of the low quality good to be sold on the high 
quality market. If the degree of credibility is sufficiently high, a market for the high 
quality good develops, otherwise it does not. Low-quality producers, who differ in their 
attitude towards risk, choose whether to cheat (i.e., sell their low quality product on the 
high quality market) or not to cheat (i.e., sell their low quality product on the low quality 
market). With this setup, while high quality producers would be better off with a fully 
credible certification mechanism, low quality producers are better off with an imperfect 
system. Given an imperfect system, low quality producers who cheat are better off when 
a market for high quality good develops, while low quality producers that do not cheat 
are indifferent. 
Whereas it is clear that GIs are non-rival, are GIs also excludable? Granted that 
producers outside the geographic area and producers that do not meet the certification 
standards can be prevented from using a GI, can complying producers be prevented from 
using a GI? In the literature, GIs have been treated as public goods and club goods. This 
second interpretation has been discussed in Rangnekar (2004) and Langinier and 
Babcock (2006). In Langinier and Babcock, the government provides a GI-certification 
scheme to high quality producers who are free to decide the size of the club (i.e., who 
among the high quality producers have access to it).8 Once established, the club prevents 
                                                 
7
 An error free certification mechanism means that the quality of the goods produced by 
inspected firms becomes known with certainty. 
 
8
 As in Anania and Nisticó (2004), the critical underlying assumption is the exogenous 
distribution of producers in high and low quality types. 
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entry of other producers whenever potential entrants decrease the net return to the club’s 
members. The club provides certification for the high quality produced by its members, 
so quality produced by the members of the club is revealed to consumers. But, if only a 
fraction of the high quality producers can enter the club, consumers cannot determine the 
quality of the non-labeled good with certainty. Without barriers, all high quality 
producers have the incentive to enter the club (quality would then be fully revealed), but, 
if all high quality producers belong to the club, the incentive to form a club may vanish. 
If a club is not formed, no revelation of information occurs.9 The ability of the producer 
organization (i.e., the club) to limit entry is crucial in Langinier and Babcock, who 
suggest that it might be better from society point of view to provide the club the authority 
to limit access to certification.  
The welfare implications of a variety of types of producer organizations in charge 
of GIs are investigated in Lence et al. (2007). The types of organizations they consider 
differ in their ability to control the amount of land allocated to and the production 
practices used in the production of a GI, and include the benchmark cases of a monopoly 
and perfect competition. Their welfare analysis shows that, conditional on the high 
quality market to develop (i.e., conditional on the organization to be developed), the 
closer the organization is to the competitive condition, the larger the increase in social 
welfare due to the creation of the high quality market. Nevertheless, the type of 
organization that, ex ante, maximizes social welfare depends on the size of the fixed cost 
                                                 
9
 Producers in the club compete in a Cournot game, given the cost of certification, they 
may be better off by not entering the club. 
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needed to develop the organization.10  Specifically, Lence et al. find that there exists a 
non empty set of fixed development costs for which: (1) a perfectly competitive 
organization does not yield gains in social welfare, (2) any producer organization with 
market power yields at least as much social surplus as the perfectly competitive 
organization and (3) there exists an organization with market power that yields strictly 
greater social surplus than the perfectly competitive organization. 
But, what is the legal environment that characterizes real-word GIs? What power 
do producer organizations representing GIs have over restricting the supply of GIs? 
Cooperatives and producer organizations have historically been created to stabilize 
market conditions and attenuate the negatives effects brought about by the fragmentation 
of the agricultural sector (Belletti et al. 2005; Crespi and Sexton 2003). In Europe, 
producer associations in charge of “geographically differentiated agricultural products” 
have existed long before the introduction of the European regulations on GIs. 
Traditionally, such associations have carried out a wide variety of activities ranging from 
promotion of the product to the provision of technical support to their membership. In 
addition, such associations have also played a role in protecting their products from 
imitation and (unfair) competition, as well as in monitoring and controlling the quality 
standards of production (Giacinti and Moruzzo 2003).  
With the introduction of the European regulation on GIs, producer organizations 
not only have lost their authority over the inspection activities (which have been assigned 
                                                 
10
 Profits are necessary to cover the fixed cost of development hence some degree of 
market power is necessary to provide the ex ante incentive for the creation of the 
organization. 
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to independent bodies), but also, in exchange for the legal protection provided by the 
regulation on GIs, have given up their property rights over the protected name (Giacinti, 
Moruzzo 2003; VIII Rapporto Nomisma 2001). Today, the role of the producer 
organizations in charge of GIs is limited to the custody of the collective brand, whose use 
is granted to all entitled producers, member and outsiders (Giacinti and Moruzzo 2003).  
The right to enter the market for GIs is guaranteed to all producers operating in 
the GI area by current GI regulations. The European regulation on PDOs and PGIs 
mandates that all producers in a specified area who comply with the associated product 
specifications are authorized to use the GI (Art. 8 regulation 510/2006). Similarly, the 
system of protection in the US requires that the owner of a certification mark make it 
available to any producer willing to adhere to the production.  
With free entry and no ability by the producer organizations to control supply, the 
likely market structure that emerges with GIs is that of competitive conditions. A welfare 
analysis of GIs by Zago and Pick (2004) shows that in competitive conditions, a credible 
certification system makes consumers and high quality producers better off. Their 
assumption of an exogenous distribution of high and low quality producers drives the 
result that low quality producers are worse off in the presence of a certification system 
compared to the case in which only one market exists in which high and low quality are 
indiscernible by consumers. With only one market, low quality producers can take 
advantage of consumer willingness to pay for the average quality in the market. 
Moschini, Menapace and Pick (2008) by contrast allow the supply of quality to be 
endogenously determined. In addition, their model assumes that certification costs are 
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needed for GIs to serve as credible certification devices. They find that GIs can support a 
competitive provision of quality that partly overcomes the market failure and leads to 
clear welfare gains.  However, GIs fall short of delivering the (constrained) first-best 
level of the high-quality good. The main beneficiaries of the welfare gains brought about 
by GIs are consumers, whereas producers may not benefit at all or may accrue some 
benefit if the production of high-quality products draws on scarce factors that they own. 
 
2.7 References 
Akerlof G.A. (1970) “The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism” Quarterly Journal of Economics 84:488-500. 
 
Anania G. and Nisticò R. (2004) “Public Regulation as a Substitute for Trust in Quality 
Food Markets: What if the Trust Substitute cannot be Fully Trusted?” Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics 160:681-701. 
 
Battaglene T. (2005) “The Australian Wine Industry Position on Geographical 
Indications” Paper presented at the Worldwide Symposium on Geographical 
Indications in Parma, Italy, June 27-29. 
 
Belletti G., T. Burgassi, A. Marescotti, S. Scaramuzzi. (2005) “The effects of certification 
costs on the success of a PDO/PGI” paper presented at 92nd EAAE Seminar 
“Quality Management and Quality Assurance in Food Chains” Goettingen, 
Germany. 
 
Barham E. (2003) “Translating Terroir: The Global Challenge of French AOC 
Labelling,” Journal of Rural Studies 19:127-138. 
 
Clemens R. (2002) “Why Can’t Vidalia Onion Be Grown in Iowa? Developing a Branded 
Agricultural Product” MATRIC Briefing Paper 02-MBF, September 2002. 
 
Crespi J.M. and R.J. Sexton (2003) “Competition, US Farmer Cooperatives and 
Marketing Orders,” English translation of “Concurrence, coopératives de 
producteurs et Marketing Orders aux Etats-Unis” Économie Rurale 
(277/278):135-151. 
 
  
 
35
Darby M. R. and E. Karni (1973) “Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud” 
Journal of Law and Economics 16:67-88. 
 
EU-DG Agriculture (2008) “Geographical Indications” Background Paper to the Green 
Paper on Agricultural Product Quality, DG Agriculture and Rural Development, 
Working Document October 2008. 
 
Giacinti R. and R. Moruzzo (2003) “I Consorzi di tutela e il sistema di controllo 
nell'ambito delle produzioni tipiche” Annali Della Facoltà di Medicina 
Veterinaria di Pisa 55:327-341. 
 
Goebel B. (2003) “Geographic Indications and Trademarks - The Road from Doha” The 
Trademark Reporter 93:964-95. Retrieved November, 29 2008 at 
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/2005/geo_pmf/presentations/pdf/wipo_geo_pmf
_05_goebel.pdf. 
 
Josling T. (2006) “The War on Terroir: Geographical Indications as a Transatlantic Trade 
Conflict” Journal of Agricultural Economics 57:337-363. 
 
Landes W. M. and R.A. Posner (2003) “The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property 
Law” Cambridge The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
 
Langinier C. and B. Babcock (2008) “Agricultural Production Clubs: Welfare 
Implications” Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization 6(1), 
Article 10. 
 
Lence S.H., S. Marette, D. Hayes and W. Foster (2007) “Collective Marketing 
Arrangements for Geographically Differentiated Agricultural Products: Welfare 
Impacts and Policy Implications” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
89:947-963.  
 
Merges R. (2004) “From Medieval Guilds to Open Source Software: Informal Norms, 
Appropriability Institutions and Innovations” Working Paper, UC Berkeley. 
 
Moschini GC. (2004) “Intellectual Property Rights and the World Trade Organization: 
Retrospect and Prospects,” in Anania, G., Bohman, M., Carter, C., and McCalla, 
A., eds., Agricultural Policy Reform and the WTO: Where are we Heading? 
Edward Elgar Publishing. 
 
Moschini GC., L. Menapace and D. Pick (2008) “Geographical Indications and the 
Provision of Quality” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 90(3):794-
812. 
 
  
 
36
Nelson P. (1974) “Advertising as information” Journal of Political Economy 82, 729-
754. 
 
Nomisma (2001) “Prodotti tipici e sviluppo locale: Il ruolo delle produzioni di qualità nel 
futuro dell’agricoltura italiana,” VIII Rapporto Nomisma sull’agricoltura italiana, 
Edizioni Il Sole 24 ore, Milano, Italy. 
 
Oskari R. (2006) “Monopolising Names? The Protection of Geographical Indications in 
the European Community” Dissertation, Faculty of Law, Helsinki University. 
 
O’Connor B. (2004) “The Law of Geographical Indications,” Cameron May Ltd., 
International Law Publishers, London, England. 
 
OECD (2000) Appellations of Origin and Geographical Indication in OECD Member 
Countries: Economic and Legal Implications, 
COM/AGR/APM/TD/WP(2000)15/FINAL. 
 
Rangnekar D. (2004) “The Socio-Economics of Geographical Indications” UNCTAD-
ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No. 8, May 
2004. 
 
Réquillart V. (2007) “On the Economics of Geographical Indications in the EU” Paper 
presented at the workshop “Geographical Indications, Country of Origin and 
Collective Brands: Firm Strategies and Public Policies” Toulouse, June 14-15, 
2007. 
 
Shapiro C. (1983) “Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations” The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(4):659-680. 
 
USPTO (2007) “Geographical Indication Protection in the United States,” United States 
Patent and Trademark Office, undated document accessed on May 2008 at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/globalip/pdf/gi_system.pdf. 
 
Winfree J.A. and J.J. McCluskey (2005) “Collective Reputation and Quality” American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 87(1):206-213. 
 
Zago, M.A. and D. Pick (2004) “Labeling Policies in Food Markets: Private Incentives, 
Public Intervention, and Welfare Effects” Journal of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics 29(1):150-165. 
 
U.S. International Trade Commission (1984) The Effects of Foreign Product 
Counterfeiting on U.S. Industry, USITC Publication No. 1479. 
 
  
 
37
WIPO (2000) Possible solutions for conflicts between trademarks and geographical 
indications and for conflicts between homonymous geographical indications, 
SCT/5/3, WIPO 2000. 
 
WIPO (2001) Geographical Indications: Historical Background, Nature of Rights, 
Existing Systems for Protection and Obtaining Effective Protection in Other 
Countries, SCT/6/3, WIPO 2001. 
 
WIPO (2003) Geographical Indications and International Trade, Worldwide Symposium 
on Geographical Indications, WIPO/GEO/SFO/03/14, WIPO 2003. 
 
WIPO (2007) Geographical Indications in the International Arena, the Current Situation, 
WIPO/GEO/BEI/07/7, WIPO 2007. 
 
WIPO (2007b) Perspectives for Geographical Indications. WIPO/GEO/BEI/07/13, WIPO 
2007. 
 
WTO (2003) Multilateral system of notification and registration of Geographical 
Indications under article 23.4 of the TRIPS agreement. Communication from 
Hong Kong, China. TN/IP/W/8 of 23 April 2003. 
 
WTO (2005) Communication from the European Communities TN/IP/W/11 of 14 June 
2005. 
 
WTO (2008) Proposed draft trips council decision on the establishment of a multilateral 
system of notification and registration of geographical indications for wines and 
spirits TN/IP/W/10/Rev.2 of 24 July 2008. 
  
 
38
CHAPTER 3:  QUALITY CERTIFICATION BY GEOGRAPHICAL 
INDICATIONS, TRADEMARKS AND FIRM REPUTATION 
 
3.1 Abstract 
We study firm reputation as a mechanism to assure product quality in perfectly 
competitive markets in a context in which both certification and trademarks are available. 
Shapiro’s (1983) model of reputation is extended to reflect both collective and firm-
specific reputations, and this framework is used to study certification and trademarks for 
food products with a regional identity, known as geographical indications (GIs). Our 
model yields two primary results. First, in markets with asymmetric information and 
moral hazard problems, credible certification schemes reduce the cost of establishing 
reputation and lead to welfare gains compared to a situation in which only private 
trademarks are available. Hence, certification improves the ability of reputation to 
operate as a mechanism for assuring quality. Second, the actual design of the certification 
scheme plays an important role in mitigating informational problems. From a policy 
perspective, our results have implications for the current debate and negotiations on GIs 
at the World Trade Organization and the ongoing product quality policy reform within 
the European Union. With regard to the instrument of choice to provide intellectual 
property protection for GIs, our model favors a sui generis scheme based on appellations 
over certification marks. Finally, our model supports the validity of the traditional 
specialities guaranteed scheme of the European Union as an instrument for the provision 
of high-quality products that are not linked to a geographic area.  
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3.2 Introduction 
The strand of literature sparked by the pioneering work of Shapiro (1983) on the role of 
firm reputation offers a possible solution to the market failure identified by Akerlof 
(1970) in settings characterized by asymmetric information and moral hazard problems. 
When firms identify themselves to consumers through trademarks, product quality can be 
credibly signaled to consumers who cannot observe it at the time of purchase. The 
emergence of this information about quality is achieved in competitive markets through 
an equilibrium price structure that provides the necessary incentives for competitive firms 
to develop and maintain reputation for producing a given quality. This literature also 
shows that reputation is an imperfect mechanism to assure quality and that high-quality 
items can only be provided at a premium above production costs. The size of the 
premium increases with the degree of the informational problem, which, in turn, depends 
upon the frequency of purchase, the delay and difficulty in detecting quality and the 
speed at which reputations are updated. More importantly for our purpose, the extent of 
the informational problem can be affected by the availability of tools for reputation 
building (e.g., trademarks, certification). 
In this paper we extend the theory of firm reputation as a mechanism to assure 
quality in competitive markets to a context in which both certification and trademarks are 
available to firms as quality indicators. The primary motivation of this paper is to show 
that, in such markets with asymmetric product quality information, credible certification 
schemes that are accessible by all firms or subsets of the firm population support the 
creation of information regarding quality, reduce the cost of establishing reputation and 
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lead to welfare gains. The reputation approach to the problem of moral hazard also draws 
attention to the fact that the design of certification schemes is important in determining 
the extent of informational problems and the distribution of benefits among 
heterogeneous consumers. 
For concreteness, our model is specifically tailored to markets for food products 
with a regional identity. For these products, the geographic names of the location of 
production, known as geographical indications (GIs), represent an option for branding. 
GIs, like trademarks, are a form of intellectual property rights, and were introduced in 
1994 with the TRIPS agreement of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The markets 
for GIs are befitting for several reasons. First, given the abundance and importance of 
experience and credence attributes among food products, these markets are fraught with 
asymmetric information and moral hazard problems (Winfree and McCluskey 2005). 
Second, these markets are typically characterized by the presence of numerous 
autonomous firms that make independent business decisions and retain their own profits, 
but share a geographic brand and act in competitive conditions (Fishman et al. 2008; 
Moschini, Menapace and Pick 2008). Third, the use of formal certifications for this 
category of products is common in many large export markets including the European 
Union (EU) and growing in popularity in emerging markets and developing economies 
(EU 2008; WIPO 2007). Fourth, the concurrent use of certification and trademarks for 
branding these products is also common (Bramley and Kirsten 2007).  
GIs have recently attracted the interest of academics in economics, marketing, law 
and sociology. In particular, a growing economics literature has assessed the role of GIs 
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as a certification tool in alleviating market failures due to the presence of asymmetric 
information when quality cannot be credibly signaled otherwise (Zago and Pick 2004; 
Anania and Nisticó 2004; Lence et al. 2007; Moschini, Menapace and Pick 2008). In this 
paper, we assess the role of GIs when quality can alternatively be sustained through 
trademarks, and consider GIs and trademarks as alternative and complementary means 
for signaling quality. We expand the existing literature on GIs in several ways. First, we 
explicitly incorporate the role of reputation and hence consider a dynamic rather than a 
static setting. Critically, we shift the focus from considering a generic certification 
scheme for GIs that allows for the emergence of a high-quality market in which a single 
product is considered in isolation, to the design of a certification scheme that applies to a 
broadly defined type of product available under many different private and collective 
brands and potentially supplied from many different GI regions.  
The model we propose in this paper relies on Shapiro’s (1983) notion of 
reputation, which we extend to reflect both collective and firm-specific reputations in 
competitive markets. Specifically, an initial investment via the production of high-quality 
product is necessary for a firm to gain private reputation. Collective reputation is 
obtained through certification and is determined by the conditions required for 
certification (e.g., minimum quality, production technology, etc.). In equilibrium, quality 
in excess of the minimum commands a premium above marginal costs, which, as in 
Shapiro, represents a fair return on the private investment in reputation. In this setting, 
certification reduces the cost of building reputation by constraining the moral hazard 
behavior of producers. 
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Our model can differentiate the two primary certification schemes currently used 
for GIs, the European-style sui generis scheme based on appellations and the American-
style scheme based on certification marks, and allows us to investigate the potential of 
the EU’s traditional specialities guaranteed scheme (EU 2009a). These schemes differ 
substantially with regard to (i) the eligibility conditions for geographic names to receive 
intellectual property (IP) protection and (ii) the requirements for certification. In a 
second-best world with asymmetric information, these differences are relevant because 
they affect the collective reputation of certified products and hence the cost of providing 
quality.  
Several instructive aspects of the role of certification in quality provision and 
reputation formation emerge from the model. First, we show that certification reduces the 
divergence between the reputation equilibrium and the equilibrium that would prevail 
under perfect information by lowering the cost of establishing reputation compared to a 
situation with only trademarks. Hence, certification improves the ability of reputation to 
operate as a mechanism for assuring quality. Second, we provide a motivation for 
industry resistance to the introduction of certification. Surprisingly we find that resistance 
from producers is not limited to those that are excluded from the certification but can also 
arise from those producers that are eligible for certification but already sell high-quality 
product when certification is introduced. This is because certification raises the price that 
entrants can command thereby reducing the cost of building and the value of established 
reputation. 
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In addition, our model has interesting implications for the current debate and 
negotiations over alternative forms of IP protection for GIs at the WTO and the ongoing 
consultations on product quality policy reform within the European Union. First, we 
provide a rationale to favor a sui generis scheme based on appellations over standard 
instruments such as certification marks. We show that this is the case even if the current 
certification mark system were to be adapted to include a screening based on the presence 
of a demonstrable quality/geography nexus similar to that used for appellations. Second, 
our model discusses the potential welfare gains associated with the traditional specialities 
guaranteed scheme, a scheme for traditional products used in the European Union, whose 
validity is currently being assessed by the EU Commission (EU 2009b). Such a scheme, 
based exclusively on quality (rather than on geographical) requirements, provides 
certification for products that meet given quality standards independently of the location 
of production. 
In what follows, we first provide a review of the institutional setting for GIs and 
then introduce the model and the reputation formation mechanism. Next, we define and 
derive a long-run, rational-expectation, stationary Nash equilibrium under three different 
IP scenarios characterized by (i) the absence of a certification scheme, (ii) the presence of 
a sui generis certification scheme and (iii) the presence of a certification mark scheme. In 
the last part of the paper, we discuss domestic and trade welfare implications and explore 
the traditional specialities guaranteed scheme. 
 
 
  
 
44
3.3 Institutional framework 
Geographical indications, which are typically names of places or regions used to brand 
goods, are a distinct form of intellectual property rights. Many GIs pertain to wines (e.g., 
Burgundy), agricultural products (e.g., Thai Hom Mali rice) and foods (e.g., Parmigiano-
Reggiano cheese), but also non-food products (e.g., handicrafts and textiles) are common, 
particularly from developing countries (e.g., Mysore silk).1 The distinctive feature of GIs 
is that the quality attributes of the goods they identify are considered to be inherently 
linked to the nature of the geographic location in which production takes place (e.g., 
climate conditions, soil composition, local knowledge), i.e., to the notion of “terroir” 
(Barham 2003; Josling 2006).2 
GIs are considered one of the earliest instruments used to counteract market 
failures resulting from asymmetric information (Rangnekar 2004) and their protection has 
a long tradition in Europe dating back to the fifteenth century (O’Connor 2004). 
However, following the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy reform in 1992, which moved 
EU policies progressively away from price supports towards programs to promote food 
quality and rural development, GIs have taken center stage as the “main pillar of the EU’s 
quality policy on agricultural products” (EU 2003). Following their recognition as a 
distinct form of intellectual property rights in the TRIPS agreement, GIs have also 
                                                 
1
 Other agricultural products not intended for human consumption are ornamental plants, 
flowers, cork, hay, cochineal, wool, wicker and essential oils. 
 
2
 See the definition of GIs in the TRIPS agreement (Article 22.1).  
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received significant international attention outside of the EU (Moschini 2004). In 
particular, significant interest in GIs has emerged recently among developing countries.3  
As for other types of brands (e.g., trademarks), the ability of GIs to alleviate 
market failures due to the presence of asymmetric information rests on their credibility, 
thus necessitating IP protection. While trademark protection is well established and 
relatively harmonized across countries, the protection of GIs varies to a large degree, and 
its implementation is a question of intense disagreement in ongoing WTO negotiations. 
The TRIPS agreement requires countries to provide legal means for protecting GIs 
against unfair competition, but it does not specify the means by which protection should 
be provided.  
Two primary legal notions, marks and appellations, essentially two alternative 
forms of certification, are used to protect GIs. Where marks are used, generally in 
common law countries including the United States, GIs are protected within the 
trademark system and are usually registered as certification marks.4 Certification marks 
simply certify that products meet given conditions and, in the case of GIs, the only such 
condition is the geographic area of production. It is critical to emphasize that the right to 
                                                 
3For example, several countries are introducing or expanding their own GI laws, 
regulations and promotion programs including China (Xiaobing and Kireeva 2007), India 
(Rao 2006), South Korea (Suh and MacPherson 2007), and Colombia (Teuber 2010). 
Noteworthy is the Kenian-Swiss ongoing project aimed at establishing a functioning GI 
protection scheme in Kenya and at raising awareness on GIs in the East African 
Community member states (see the Swiss Institute of Intellectual Property’s website at 
https://www.ige.ch/en.html).  
 
4
 In the United States, certification marks used for GIs are registered with the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office. 
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use a certification mark is collective in nature. In the case of a GI in the form of a 
certification mark, all producers that operate within the geographic area indicated by the 
GI have access to certification and can use (subject to obtaining certification) the GI to 
label their products. In contrast, usage rights over trademarks are private and belong to a 
single entity or firm. Only under special circumstances, specifically when a geographic 
term has acquired a “secondary meaning,” can a GI be registered as a trademark.5 When 
this is the case the rights over the GI are private and belong to a single entity or firm. 
Alternatively, GIs are protected through so-called sui generis schemes based on 
appellations, originally developed and used in Roman law countries, and currently 
adopted in the European Union (OECD 2000), several Asian and a few North American 
and Latin American countries6 (WIPO 2007). The main distinctive characteristic of a sui 
generis scheme is the requirement of a specific link between a good’s qualities and its 
geographical origin. In other words, for a geographic name that identifies a given good to 
be eligible to receive IP protection in the form of an appellation, evidence must be 
provided that the quality or characteristics of the good are due to the natural and human 
factors (e.g., climate, soil quality, local knowledge) characterizing the geographic area of 
origin (EU Reg. 510/2006 Art. 2 and Art. 4.2.f). This requirement for appellations rests 
on the notion of “terroir,” the idea that the nature and characteristics of the geographic 
                                                 
5
 This means that when the “secondary meaning” of a geographic name in consumers’ 
minds is a production or manufacturing source (while the primary meaning is the 
geographic place), then it is possible under US trademark law to register a geographic 
name as a trademark, a private rather than collective IP right (USPTO 2007). 
 
6
 These include China, Mongolia, North Korea, Thailand, Vietnam, Colombia, 
Venezuela, Cuba and Costa Rica. 
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location of production are responsible for the goods’ distinct quality attributes of interest 
to consumers. 
In addition to the existence of a specific quality/geography link, the sui generis 
scheme requires the definition of a code of rules for each GI product (commonly referred 
to in the literature as the specification). The specification details all the product 
characteristics7 and the geographic area of production, and effectively mandates two 
conditions: (i) a minimum level of quality that the product needs to satisfy, and (ii) the 
geographic area in which production takes place (EU Reg. 510/2006 Art. 4).  
The US system for GIs based on certification marks, by contrast, does not require 
the existence of any link between quality and geography – in fact the patent office does 
not scrutinize certification mark applications based on the characteristics to be certified or 
require the definition of quality standards. Indeed, when a certification mark includes a 
geographic name it is understood that the only attribute to be certified is the origin of the 
good (USPTO 2007). 
Finally, with the sui generis scheme, usage rights over a GI are granted to all 
producers within a designated production area who comply with the product specification 
(EU Reg. 510/2006 Art. 8).  Hence, GIs, whether in the form of certification marks or 
appellations, are a collective form of property rights (i.e., collective brands). 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 The product characteristics include the physical, chemical, microbiological and 
organoleptic characteristics of the raw materials and of the final product. 
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3.4 Model 
Our model can be characterized as a dynamic discrete time model with a period-between-
sales interest rate of 0.r >  We consider the market for an experience good (e.g., 
parmesan cheese, sparkling wine, dry-cured ham) that can be produced in a continuum of 
qualities indexed by .q +∈ℝ  We assume that all products in the market are subject to a 
minimum quality standard (MQS), 0 0,q >  which can be interpreted as the minimum 
quality necessary to ensure consumer safety and sanitary conditions. The MQS is 
enforced. 
We assume that there are two types of production areas, the GI regions and the 
other regions, and that each single region is identified by a distinctive name. Two 
different production technologies exist: the GI technology and the standard technology. 
The GI technology is available in each of the GI regions but not in the other regions, the 
standard technology is only available in the other regions. The technologies, represented 
by the cost functions ( )Gc q  and ( )c q  respectively, satisfy standard assumptions. 
Specifically, ( )Gc q  and ( ),c q
 
are assumed to be continuous, (strictly) increasing and 
(strictly) convex functions of quality, .q  Hence, ( ) 0,qc q >
 
( ) 0,qqc q >
 
( ) 0,Gqc q >
 
and 
( ) 0.Gqqc q >
 
Furthermore, we assume that the GI technology displays a comparative 
advantage in the production of the upper-end of the quality spectrum, .q q> ɶ  Specifically, 
 
for all  ,    ( ) ( ),
for all  ,    ( ) ( ),
G
G
q q c q c q
q q c q c q
≤ ≥
> <
ɶ
ɶ
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where qɶ  is such that ( ) ( ).Gc q c q=ɶ ɶ  The comparative advantage assumption is intended to 
capture the notion of “terroir,” the fact that the nature and characteristics of the 
conditions of production in the GI regions facilitate the attainment of quality. 
Specifically, we assume that the comparative advantage in the high-quality range confers 
the GI regions the quality/geography nexus that is necessary for eligibility to receive IP 
protection under a sui generis scheme.  
We assume that all producers are price-takers and that the industry (both the 
standard and the GI-certified product sectors) is characterized by free entry. The role of 
competitive markets and free entry into the GI sector has been discussed by Moschini, 
Menapace and Pick (2008), and we refer the reader to their paper for additional details. 
While for simplicity, we assume that each active firm produces a fixed quantity of output 
per period, normalized to unity, we let each firm choose a sequence of qualities to 
maximize the present value of profits.8 
 
3.4.1 Branding options: trademarks and GI labels 
In addition to choosing quality, producers use brands to differentiate their products from 
those of other producers. A brand
 
can be a trademark, a mix of a trademark and a GI label 
or a GI label. A GI label takes the form of an appellation or a certification mark 
                                                 
8
 By fixing the size of the firm, we abstract from the issues regarding the presence of 
economies or diseconomies of scale in establishing reputation. The issue of economies of 
scale in establishing collective reputation has been addressed in a recent working paper 
by Fishman et al. 2008. The relationship between firm size, investment in quality and 
individual brand reputation is investigated by Choi (1997), Cabral (2000) and Rob and 
Fishman (2005). 
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depending upon whether a sui generis scheme or a certification mark scheme is in place. 
Trademarks and mixed brands (i.e., combinations of a trademark and a GI label) are used 
to convey firm-specific reputations. GI labels alone convey collective reputations. We 
assume that each producer can, at any time, adopt and use a trademark at no cost and that 
there is an infinite supply of potential trademark names. Instead, to be able to use a GI 
label, a producer needs to obtain certification.  
Whether a producer is able to obtain certification depends upon two sets of 
conditions – accessibility of certification and the certification requirements – which vary 
across certification schemes. We say that producers in a given area have access to 
certification when they have the right to register the geographic name of their production 
area as a GI. With regard to accessibility we consider two options: schemes that require 
the existence of a quality/geography nexus and schemes that do not. Schemes that require 
the existence of a quality/geography nexus (e.g., the sui generis scheme) limit 
accessibility to certification to producers that operate in a GI region (by definition, GI 
regions are characterized by the GI technology and the quality/geography nexus). 
Schemes that do not require the existence of a quality/geography nexus (e.g., the 
certification marks scheme) make certification available to producers in all regions. 
Once a geographic name is registered, the right to use it to brand a given product 
is conditional on the product meeting the scheme’s certification requirements. We 
consider two requirements: a location of production and an MQS requirement. To satisfy 
the location of production requirement, a product needs to be produced in the geographic 
area corresponding to the GI label. In other words, GI labels must be truthful with regard 
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to the geographic origin of the good. To satisfy the MQS requirement, a product needs to 
meet a GI-specific MQS, 0 .Gq  We assume that 0Gq  is scheme specific, meaning that it can 
vary across different schemes but is the same for all GI labels registered under the same 
scheme, and is such that 0 0 .
Gq q≥
 This last assumption means that the minimum quality 
standard imposed by a GI scheme is at least as strict as the baseline standard that applies 
to all products. 
Consistent with the collective nature of GI rights, we assume that all producers 
that satisfy the certification requirements for a given GI are entitled, subject to paying the 
certification cost, to use the GI to brand their products. A GI label can be used in addition 
to, or in place of, a trademark. We assume the per-period, per-unit certification cost to be 
the same across all considered schemes and to be equal to .ω  Finally, we postulate an 
economy with a fully credible trademark system and a fully credible certification scheme 
for GIs (i.e., there is no counterfeit product on the market and all certified products meet 
the requirements established by the certification scheme). 
 
3.4.2 Reputation and information structure 
In the economic literature on branding, the ability of sellers to develop a reputation rests 
on the ability of brands to convey information regarding the firm’s actions or 
characteristics (or both). Consumers, who at the time of purchase cannot observe product 
quality but observe brands, rely for their purchase decisions on the firms’ reputations 
captured by their brands. In the literature on the economics of information, the concept of 
reputation is formalized in various ways depending upon the source of the uncertainty 
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regarding quality (Bar-Isaac and Tadelis 2008). When quality uncertainty is due to 
unobservable characteristics (markets primarily characterized by adverse selection 
problems), reputation is commonly modeled as consumer beliefs regarding a firm’s type 
and is assumed to evolve based on signals (e.g., the firm’s performance). When, as in our 
case, the uncertainty regarding quality is primarily due to unobservable actions (markets 
characterized by moral hazard problems), reputation is conceptualized as a firm’s past 
quality, and a “good” reputation is assumed to persist until the firm cheats by cutting its 
quality. The latter notion of reputation is based on the seminal papers of Klein and Leffler 
(1981) and Shapiro (1983).  
For convenience, we adopt the simplest form of reputation building proposed by 
Shapiro (1983). Specifically, we assume that firms acquire reputation by selling high 
quality product at low prices over one period of time. We assume that reputation, ,R  is 
common knowledge among all consumers in a given market, is market-specific,9 brand-
specific, and adjusts immediately from period to period. Hence, for a brand k
 
at time t , 
 1.
k k
t tR q −=  (1) 
In our context, a brand k
 
can be a trademark, a mix of a trademark and a GI label or a GI 
label. Consumers identify products of different firms through brands and make purchase 
decisions based on the firms’ reputations for quality as conveyed by the brands. 
Consumers are rational and have full information about technologies, MQSs, and the 
other parameters of the model but cannot observe quality. In addition, consumers cannot 
observe which technology was used, the location of production or brand ownership.  
                                                 
9
 This assumption is relevant for the discussion of the trade implications of GI protection. 
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Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their taste for quality but consider 
brands of like quality to be perfect substitutes.10 We assume that there is a continuum of 
consumer types, [0 , ],θ θ∈  with distribution ( ).F θ  Consistent with previous literature, we 
assume that consumers purchase the quality that provides the highest positive surplus, 
and otherwise buy nothing, where the surplus from purchasing quality q  at price ( )p q  for 
a consumer of type θ  is given by 
 ( ; ) ( ).U q p qθ −  
We make the following standard assumptions regarding consumers: (i) consumers value 
quality; (ii) the marginal utility of quality is decreasing; (iii) consumers with higher taste 
for quality (higher values of θ ) value quality more; and (iv) the marginal utility of quality 
is larger for consumers with higher values of θ . Mathematically, we have 0,qU >
 
0,qqU <
 
0,Uθ >  and 0.qUθ >
 
Because consumers cannot observe quality at the time of 
purchase and rely on reputation, which evolves according to equation (1), producers can 
surprise consumers (for one period) with a lower quality than expected. Such a quality 
cut is discovered by consumers with a one-period delay, and consumers punish the seller 
by boycotting the brand thereafter (Allen 1984).11 
 
                                                 
10
 It is taste heterogeneity with regard to quality that supports a range of different 
qualities exchanged in equilibrium. We recognize that some consumers might value the 
very fact that a product is produced in a specific geographic area independently of the 
actual quality of the product. For simplicity, our model only considers consumer 
preferences over quality. 
 
11
 Because brand ownership is not observable to consumers, a producer that has cheated 
and has lost all his customers could re-enter the market using a different brand. 
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3.5 Long-run partial equilibrium  
We consider a rational-expectation, stationary Nash equilibrium in a long-run partial 
equilibrium setting.12 Specifically, the reputation equilibrium we consider is a steady 
state configuration with a price function across qualities, ( )p q , and a distribution of firms, 
( )n q , such that (i) each consumer, knowing ( )p q , chooses his most preferred quality level 
or decides not to purchase anything; (ii) markets clear at every level of quality (thus 
determining ( )n q ); (iii) any firm with reputation R  finds it optimal to produce quality 
q R=
 rather than to deviate; and (iv) there is no entry or exit. 
We focus on the case in which land and all other factors of production are in 
perfectly elastic supply and derive the price-quality schedule relying on cost 
considerations (because in a long-run equilibrium with perfectly elastic factor supplies, 
output prices are determined exclusively by costs) and basic assumptions regarding 
consumer preferences: (i) consumers are indifferent between products of equal quality; 
(ii) utility is strictly increasing in quality and strictly decreasing in the price paid for 
quality; and (iii) consumers have heterogeneous preferences regarding quality.13 We 
believe that the assumption of perfectly elastic factor supply is justifiable in the context 
of markets for food and agricultural products that are broadly defined (e.g., extra virgin 
olive oil, wine). In these markets, we observe the presence of many private brands and 
                                                 
12
 Consumer expectations of quality are adaptive but rational in equilibrium: consumers 
expect firms to maintain their reputation and firms do. 
 
13
 Assumptions (i) and (ii) rule out “irrelevant” price-quality combinations. Assumption 
(iii) supports a range of different qualities to be exchanged in equilibrium. 
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numerous GI labels from a variety of geographical areas (for example, in the European 
Union over one hundred GIs for extra virgin olive oil and several thousand GIs for wines 
are currently registered).14  
In what follows, we consider three IP scenarios and, for each scenario, we derive 
the equilibrium market price-quality schedule. The first scenario, our benchmark case, is 
one in which trademarks are the only branding option. In the second and third scenarios, 
we consider two alternative certification schemes for GIs, the sui generis scheme based 
on appellations and the certification mark scheme respectively.  
 
3.5.1 The benchmark case with trademarks only 
In this section, we derive the equilibrium market price-quality schedule when, absent a 
certification scheme, trademarks are the only available branding option for producers. 
First, consider a representative firm that uses the standard technology and whose 
reputation in equilibrium is equal to q . If this firm remains honest, it earns a discounted 
profit equal to 1 ( ) ( )r
r
p q c q+ −   , while, if it cheats, the most profitable avenue is to cut 
quality to the minimum level thereby earning a one-period profit equal to 0( ) ( ).p q c q−  
The credibility constraint, which determines the range of prices at which a producer has 
no incentive to cheat, can therefore be written as  
 
0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .p q c q r c q c q≥ + −  
 
                                                 
14
 See the DOOR and E-BACCUS databases on the EU’s website at 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/database/index_en.htm and  
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/markets/wine/e-bacchus/.  
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As in Shapiro (1983), we argue that the presence of a potentially infinite supply of fly-by-
night sellers who could overrun the market with minimum quality and the fact that 
consumers know that product quality is at least equal to the minimum level, 0 ,q  imply 
that the entry price for a new brand, ,ep  is equal to the cost of producing minimum 
quality, 0( ).c q  Hence, 0( ).ep c q=  In equilibrium, a potential entrant incurs a sure loss 
equal to 0( ) ( )c q c q−  in the entry period when the brand is still unknown and earns a profit 
equal to ( ) ( )p q c q−  in any subsequent period. Free entry, which requires discounted 
profits of potential new brands to be non-positive, 10( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0rc q c q p q c q− + − ≤   , imposes 
a second restriction on the equilibrium price configuration, which can be written as  
 
0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .p q c q r c q c q≤ + −  
 
Together the credibility constraint and the free-entry condition imply an equilibrium 
price-quality schedule for producers who use the standard technology equal to 
 0 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( )      for .A q c q r c q c q q q≡ + − ≥    (2) 
Similar conditions can be derived for producers who use the GI technology. 
Given that the technology of production is undetectable for consumers, and that the cost 
of in-house production of minimum quality using the GI technology exceeds the cost of 
outsourcing production to firms that use the standard technology,
 
0 0( ) ( ),
Gc q c q>
 the most 
profitable cheating option for these producers is outsourcing at a cost equal to 0( ).c q  The 
credibility constraint for producers who use the GI technology is then equal to 
   
0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
G Gp q c q r c q c q ≥ + −
 
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Being unable to detect the technology of production, consumers are willing to pay 0( )c q  
for any reputationless brand independently of the actual technology used. The free entry 
condition for producers who use the GI technology is then equal to 
   
0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
G Gp q c q r c q c q ≤ + −
 
 
Hence, the credibility constraint and the free-entry condition for producers who use the 
GI technology imply an equilibrium price-quality schedule equal to  
  0 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( )      for .
G GN q c q r c q c q q q ≡ + − ≥
 
          (3) 
Because consumers are indifferent between products of equal quality (hence, they would 
purchase only brands with the lowest price for any given quality), and given that 
consumer utility is strictly increasing in quality (hence, consumers purchase only brands 
with the highest quality at any given price), from (2) and (3), the market price-quality 
schedule that prevails in equilibrium – absent a GI scheme – is 
   
0( ),      for [ , )( )
( ),      for 
A q q q q
P q
N q q q
 ∈
≡  ≥
ɶ
ɶ
                      
(4) 
where qɶ
 
is the quality level that separates the comparative advantage ranges of the two 
technologies. The market schedule, ( ),P q  is represented in Figure 1 by the bold curve. 
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Figure 1. Market price-quality schedule with trademarks only 
 
3.5.2 The sui generis certification scheme based on appellations 
Three features (the geographic/quality nexus, the product specification and the collective 
nature) characterize the sui generis scheme and distinguish GI labels (i.e., here 
appellations) from trademarks. First, eligibility for registration and protection of a 
geographic name as an appellation requires a demonstrable link between the 
characteristics of a specific geographic region and the quality attributes of the product. 
No such nexus between geography and quality is required for registration and protection 
of a trademark. In our setup, only the names of the GI regions, identified through GI 
logos,15 receive IP protection with the sui generis scheme. Hence, only producers that use 
the GI technology have access to certification. 
                                                 
15
 While trademarks are identified by the ® or the TM symbols, appellations with the 
EU’s sui generis scheme are identified by GI-specific logos that are available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/logos/index_en.htm. 
qɶ
Nc
Gc
0q q
A
  
 
59
Second, the sui generis scheme requires the establishment of the product 
specification that includes two certification requirements: a GI-specific MQS and a 
location of production requirement. Hence, all GI certified product must be of quality 
equal to or in excess of 0
Gq
 
and must have been produced in the area identified by the GI 
label.16  
Third, usage rights over a GI label are granted to all producers within the GI area 
who meet the MQS requirement. Hence, when a sui generis certification scheme is in 
place, all firms using the GI technology that produce a quality equal to or in excess of 0
Gq
 
can certify their product at a per-period cost ω  and can use the GI label corresponding to 
their area of production for branding. These firms can also elect to use a trademark in 
addition to the GI label. Whether or not an additional trademark is used, the cost of 
producing and certifying quality 0
Gq q≥  is equal to ( ) .Gc q ω+  
The derivation of the equilibrium price-quality schedule for producers who certify 
requires discussing the entry price that consumers are willing to pay for a new GI-
certified product, and the best cheating option for producers. By a “new GI-certified 
product” we mean any product that is sold on the market with a pure GI label (i.e., 
                                                 
16
 In a setup like ours in which all GI regions are characterized by the same GI 
technology and in which consumers care about quality but have no preference over origin 
per se, the presence of a location of production requirement does not generate additional 
information compared to the case of a scheme that conditions eligibility to the existence 
of a quality/geography nexus and is characterized by an MQS requirement alone. 
Nevertheless, the distinction between the eligibility condition and the location of 
production requirement is important to meaningfully discuss the welfare properties of 
alternative certification schemes that are used or that could be used for food products. 
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without a trademark) or with a mixed brand (i.e., a GI label and a trademark) when the 
trademark is unknown to consumers.17   
First, we argue that the entry price for a new GI-certified product is 0( ) .
G Gc q ω+
 
To this end, we note that consumers know that a GI-certified product is produced using 
the GI technology and is of quality at least 0 .
Gq
 Consumers also know that the quality 
produced by an entrant who certifies and wants to stay in business must be such that the 
entrant’s brand is (at least weakly) preferred over alternative brands of equal quality once 
reputation is built and, hence, that the quality must be above a given threshold.18 Given 
these pieces of information, a new GI-certified product represents a bargain at a price 
0( ) .
G Gc q ω+
 
At the same time, any price above 0( )
G Gc q ω+
 
would attract fly-by-night 
producers into the market hence, it is assumed that consumers protect themselves from 
such potential suppliers by refusing to pay more than 0( ) .
G Gc q ω+
 
Second, we note that the presence of certification limits the cheating options for 
producers. Once a mixed brand is known to consumers to be GI-certified, the firm must 
continue certifying the product; otherwise consumers would anticipate that the firm is 
                                                 
17
 Any GI-certified product that is sold without a trademark is expected from consumers 
to be of quality 0 .
Gq
 
To build reputation in excess of 0 ,
Gq
 
the use of a trademark in 
addition to a GI label is needed. 
 
18
 As explained below, the quality must be at least { }0 ˆmin ,Gq q q≥   where qˆ
 
is defined as 
the quality at which (5) and (2) intersect. 
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cheating.19 Conditional on certifying, the most profitable cheating avenue is to produce 
minimum quality 0
Gq
 
at cost 0( ) .
G Gc q ω+
 Based on these considerations regarding the 
entry price and the best cheating option, we conclude that the price-quality schedule for 
producers who certify is equal to 
 0 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) +      for .
G G G G GG q c q r c q c q q qω ≡ + − ≥
 
 (5) 
Producers who use the GI technology can also decide not to certify. In this case, 
producers can choose any quality equal to or above the baseline minimum quality, 0 ,q q≥
 
which costs ( )Gc q  to produce. Without certification, their only branding option is to use 
trademarks. Because consumers cannot observe the technology used in production, the 
entry price for these producers must be equal to the entry price for unknown brands 
produced with the standard technology,
 
0( ).c q  In addition, because 0 0( ) ( ),
Gc q c q>
 
the 
most profitable cheating option is to outsource the production of 0q  at a cost 0( ).c q  It 
follows that the price-quality schedule for producers who use the GI technology but do 
not certify coincides with (3). Finally, the presence of a sui generis scheme does not 
affect the price-quality schedule of producers who use the standard technology. For them, 
the price-quality schedule coincides with (2). 
                                                 
19
 In the case of a firm using a pure GI label as a brand, discontinuing certification means 
selling an unbranded product, which is expected by consumers to be of baseline 
minimum quality 0 .q   
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To focus on the relevant case in which, for all certification schemes considered, 
reputation building through certification is a viable option, in what follows we assume 
that the following parametric condition holds:20 
 ( ) ( ){ } ( )0 0 0min , .G Gr c q c q c qω  < −    (6) 
The market price-quality schedule prevailing in the presence of a sui generis scheme 
corresponds to the “lower envelope” of the three schedules in (2), (3) and (5). Its 
mathematical form, which is given by (7), varies depending on the value of 0Gq  and 
requires the following implicit definitions of ˆ,q
 
,q
 
,q
 
1q
 
and 2q : 
 
1 0
2 0
ˆ ˆ( ) ( ),
( ) ( ) ,
( ) ( ) ,
( ) ( ) ,
( ) ( ) .
G
G
G G
G G
G q A q
A q c q
A q c q
A q c q
N q c q
ω
ω
ω
ω
=
= +
= +
= +
= +
ɶ
 
Depending on the value of 0 ,
Gq  we identify three cases corresponding to (a) 
0 0[ , )
Gq q q∈ , 
(b) 
0 [ , )
Gq q q∈  and (c) 0 .Gq q≥  In all cases, (a), (b) and (c), the schedule corresponds to 
that of the producers using the standard technology in the bottom range of the quality 
spectrum (for q
 
smaller than qˆ , 1q  and qɶ  respectively) and to that of the GI-certified 
producers in the upper range of the quality spectrum (for q  larger than qˆ  in case (a) and 
larger that the GI-specific MQS, 0 ,Gq  in cases (b) and (c)). In case (c) only, the 
                                                 
20
 For given functional forms of the cost functions and for given values of  r
 
and 0 ,q
 
this 
restriction places an upper bound on the value of the certification cost, ,ω  or a lower 
bound on the value of the GI-specific minimum quality standard, 0 .
Gq     
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intermediate range of quality spectrum, between qɶ
 
and 2 ,q  is supplied by producers who 
use the GI technology and do not certify. Moreover, while in case (a), the schedule is 
continuous, in cases (b) and (c) the schedule presents a discontinuity, indicating a quality 
gap that is typical in the presence of production technologies with comparative advantage 
over different quality ranges.21 Thus, the market price-quality schedule can be written as 
 
0
0 0
0 1
0
0
0
2 0
0
ˆ( ),      [ , )
      for [ , )
ˆ( ),      
( ),      [ , )
     for [ , )
( ),      ( )
( ),      [ , )
( ),      [ , )       for      
( ),      
G
G
GG
G
G
A q q q q
q q q
G q q q
A q q q q
q q q
G q q qP q
A q q q q
N q q q q q q
G q q q
 ∈
∈ ≥
 ∈
∈
≥≡  
 ∈

∈ ≥
 ≥
ɶ
ɶ












 (7) 
The market price-quality schedule, ( ),GP q  is represented by the bold curve in Figures 2(i) 
and 2(ii). Specifically, Figure 2(i) represents case (a) where 
0 0[ , )
Gq q q∈  and Figure 2(ii) 
represents case (c) where 0 .Gq q≥
 
To facilitate comparison, the dashed curve in Figures 
2(i) and 2(ii) represents the price-quality schedule, ( ),P q  that would prevail absent a 
certification scheme. Finally to keep the pictures as clean as possible, the value of the 
certification cost, ,ω  is considered to be equal to zero. 
 
                                                 
21
 Quality gaps in the presence of production technologies with comparative advantage 
over different quality ranges appear also in Falvey and Kierzkowski (1987) and in Flam 
and Helpman (1987), among others.  
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Figure 2(i): Case (a) Figure 2(ii): Case (c) 
       Figure 2. Market price-quality schedule with a sui generis scheme 
 
3.5.3 The certification scheme based on certification marks 
IP protection for GIs in the United States is provided through the trademark system 
usually as certification marks. An example of a GI protected as a certification mark is 
“Washington Apples.” This mark certifies that the apples are produced in the state of 
Washington, while no quality standard is needed to be met by producers (Winfree and 
McCluskey 2005). A critical feature of the trademark system is that certification marks 
that consist of geographic names can only be use to certify the geographic origin of 
products, while normally no additional requirements can be included in the mark 
definition. Nor is the eligibility for registration of a certification mark that consists of a 
geographic name conditioned upon the presence of a link between quality and geography 
(USPTO 2007). Given these features, the certification mark system can be framed in our 
setup as a scheme with no limitation regarding accessibility to certification (i.e., every 
region’s name is eligible to be protected as a certification mark), with a location of 
production requirement and no MQS requirement. With this scheme, a GI label in the 
qɶ
Nc
G
c
0q q
A
0
Gq
G
qɶ
Nc
G
c
0q q
A
0
Gq
G
2q
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form of a certification mark informs consumers that the certified product originates in the 
area indicated by the label.  
Following the same procedure used thus far, we derive the market price-quality 
schedule that prevails under a certification mark scheme. Here, we assume that 
consumers have no knowledge regarding which technology is available in which area and 
hence are not able to infer the production technology from the GI label (this assumption 
will be relaxed in section 5.1). Now, for a producer who uses the standard technology and 
certifies, the cost of quality 0q q≥  is equal to ( ) .c q ω+  In equilibrium, if a firm with 
reputation equal to q  remains honest, it earns a discounted profit equal to 
1 ( ) ( )r
r
p q c q ω+ − −   , while, if it cheats, the most profitable avenue is to cut quality to the 
minimum level while continuing to certify, thereby earning a one-period profit equal to 
0( ) ( ) .p q c q ω− −
22
  The credibility constraint can therefore be written as  
 
0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .p q c q r c q c q ω≥ + − +  
 
Given the potentially large number of non-GI regions (and hence of certification 
marks from non-GI regions), we argue that the entry price for a new certified brand under 
the certification mark scheme is 0( ) .c q ω+
23
 This is based upon the argument that 
consumers protect themselves from potential suppliers from non-GI regions by refusing 
to pay more than 0( ) .c q ω+  In equilibrium, a potential entrant incurs a sure loss equal to 
                                                 
22
 The firm must continue certifying the product; otherwise, consumers would correctly 
infer that the firm is cheating. 
 
23
 Consistently, by a “new certified brand” we mean a GI label in the form of a 
certification mark or a mixed brand when the trademark is unknown to consumers. 
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0( ) ( )c q c q−  in the entry period when the brand is still unknown and earns a profit equal to 
( ) ( )p q c q ω− −  in any subsequent period. Free entry, which requires discounted profits of 
potential new brands to be non-positive, 10( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0rc q c q p q c q ω− + − − ≤   , imposes the 
following restriction on the equilibrium price configuration: 
 
0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .p q c q r c q c q ω≤ + − +  
 
Together the credibility constraint and the free-entry condition imply an equilibrium 
price-quality schedule for producers who use the standard technology and certify equal to 
 0 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( )      for .B q c q r c q c q q qω≡ + − + ≥    (8) 
The cost of quality 0q q≥ , for producers who use the GI technology and certify, is 
( ) .Gc q ω+
 
Because consumers cannot infer the production technology from the GI label, 
they are willing to pay the same amount for any new certified brand. Hence the entry 
price for producers who use the GI technology and certify must be equal to 0( ) .c q ω+  
Also, their best cheating option is to cut quality to 0q  and continue to certify at a cost 
0( ) .
Gc q ω+
 Based on the entry price and the best cheating option, we can conclude that 
the equilibrium price-quality schedule for producers who use the GI technology and 
certify is equal to 
 0 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( )      for .
G GH q c q r c q c q q qω ≡ + − + ≥
 
 (9) 
Finally, the presence of a certification mark scheme does not affect the price-quality 
schedule of producers who use the standard technology and do not certify – for whom the 
price-quality schedule coincides with (2) – or the price-quality schedule of producers who 
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use the GI technology and do not certify – for whom the price-quality schedule coincides 
with (3). 
Given (2), (3), (8) and (9), it can be readily seen that, for any value of 0,ω ≥  the 
market price-quality schedule prevailing in the presence of a certification mark scheme 
coincides with ( ),P q  as given by (4), and, in fact, for any value of ,q  ( ) ( )B q A q≥  and 
( ) ( ).H q N q≥
 We can conclude that, when consumers have no knowledge regarding what 
technology is available in which area, the market price-quality schedule prevailing in the 
presence of a certification mark scheme is identical to the schedule prevailing absent any 
GI scheme, ( ).P q   
 
3.6 Welfare implications 
Depending on whether or not a sui generis scheme is in place, the market price-quality 
schedule that prevails in equilibrium is ( )GP q  or ( ).P q  As is typical in this type of 
reputation model, the minimum quality, 0 ,q  for which no informational problems exist, 
sells at production cost. Similarly, the minimum quality guaranteed by the sui generis 
scheme, 0 ,
Gq
 also sells at production cost when the product is certified.24 Any other 
quality q  in excess of the minimum quality, 0 ,q  sells at a premium above production 
costs that is exactly equal to the one-time information cost that is needed in order to 
establish a reputation for quality .q  
                                                 
24
 Clearly, certified quality 0
Gq
 
is viable only for 
0 .
Gq q≥   
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As can be easily verified by comparing (4) and (7), the price-quality schedules 
( )GP q
 or ( )P q overlap in the bottom range of the quality spectrum, while in the upper 
range of the quality spectrum ( )GP q  lies below ( )P q . This means that the presence of a 
sui generis scheme leads to lower prices for high-quality products while the prices of 
lower qualities are unaffected. Lower prices for high-quality products are the result of 
reduced costs of establishing reputation in the upper quality range under the sui generis 
scheme. The cost reduction has two components, each of which is linked to the revelation 
of some information regarding the GI-certified product. The first piece of information 
regards the fact that the GI-certified product is produced with the GI technology (i.e., that 
the conditions of the area of production favor the attainment of quality). For any given 
value of the GI-specific MQS, 0 ,Gq  such that 0 ,Gq q< ɶ
 
the availability of the information 
regarding the technology of production curtails producers’ incentives to milk their 
reputation by 0 0( ) ( )
G G Gc q c q−
 thereby increasing consumers’ willingness to pay for a new 
GI-certified product by the same amount.25 The second piece of information concerns the 
fact that the GI-certified product meets a stricter MQS than does a generic product, 
0 0 .
Gq q>  This curtails producers’ incentives to milk their reputation by an additional 
0 0( ) ( )
Gc q c q−
 and, by the same amount, increases consumers’ willingness to pay for a new 
GI-certified product.  
To the contrary, no information is revealed under the certification mark scheme 
that could lower the cost of building reputation compared to the case with trademarks 
                                                 
25
 This effect occurs only for 0 ,
Gq q< ɶ
 
where 0 0( ) ( ).
G G Gc q c q<  
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only. Because all geographic names can be protected as GIs, registration itself does not 
convey any information regarding the actual technology used in production. As well, 
because no GI-specific MQS needs to be met, producers’ incentive to milk their 
reputation is unchanged compared to the case in which only trademarks are used. 
Given the effect on equilibrium market prices, the introduction of a sui generis 
scheme affects consumers and producers in different ways. Consumers, to the extent that 
they prefer high quality, are clearly better off with lower prices, while the effect on 
producer surplus depends upon whether or not the investment in reputation occurred 
before the introduction of the sui generis scheme. With zero discounted profits for new 
brands under every IP scenario, only producers with established brands (i.e., those that 
have invested in reputation before the introduction of the certification scheme) can be 
affected by the introduction of the sui generis scheme. We can conclude that the 
introduction of a sui generis scheme has the potential to increase aggregate welfare 
because it reduces the informational cost of building reputation for high quality in a 
market affected by asymmetric information problems. This conclusion provides a 
rationale for favoring a sui generis scheme over a certification mark scheme to provide IP 
protection for GIs. Moreover, the welfare gains are more likely to be larger when the 
introduction of the sui generis scheme occurs at an earlier stage, i.e., before the 
investments in reputation are sunk.  
When the introduction of a sui generis scheme occurs after investments in 
reputation have taken place (hereafter ex post), welfare considerations regarding the 
introduction of a sui generis scheme need to take into account the effect on established 
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producers (i.e., producers of an established brand). Starting from a situation of 
equilibrium in which producers have already invested in reputation, we analyze the case 
in which the government considers introducing a sui generis scheme. While established 
producers in the bottom-end range of the quality spectrum will not be affected by the 
introduction of the scheme, producers in the upper-end range of the quality spectrum 
might completely or partially lose their investment in reputation.  
The bottom-end range of the quality spectrum in which established producers are 
not affected by the introduction of the scheme corresponds to * ,q q≤  where *q
 
represents 
the quality of the non-certified product that would be purchased by the type of consumer 
who is indifferent between consuming a GI-certified product under the sui generis 
scheme and a non-certified product.26 For all other qualities, * ,q q>
 
established 
producers are at risk of completely or partially losing their investment in reputation when 
the sui generis scheme is introduced.  
Specifically, there will be established brands that completely lose their reputation 
and are replaced by new GI-certified brands of the same qualities. Define the quality 
range 0Q as follows: 
 
0
0
0 0
0
ˆ[ , ],       if [ , )
[ , ],     if [ , )
,            if 
G
G G
G
q q q q q
Q q q q q q
q q
 ∈


≡ ∈

∅ ≥
ɶ
ɶ
 
                                                 
26
 The value of *q  depends upon the shape of consumer preferences and on the value of 
0 .
Gq
 
See Appendix A3 for details regarding consumers selection of qualities. 
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In an equilibrium without a sui generis scheme, the qualities in 0Q are supplied by 
producers that use the standard technology. As shown in appendix A1, if a sui generis 
scheme were introduced, all producers with established brands in the quality range 0Q  
would lose their reputation because the introduction of a sui generis scheme makes 
cheating more attractive than maintaining the same quality. Finally, if these producers 
have access to the GI technology (e.g., when they can relocate to a GI region) or can sell 
their trademarks to producers within the GI region, then the loss of reputation is only 
partial. That producers operating in this quality range need to switch to a different 
technology to remain competitive is noteworthy because the technology they switch to is 
characterized by higher production costs.  
Established brands in the quality range 0Q  are not the only brands produced with 
the standard technology that stand to completely lose their reputation. Depending on the 
shape of consumer preferences over quality, there will be a range of qualities to the left of 
0Q
 
produced with the standard technology, and such that * ,q q>
 
that no longer 
represents “good deals” for consumers, who now would rather purchase GI-certified 
products. These qualities will no longer be exchanged in the market.  
Contrary to what intuition might suggest, the reputations of established brands 
produced with the GI technology (all of which are of quality q q≥ ɶ ) are also negatively 
affected by the introduction of the sui generis scheme. But, unlike the case of established 
brands produced using the standard technology, brands produced using the GI technology 
whose quality is at least 0
Gq
 
face a partial loss in reputation and are not forced out of the 
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market. As shown in appendix A2, in fact, their ability to certify affects their incentive to 
cheat. For them, the best response is to continue producing the same quality and to start 
certifying as soon as the system is introduced.27 We conclude that, given the complete 
and partial losses in reputation of a subset of established producers, the ex post 
introduction of a sui generis scheme is desirable only if consumer gains are larger than 
the losses in reputation of established brands.28  
Finally, we address the following question: if a sui generis scheme were to be 
introduced before any investment in reputation has taken place, what should the GI-
specific MQS, 0 ,Gq
 
be in order to maximize aggregate welfare? From an ex ante29 
perspective, the optimal value of the GI-specific MQS maximizes aggregate consumer 
surplus. The value of the GI-specific MQS affects the shape and position of the 
equilibrium market price-quality schedule and hence the price-quality combinations that 
are available to consumers. The available price-quality combinations, in turn, determine 
the surplus that each consumer type can derive in the market. Hence, the specific welfare-
maximizing value of the GI-specific MQS will generally depend on the distribution of 
consumer types. Nevertheless, as discussed in appendix A3, for all distributions of 
                                                 
27
 This is the case independent of whether or not the introduction of the system is 
announced ahead of time or unexpectedly introduced. 
 
28
 Another aspect that needs to be taken into consideration is the welfare loss that occurs 
during the “transition” period (i.e., the period in which investment takes place). During 
the transition period quality is misallocated; new entrants sell products of heterogeneous 
quality at the same price and consumers are unable to select the exact quality that 
maximizes their utility. 
 
29
 As opposed to ex post, here ex ante refers to the case in which the introduction of the 
sui generis scheme occurs before any investment in reputation has taken place. 
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consumer types the optimal value of the GI-specific MQS
 
has to balance the welfare 
losses of consumers whose purchase is constrained by the value of 0
Gq
 
and the welfare 
gains to consumers who purchase the GI-certified product. It follows that the welfare-
maximizing value of the GI-specific MQS belongs in the quality range above ,q ε+  
where q ε+
 
is defined as the smallest value of 0
Gq
 such that at least one consumer type 
purchases the quality level corresponding to the GI-specific MQS. 
 
3.6.1 Welfare implications of a certification mark scheme with screening 
Our conclusion that a certification mark scheme for GIs does not convey any information 
that could lower the cost of building reputation below the cost required when only 
trademarks are available is predicated on two assumptions regarding consumers: (i) 
consumers have no knowledge regarding which technology is available in which area and 
(ii) consumers have no preferences over origin per se (rather than as a signal for quality). 
When either assumption is relaxed, there conceivably are welfare gains from a 
certification mark scheme over a situation with only trademarks. Nevertheless, as we will 
show, the result that a sui generis scheme is preferable in terms of welfare to a scheme 
based on certification marks holds true even when consumers have full information 
regarding which technology is available in which area and value origin per se in addition 
to quality. 
To this end we consider the following modification of the certification mark 
system in which an initial screening of geographic names based on the presence of a 
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quality/geography nexus is introduced. We refer to this hypothetical scheme as the 
technology scheme. A technology scheme yields the same market price-quality schedule 
that a certification mark scheme would yield under the assumption that consumers have 
full knowledge of the production conditions in each region. This is the case because in 
either case (with a technology scheme or with a certification mark scheme with full 
information about regional production conditions) the same information – the technology 
used in production – is available to consumers.  
Following the same procedure used thus far, we derive the market price-quality 
schedule that prevails with a technology scheme. The schedule can be written as follows:  
 
 ∈
≡ 
≥
0( ),      for [ , )( )
( ),      for ,
t
T
t
A q q q q
P q
T q q q
 (10) 
where we define tq  and ttq  as  
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ,
t t
t G tt
A q T q
A q c q ω
=
= +
 
and ( ),T q  the price-quality schedule for producers who use the GI technology and certify 
their product with the technology scheme, is  
 
0 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( )      for .
G G GT q c q r c q c q q qω ≡ + − + ≥
 
 
A comparison between (10) and (7) reveals that (i) for any given value of 0G ttq q≤  every 
consumer type is at least as well off with the sui generis scheme as with the technology 
scheme because of lower prices in the upper end of the quality range; and (ii) for any 
given value of 0
G ttq q>  the scheme that provides the largest welfare depends on the 
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distribution of consumer types. Specifically, for 0
G ttq q> the sui generis scheme leads to 
lower prices in the upper part of the quality spectrum, favoring consumers with relatively 
high values of ,θ  while the technology scheme might lead to lower prices in the 
intermediate quality range favoring consumers with intermediate values of .θ  Finally, if 
the value of 0
Gq  can be chosen optimally so as to maximize aggregate welfare, the sui 
generis scheme is unambiguously better than the technology scheme for any given 
distribution of consumers. This is because it is always possible to set 0 0 .
Gq q=
  
The market price-quality schedule, ( ),TP q  is represented by the bold curve in 
Figure 3. Specifically, Figure 3 represents the case with 0 .
G ttq q≤
 To ease comparison, the 
schedule that would prevail with a sui generis scheme is also represented in Figure 3 by 
the dashed curve.  
 
Figure 3. Market Price-Quality Schedule with a Technology Scheme 
qɶ
Nc
Gc
0q q
A
0
Gq
GT
tq1q
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3.6.2 Trade implications 
In this section, we briefly discuss some welfare considerations regarding the introduction 
of a sui generis scheme in a trading context when reputation must be established 
independently in each country. We maintain the same partial equilibrium setup, add a 
second country – the rest of the world (ROW) – and allow for trade. We assume that the 
technology available in the home country is the standard technology considered so far, 
( ),c q
 and that the two countries are otherwise identical; in particular, they have the same 
MQS, 0 ,q  and discount rate, .r  This setup is similar to Falvey (1989), but in Falvey each 
trading country has (only) one production technology, each with a range of comparative 
advantage. 
We maintain the assumption that a sui generis scheme is in place in the country 
that is home to the GI (the home country) and consider two alternative scenarios for 
ROW: (i) ROW provides the same type of IP protection for GI as the home country (e.g., 
the same sui generis scheme), (ii) ROW does not provide IP protection for GIs. Given the 
setup, the general pattern of intra-industry trade is straightforward; in either scenario, 
ROW imports the higher end of the quality range, but the actual range depends upon 
whether ROW offers a sui generis scheme or not. Even though when reputation needs to 
be established independently in each country, trade alone does not “create a unified world 
market” (Falvey 1989, p. 611), the price-quality schedule that prevails with free trade is 
identical in both countries as long as they offer the same sui generis scheme, and 
coincides with (7). Instead, when ROW does not provide IP protection for GIs, the 
prevailing schedule in ROW is (4).  
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It follows directly that ex ante both countries have identical incentives to 
introduce a sui generis scheme, while ex post, ROW’s producer losses involve a 
relatively smaller set of producers, those established producers operating in an 
intermediate range of the quality spectrum (using the standard technology), while the 
home country alone bears the losses of established producers operating in the upper range 
of the quality spectrum (those producers using the GI technology). 
Finally, we comment on the informational role of country-of-origin labels 
(COOL) in markets where trademarks are important quality indicators. Falvey (1989) has 
shown that, in a setup in which countries are endowed with different technologies, COOL 
can reduce the cost of establishing reputation and can lower the price for high-quality 
products. Therefore in his setup, COOL regulations have a valuable non-protective role. 
In our framework, by contrast, when both countries have access to the same standard 
technology, COOL provisions are not sufficient to provide information to consumers 
regarding the quality of imports and hence are not a viable substitute for a sui generis 
scheme. 
 
3.7 The traditional specialities guaranteed scheme 
Next, we consider the traditional specialities guaranteed (TSG) scheme of the European 
Union. Like the sui generis scheme, the TSG scheme belongs to the set of the instruments 
used to foster product quality within the EU policy framework but departs from the EU’s 
GI scheme because of the absence of a link between the certified products and the 
geographic area of production. The aim of the TSG scheme is to allow high-quality 
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products that are not necessarily linked to a geographic area to be differentiated from 
standard products.  
Specifically, the TSG scheme certifies traditional products, such as “mozzarella” 
or “pizza napoletana,” independently of the location in which production takes place. 
According to EU Regulation 509/2006, a traditional product is produced using traditional 
raw materials, has traditional composition or is obtained by a mode of production and 
processing that reflects traditional methods.30 Even though not linked to a specific area of 
production, traditional products share many features with GIs. In particular, traditional 
product markets are also fraught with asymmetric information and moral hazard 
problems and are typically characterized by competitive conditions and by the concurrent 
use of certification and trademarks.  
Similar to the case of product names registered under the sui generis schemes, 
registered TSG products are defined by a product specification, which includes “the key 
elements that define the product’s specific character” (EU Regulation 509/2006 Art. 6). 
TSG certified products are subject to inspection to verify compliance with the product 
specification. We do not explicitly model what a traditional ingredient or a traditional 
mode of production or processing is, but rather interpret the traditional nature of these 
products as conferring them a given minimum quality, and in what follows we provide a 
justification for why this is a reasonable assumption. 
                                                 
30
 The TSG scheme offers two types of registration of a name: with or without 
“reservation.” When a name is registered with reservation, it can only be used to label the 
product made in accordance with the specification. When the name is registered without 
reservation, it can be used for products that do not correspond to the specification but 
without the indication “traditional specialities guaranteed,” the abbreviation “TSG” or the 
Community symbol (EU 2009b). 
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As already discussed, we have modeled the quality/geography nexus required for 
a GI under the sui generis scheme as an attribute of the production technology, while we 
conceptualize the conditions for traditional products as a quality requirement. There is a 
striking conceptual difference between the production conditions associated with a 
quality/geography nexus and those characterizing traditional products. The former are 
typically present in marginal or mountain areas, among others, where topography and 
climatic conditions (e.g., including exposure, humidity, daily temperature swings etc.) 
favor the attainment of a high level of quality while limiting the ability to cost-efficiently 
provide standard mass-production commodities (e.g., limited mechanization 
possibilities). Hence, we have assumed production technologies with comparative 
advantage over different quality ranges. To the contrary, the traditional feature of 
products under the TSG scheme has little to do with the conditions of the production 
environment or the technology available for production but is rather attributable to the 
use of ingredients and production procedures that favor the attainment of specific 
organoleptic characteristics, appearance, consistency, taste, aroma, chemical, 
microbiological and other characteristics that are associated with high quality. For 
example, the product specification for “pizza napoletana” defines the handling, kneading, 
rising and baking process (including specific conditions regarding temperature and 
duration) that are considered necessary for high-quality pizza (see the Official 
Journal C40, February 14, 2008). We conceptualize these features in a one-dimensional 
quality scale. 
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The TSG scheme is currently under scrutiny within the European Union, and 
several policy options have been discussed, including abandonment of the scheme. A 
concern is that, to date, there is only a limited use of this scheme (only about 30 products 
are currently registered or have been published and 14 others have applied for 
protection). Also, it seems that the terminology and logos used to identified TSG-certified 
goods have proven to be difficult for the public to understand. Despite a widespread 
support for the scheme from stakeholders (EU 2009b), some confusion remains on the 
effectiveness of the scheme as a tool for fostering the provision of quality. Our analysis 
offers a rationale for maintaining the TSG scheme and shows the potential welfare gains 
that the TSG scheme can bring about compared to the sui generis scheme.  
We frame the TSG scheme as a scheme with no limitation regarding accessibility 
to certification or a location of production requirement but with an MQS requirement.31 
Certified products under the TSG scheme are identified by a TSG logo.32 With this 
scheme, the presence of a TSG logo informs consumers that the product meet the MQS, 
0 .
Sq
 
Following the same procedure used thus far, we derive the market price-quality 
schedule that prevails with a TSG scheme. The schedule can be written as follows:  
                                                 
31
 Outside the food sector, there are many examples of certification schemes based on 
quality standards only. These include, among others, the CE mark indicating that 
products meet the health and safety requirements set out in the European Directives and 
the certification marks administered by Underwriters Laboratories for electronic devices. 
 
32
 TSG logo is available at http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/logos/index_en.htm. 
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where q
 
and sq
 
are defined as  
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and ( ),M q  the price-quality schedule for producers who use the standard technology and 
certify, and ( ),L q  the price-quality schedule for producers who use the GI technology and 
certify, are respectively 
 
0 0 0
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S S S
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( )M q  and ( )L q  are piecewise defined because, depending on the value of 0 ,
Sq  the optimal 
cheating strategy is either producing or outsourcing the minimum quality.  
  
 
82
Finally, implicitly define mq as the quality at which ( )M q  and ( )G q  meet when the 
minimum quality standard of the TSG scheme, 0 ,
Sq  has the same value as the GI-specific 
MQS (i.e., 0 0S Gq q= ), 
 
0 0( | ) ( | ).
m G m GM q q G q q=
 
Given a common value of the MQS standard across schemes (equal to 0Gq ), the TSG 
scheme and the sui generis scheme differ in two regards. First, compared to a sui generis 
scheme, the TSG scheme reduces the informational content of the certified product since 
it does not pin down the technology used in production. This expands the cheating 
options of producers who use the GI technology when the value of the MQS is such that 
0 .
Gq q< ɶ  As an effect, when the value of the MQS is such that 0 ,Gq q< ɶ  the TSG scheme 
leads to higher prices for qualities mq q>  than the sui generis scheme. For the other 
values of the MQS, the cheating options of producers who use the GI technology are 
unaffected. 33  
                                                 
33
 For values of the MQS such that 0 ,Gq q< ɶ  the TSG scheme expands the cheating options 
of producers who use the GI technology, thereby decreasing consumers’ willingness to 
pay for new but certified brands by 0 0( ) ( ),
G G Gc q c q−  and increasing the reputation-building 
costs for these producers. In contrast, when 0 ,
Gq q≥ ɶ
 the cost of producing the MQS 
quality is lower with the GI technology, 0 0( ) ( )
G G Gc q c q≤ , and therefore outsourcing is not 
a cost-saving option for producers that use the GI technology. In this case, and 
independent of the type of certification scheme (TSG or sui generis), the best producers 
can do when cheating is to reduce quality to 0 .
Gq
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The second difference between the sui generis and the TSG schemes concerns 
producers’ access to the certification, because the TSG scheme is available to all 
producers independently of the technology used in production. The ability to certify 
lowers the cost of building reputation for producers who use the standard technology by 
increasing consumers’ willingness to pay for their new but certified brands.34 Hence, for 
0 ,
Gq q< ɶ
 the TSG scheme leads to lower prices for all qualities ( , )mq q q∈  than the sui 
generis scheme. For values of the MQS such that 0 ,Gq q≥ ɶ  the ability to certify for 
producers who use the standard technology is not sufficient to make them competitive 
with producers who use the GI technology. It follows that, for a common value of the 
MQS across the two systems and such that 0Gq q< ɶ , qualities in the range ( , )mq q q∈
 
can 
be supplied at a lower cost with the TSG scheme while quality in the range  mq q>  can be 
supplied at a lower cost with the sui generis scheme. Hence, which scheme leads to 
higher aggregate surplus depends on the distribution of consumers ( ).F θ  
Finally, we consider the possibility of choosing the values of the MQS, one for 
each certification scheme, so as to maximize aggregate welfare and show, in appendix 
A4, that when it is possible to choose the values of the MQSs optimally, the TSG scheme 
yields at least the same level of welfare as the sui generis scheme. We also show that the 
TSG scheme does strictly better than the sui generis scheme for some populations of 
                                                 
34
 Consumers’ willingness to pay increases by 0 0( ) ( )
Gc q c q−
 if 0
Gq q< ɶ
 
and by 
0 0( ) ( )
G Gc q c q−  if 0 .
Gq q≥ ɶ
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consumers, ( ),F θ  for which the optimized value of the MQS for the sui generis scheme, 
*
0 ,
Gq
 
happens to be such that
 
*
0 .
Gq q< ɶ
  
The market price-quality schedule, ( ),SP q  is represented by the bold curve in 
Figure 4, which specifically represents the case of 
0 .
Gq q q= < ɶ  To ease comparison, the 
price-quality schedule that would prevail with a sui generis scheme is also represented in 
Figure 4 by the dashed curve. 
f 
Figure 4. Price-Quality Schedule with a TSG scheme (Note 
0
Gq q= ) 
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3.8 Conclusions  
We contribute to the stream of literature sparked by the pioneering work of Shapiro 
(1983) by extending the theory of firm reputation to a context in which both certifications 
and trademarks are available to firms as quality indicators. We tailor our analysis to 
assess the role of certification and trademarks for food products with a regional identity, 
known as geographical indications, whose markets, typically characterized by 
competitive conditions, are commonly fraught with asymmetric information and moral 
hazard problems. Specifically, we provide a rationale for producers of such goods to use 
certification (in addition to trademarks) when product quality could be alternatively 
sustained through trademarks, a fact that is consistent with the empirical evidence that the 
concurrent use of certification and trademarks is common for such products. 
Several instructive aspects of the role of certification in quality provision and 
reputation formation that are applicable to many forms of certification (not just GIs) 
emerge from the model. First, we show that certification reduces the divergence between 
the reputation equilibrium and the equilibrium that would prevail under perfect 
information by lowering the cost of establishing reputation compared to a situation with 
only trademarks. Hence, certification improves the ability of reputation to operate as a 
mechanism for assuring quality. Second, we show that the welfare gains are more likely 
to be larger when the introduction of a certification scheme occurs at an earlier stage so 
as to limit the potential losses in the value of already established reputations. This is 
because certification, by raising the price that entrants can command, reduces the cost of 
building a reputation and hence the value of an established reputation. This observation 
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also provides a rationale for industry resistance to the introduction of certification from 
eligible producers who have already committed resources towards building a reputation 
at the time the certification is introduced.  
With this paper we expand the existing literature on geographical indications by 
shifting the focus to explicitly consider the design of the certification scheme. This is 
relevant because, as our model reveals, the design plays an important role in mitigating 
the informational problems in the market. Moreover, we show that different designs 
might be optimal for different populations of consumers depending on the distribution of 
their tastes for quality. From a policy perspective, our model offers specific 
recommendations concerning the current ongoing debate and negotiations on 
geographical indications at both the WTO and the EU levels. With regard to the type of 
IP protection instrument for GIs, our model indicates that a sui generis scheme based on 
appellations is preferable to standard instruments, such as certification marks, that are 
currently used in many important markets, including the United States. We have 
identified a feature of certification marks (i.e., the fact that eligibility for registration is 
not conditioned upon the presence of a demonstrable link between the characteristics of a 
geographic region and the quality of the product) that limits their ability to convey 
information to consumers regarding the quality of GIs and lower the cost of building 
reputation (in this sense, certification marks are no better than trademarks). In addition, 
we show that even if the current certification mark system were to be adapted to include 
an initial screening of products seeking IP protection based on the presence of a 
demonstrable quality/geography nexus, a sui generis scheme, which combines geography 
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and quality requirements, would still provide larger welfare gains than certification 
marks.  
Our model also sheds light over the role of the EU’s traditional specialities 
guaranteed scheme in the provision of high-quality products that are not linked to a 
geographic area. This scheme, which is currently under scrutiny by the EU commission, 
is used to register and protect the names of traditional products (i.e., products that are 
produced using traditional raw materials, have traditional composition or are obtained by 
a mode of production and processing that reflects traditional methods). Such a scheme, 
based exclusively on quality (rather than on geographic) requirements, certifies that 
traditional products meet given quality standards. We show that, for a given common 
value of the MQS, the traditional specialities guaranteed scheme more strongly reduces 
the cost of providing intermediate quality products compared to the sui generis scheme, 
while the sui generis scheme is better suited for reducing the cost of providing the higher 
end of the quality spectrum. Compared to the sui generis scheme, the traditional 
specialities guaranteed scheme has the advantage of extending the accessibility of 
certification to a larger set of producers. When it is feasible to optimally set the value of 
the MQS, this advantage leads to welfare gains compared to the sui generis scheme when 
the distribution of consumer preferences is clustered in the middle of the quality range. 
Finally, with regard to the informational role of country-of-origin labels, our model 
suggests that COOL provisions are not sufficient to provide information to consumers 
regarding the quality of imports that could lower the cost of building reputation and 
hence are not a viable substitute for a geographical indications scheme. 
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3.9 Appendix  
This appendix establishes the welfare results discussed in sections 5 and 6.  
 
Proof that the reputation of established brands in the quality range 0Q  is lost when 
a sui generis scheme is introduced 
First, suppose that a sui generis scheme is introduced at the beginning of time t  
unexpectedly. At time t , producers who have access to the GI technology can invest in 
reputation (i.e., produce a quality 0Gq q≥
 
and sell it below production costs). At time 
1,t +  reputation, ,R q=  is established and, from time 1t+
 
on, the new equilibrium 
schedule ( )GP q  prevails in the market. Anticipating the new equilibrium schedule, a 
producer of quality 0q Q∈  with an established brand will be better off deviating at time t  
(i.e., producing the minimum quality) than maintaining the same quality from time t   on 
if  
 
1
0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).
G
r
c q P q c q c q − + − < −
 
 
As can be readily verified, the above inequality can be rewritten as ( ) ( ),GP q A q<  
where ( )GP q
 
and ( )A q  are given by (7) and (2) respectively. Over the range in which 
( )GP q  is defined, ( ) ( )GP q A q<
 
always holds. It follows that producers are better off by 
deviating at time t . This is also true for those producers operating in the quality range 
where ( )GP q  is not defined (the discontinuity range), since the price at which they would 
be able to sell their products at time 1t+  is strictly less then ( )A q  (consumers can find 
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higher qualities at prices ( )A q ). Knowing that it is optimal for these producers to cheat, 
consumers will not be willing to pay more than 0( )c q  for these brands at time t . It 
follows that established brands in the quality range 0Q completely lose their reputation as 
soon as the sui generis scheme is introduced. Finally, if these producers have access to 
the GI technology (i.e., if they can relocate to a GI region) or can sell their trademarks to 
a producer with access to the GI technology, then the loss of reputation might be partial.  
In the alternative case in which the introduction of a GI scheme at time t
 
is 
announced and expected by both producers and consumers at time 1,t −  producers would 
immediately cheat and lose their reputation at time 1t− . Consumers would correctly 
predict this behavior and would be willing to pay at most 0( )c q  in 1t− . Finally, in the 
alternative case where in time 1t−
 
only producers anticipate the introduction of a sui 
generis scheme (but consumers are unaware), producers immediately cheat. Consumers, 
being unable to anticipate producers’ behavior, are surprised by lower-than-expected 
qualities while producers recoup their original investments in reputation. 
 
Proof that the reputation of established brands of quality 0
Gq q≥
 
produced with the 
GI-technology is partially lost when a sui generis scheme is introduced 
When a sui generis scheme is introduced, producers of established brands who use the 
GI-technology have the following options: (i) maintain the same quality q  without 
certifying; (ii) cut the quality to 0 ;q  (iii) maintain the same quality q
 
and certify; (iv) cut 
the quality to 0
Gq
 and certify.  
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Conditional on not certifying, producers are better off by cutting their quality to 
0 ,q
 
because their credibility constraint, 
 
1
0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),
G G
r
c q G q c q c q − + − ≥ −
 
 
does not hold for any value of .q q≥ ɶ  Observing the absence of certification, consumers 
correctly anticipate that producers have cut their quality to 0 .q  Hence, conditional on not 
certifying, producers lose their reputation immediately and their future profits, discounted 
to time ,t  are equal to zero. Conditional on certifying, the credibility constraint is 
 
1
0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
G G G G
r
c q G q c q c qω ω ω − − + − − ≥ − −
 
 
Because, conditional on certifying, the credibility constraint holds (with equality) for all 
,q q≥ ɶ
 maintaining the same quality is a best response for producers. Observing the 
presence of certification, consumers correctly anticipate that maintaining quality is 
optimal for producers and, in this case, producers’ future profits, discounted to time ,t  are 
equal to  
 
1
0 0 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,
G G G G G G
r
N q c q G q c q r c q c q c q c qω ω ω     − − + − − = + − − + −
     
 
By (6), these discounted profits are strictly positive for any { }0max , .Gq q q≥ ɶ  We can 
conclude that, for producers of established brands of quality { }0max ,Gq q q≥ ɶ  who use the 
GI-technology, the best response to the introduction of a sui generis scheme is to 
maintain and certify the same quality.  
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Finally, the future profits, discounted to time ,t  that producers would earn if no 
sui generis scheme were to be introduced are equal to 0(1 ) ( ) ( ) .
Gr c q c q + −
 
 Hence, since 
for any { }0max ,Gq q q≥ ɶ  
 
0 0 0 0(1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,
G G G G Gr c q c q r c q c q c q c qω     + − > + − − + −
     
 
the value of reputation is partially lost when the sui generis scheme is introduced. Finally, 
for producers with quality 0
Gq q q≤ <ɶ  the loss of reputation is complete because these 
producers do not have the option to maintain the same quality and certify. 
 
Consumer Selection of Qualities and the Optimal Value of the MQS for a sui generis 
Scheme 
If a sui generis scheme were to be introduced before any investment in reputation has 
taken place, what should the value of 0
Gq
 
be in order to maximize welfare? From an ex 
ante perspective, the optimal value of 0
Gq
 
maximizes aggregate consumer surplus. Based 
on our assumptions regarding consumer preferences, consumers can be divided into 
different groups depending on the product they opt to purchase: nonpurchasers 
( )00 θ θ≤ < ; those who purchase standard product of minimum quality ( )0 1θ θ θ≤ < ; 
those who purchase standard product of quality in excess of the minimum 
0q q> ( )1 2θ θ θ≤ < ; those who purchase non-certified product from the GI region(s) 
( )2 3θ θ θ≤ < ; those who purchase GI-certified product of quality 0Gq  ( )3 4θ θ θ≤ < ; and 
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those who purchase GI-certified product of quality 0
Gq q>
 ( )4 .θ θ θ≤ <  Depending on the 
value of 0
Gq
 
one or more of these groups could be empty. Whereas the specific value of 
0
Gq
 that maximizes aggregate consumer surplus depends on the specific distribution of 
consumer types, ( ),F θ  the following considerations apply for all possible ( ).F θ
 
First, we 
note that the effect on welfare of the specific value of the GI-specific MQS, 0 ,Gq  occurs 
through its effect on the position of the equilibrium market price-quality schedule. 
Second, we argue that no value of 0
Gq
 such that 0 ,
Gq q q ∈    can be optimal. Suppose, in 
contradiction, that 0 ,
Gq q q ∈   . A small increase in the value of 0
Gq
 
from its initial value 
shifts down ( )G q  while leaving ( )A q  unaffected. The downward shift in ( )G q  increases 
the surplus of those consumers who purchase the GI-certified product, the price of which 
has decreased. When 0 ,
Gq q q ∈   , at most four groups of consumers exist: (1) 
nonpurchasers, (2) purchasers of 0q , (3) purchasers of standard product of quality in 
excess of the minimum, and (4) purchasers of GI-certified product of quality 0 .Gq q>
 
Hence, 2 3 4 .θ θ θ= =  
Moreover, because no consumer’s purchase is constrained by 0 ,
Gq
 a small 
increase in the value of 0
Gq
 
does not reduce the surplus of other consumers. Without costs 
for raising the quality standard, but with benefits due to the lower prices of the GI-
certified product, welfare can be increased by raising the value of 0
Gq
 
to .q  A small 
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increase in 0
Gq
 
also causes substitution by the marginal consumers that are indifferent 
between buying standard and GI-certified product, with no first-order effect on welfare. 
Moreover, given that consumer indifference curves are smooth, additional gains in 
welfare can be achieved by marginal successive increases of the value of 0
Gq
 above q
 
until the quality choice of some consumers becomes constrained by the value of 0 .
Gq
 
Once 0
Gq
 has reached such value, call it ,q ε+
 
a new group of consumers is formed, 
( )3 4 .θ θ θ≤ <  q ε+  is defined as the smallest value of 0Gq
 
such that at least one consumer 
type, 3 ,θ  buys quality 0 .
Gq These consumers buy quality 0
Gq . Any additional increase in 
the value of 0
Gq  above q ε+  involves welfare losses to this new group of consumers 
whose purchases are constrained by the value of 0
Gq .  We conclude that the welfare-
maximizing value of 0
Gq
 
has to balance the welfare losses of these consumers and the 
welfare gains to consumers who purchase the GI-certified product and therefore belongs 
in the range between q ε+  and the value at which all consumers who purchase GI-
certified product are constrained by the value of the GI-specific MQS. Finally, note that 
depending on ( ),F q  the optimal value of the MQS could be above .q  When this is the 
case, there might exist a group of consumers that purchase non-certified product 
produced with the GI technology ( )2 3θ θ θ≤ < . 
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Proof that the TSG scheme (i) is at least as good as the sui generis scheme and (ii) 
can be strictly better than the sui generis scheme in terms of aggregate welfare 
Suppose that it is possible to choose values of the MQS for the sui generis scheme, 0 ,Gq  
and for the TSG scheme, 0 ,
Sq
 that maximize aggregate welfare. Suppose that for a given 
distribution of consumer types, ( ),F θ  the optimal value of 0
Gq
 happens to be *0 .
Gq q≥ ɶ
 
When this is the case, the TSG scheme is at least as good as the sui generis scheme 
because it is always possible to set the value of 0
Sq
 
in such a way that the resulting price-
quality schedule coincides with the schedule under the sui generis scheme (by setting 
0
Sq equal to *0
Gq ). Suppose instead that for a given distribution of consumer types, the 
optimal value of 0
Gq
 happens to be *0 .
Gq q< ɶ
 When this is the case, it is also possible to 
find a value of *0 0
S Gq q>
 
such that ( ) ( )*0 0 .G G Sc q c q=
 
Denote this value 0ˆ .
Sq  For such a pair 
of values, *0
Gq
 and  0ˆ ,
Sq
 the price-quality schedule that prevails with the sui generis 
scheme, ( ),G q  and the price-quality schedule that prevails with the TSG scheme, ( ),L q  
overlap in the quality range 0ˆ .
Sq q≥
 
Also, on the other side of the quality spectrum, in the 
range *0 ,
Gq q<  the relevant price-quality schedules of the two schemes coincide and are 
equal to ( ).A q  Only the sui generis scheme provides the intermediate quality range, 
)*0 0ˆ, .G Sq q  This range is provided at a price ( ),G q  which is strictly increasing in .q  
Specifically, the price for the minimum quality in this range, *0 ,
Gq  is ( )*0 .GG q
 
Because by 
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construction ( ) ( )*0 0ˆ ,S GM q G q=  at the price ( )*0GG q
 
the TSG scheme provides quality 0ˆ ,
Sq  
which is the supremum of the quality range )*0 0ˆ, .G Sq q  Hence, as long as there is at least 
one consumer who would purchase a quality in the range )*0 0ˆ,G Sq q  when the sui generis 
scheme is in place, the TSG scheme is strictly better than the sui generis scheme in terms 
of aggregate welfare, because this consumer can purchase a higher quality at a lower (or 
at the same) price. 
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CHAPTER 4:  CONSUMER PREFERENCES FOR GEOGRAPHICAL-ORIGIN 
LABELED PRODUCTS 
 
4.1 Abstract 
Motivated by recognition that geography is often correlated with, or a determinant of, 
overall quality of agricultural products, geographical origin labels are important 
information and marketing tools and have recently become a central component of EU 
agricultural promotion. In contrast to previous studies of EU origin labels, we consider 
demand in a non-EU export market for three distinct label types: country-of-origin, 
protected designations of origin and protected geographical indications.  Findings from 
choice experiments indicate that consumers value these three forms of origin labels to 
differing degrees and lend support for current and proposed EU promotion activates in 
export markets. 
 
4.2 Introduction 
The primary overarching economic motivation for product labels is to facilitate the 
resolution of market failures associated with the supply of high-quality goods under 
asymmetric information (e.g., Akerlof 1970). In the crowded heterogeneous food product 
space, information asymmetries are particularly problematic given the abundance and 
importance of credence and experience attributes. As a result, food labeling is viewed as 
a critical mechanism to help ensure consumers can correctly match with products, enable 
producers to adapt production to meet consumer demands and expectations, and promote 
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social or political economy objectives (e.g., health outcomes, growth in desirable sectors, 
increased exports).  
One particular category of labels that has recently received extensive attention 
among regulators and trade representatives are “geographical origin” labels (i.e., labels 
that denote, with some degree of specificity, the location of origination of the end-
product, inputs, or production).  Informing consumers of the origin of food products via 
labeling is motivated by the recognition that geography is often correlated with a 
product's overall quality or, in the stronger case, geography may even be a determinant of 
a product's ultimate realized quality, i.e., the concept of terroir (Barham 2003; Josling 
2006). Recently, interest in geographic origin labeling for foods has been invigorated as a 
result of (1) an increased demand by consumers for production and safety related 
information following a string of food scares,1 (2) a surge in global culinary awareness 
and demand for foreign cuisine, and (3) a movement of many nations away from 
traditional agricultural price supports towards promotion of value-added and high quality 
products.   
Two types of origin labels, country of origin labels (COOL) and geographical 
indications (GIs), have received extensive attention in the economic and marketing 
literature and are currently the subject of domestic and international policy debates.2 An 
                                                 
1
 Examples include bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), E-coli, Salmonella, 
botulism, and harmful bacteria. 
 
2
 For country of origin, the debate is largely between advocates who argue that 
mandatory COOL requirements would provide vital information to consumers regarding 
safety and opponents who assert that it imposes unnecessary or costly regulatory burdens 
on producers and retailers which ultimately hurt consumers. Additionally, opponents 
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abundant economic and marketing literature has analyzed COOL as signals of a broadly 
defined concept of product quality (i.e., the aggregation of many intrinsic and extrinsic 
product attributes linked to origin). The empirical literature on COOL has grown to be 
quite large.  Recent works focusing on agriculture include Loureiro and Umberger 
(2003), Alfnes and Rickertsen (2003), Umberger (2004), Tonsor, Schroeder, and Fox 
(2005), Carter, Krissoff and Peterson Zwane (2006), and Chung, Boyer and Han (2009). 
For reviews of works outside of the agricultural product space see Bilkey and Nes (1982) 
and Verlegh and Steenkamp (1999). 
Variations in quality across countries are determined in part by differences in the 
natural environmental and climatic conditions as well as differences in national quality 
standards, production and processing technologies, quality audit systems, etc.  This 
feature has even led to the reference of COOL as “country brands” (e.g., Unterschultz 
1998; Gilmore 2002; Clemens and Babcock 2004).  
In contrast to COOL, GIs are not only a form of origin labels but also a distinct 
form of intellectual property rights. The recognition of GIs as distinct form of intellectual 
property rights dates to 1994 with the signing of the TRIPS agreement by the World 
Trade Organization. The TRIPS agreement defines GIs as “indications which identify a 
good as originating in the territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory, 
where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially 
attributable to its geographical origin” (TRIPS Art 22.1). As classified by TRIPS, GIs 
                                                                                                                                                 
contend that COOL requirements effectively impose new non-tariff trade barriers that 
hamper international trade (e.g., see Rude, Iqbal and Brewin 2006).  For geographical 
indications, the debate regards the conflicting forms of cross-country legal protection for 
GIs and the level of exclusiveness reserved to GI names (Josling 2006). 
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differ from COOL in several regards which significantly impact their informational 
content and potential value to both consumers and producers. Compared to COOL, GIs 
typically denote a much smaller geographical area of origin like a town or region (e.g., 
Champagne, France or Ardennes, Belgium). Hence, GIs are capable of communicating 
characteristics specific to a specialized area that are not necessarily reflected by the 
country as a whole. Most relevant, the defining feature of GIs based on the TRIPS 
definition is the presence of a link between the area of production and the characteristics 
(quality, reputation etc.) of the product. While the TRIPS agreement requires countries to 
provide legal means for protecting GIs against unfair competition, it does not specify the 
means by which protection should be provided. Protection for GIs is primarily provided 
through a so-called sui generis system based on appellations, originally developed in 
France and currently used by the European Union and many other countries worldwide 
(OECD 2000; WIPO 2007). In contrast to COOL, for a geographic name to be 
recognized and receive intellectual property protection as a GI – in the form of an 
appellation – producers must demonstrate the existence of a link between the 
characteristics of the geographic environment of production and the quality of the product 
that seeks the GI status (EU Reg. 510/2006 Art. 2 and Art. 4.2.f). Furthermore, in order 
for eligible producers in the delineated region to use the GI label, they must adhere 
(subject to third-party inspection) to established production specifications, including 
input and processing requirements, that are unique to the GI and beyond those of standard 
non-GI products (EU Reg. 510/2006 Art. 4). Finally, the European sui generis GI system 
specifically distinguishes between two distinct types of appellations, protected 
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designation of origin (PDO) and protected geographical indication (PGI) that differ 
depending upon how closely a product's quality is linked to geography. This distinction 
introduces an additional level of quality differentiation among GI labeled products, 
reserving the PDO status for the highest qualities (for additional details regarding the 
distinction between PDO and PGI see EU Reg. 510/2006, Art.2).3  
Conceptually, to understand how these distinctions between different geographic 
labels provide information to consumers, consider a purchase situation in which a 
consumer faces a distribution of products over a spectrum of qualities. From the 
prospective of a consumer that takes the product quality distribution as exogenous, we 
can consider a purchase from a set of unlabelled (or generic) products as a draw from an 
unconditional distribution that spans the entire quality range. Similarly, a purchase of a 
product with a “geographical origin” label is a draw from a conditional distribution, 
whereby the conditional distribution varies by type of label. For country-specific products 
the distribution is over a sub-set of the quality spectrum and centered around a country-
specific mean (that could be above or below the unconditional mean). For appellations 
the distribution is over a sub-set of a country-specific distribution, consisting of qualities 
above a truncation point determined by the appellation's quality standards. Finally, PDOs 
                                                 
3
 It is important to note that while the majority of GIs are protected in the form of 
appellations, a few others (e.g., Washington Apples) are protected through the trademark 
system and registered as certification marks. Certification marks differ substantially from 
appellations. Indeed, registration of a geographic name in the form of a certification mark 
does not require the existence of a link between quality and geography or the definition 
of product specification and quality standards. Indeed, when a certification mark includes 
a geographic name it is understood that the only attribute to be certified is the origin of 
the good (USPTO 2007). Hence, the informational content of GIs in the form of 
certification marks might substantially differ from that of GIs in the form of appellations. 
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are clustered in the upper portion of the appellation distribution. At each iteration (from 
COOL to appellations to PDOs), the derived conditional distribution is characterized by a 
higher mean and a smaller variance. Based on this conceptual framework, geographical 
origin labels are valuable to consumers for two reasons: (i) they provide a more precise 
indication of the expected quality of a given product (i.e., the expected mean of the 
distribution), thus improving the ability of the consumer to match with a desired quality 
(valued by both risk neutral and risk averse consumers) and (ii) they reduce the quality 
dispersion around the expected mean thereby reducing uncertainty regarding the purchase 
(valued by risk averse consumers).  
In this paper, we investigate whether consumers indeed value the informational 
content of a set of geographical origin labels. Several empirical studies have attempted to 
quantify the value of specific GIs in isolation (see for example Bonnet and Simioni 2001; 
van der Lans et al. 2001; Scarpa and Del Giudice 2004; Santos and Ribeiro 2005; and 
Krystallis and Ness 2005).  For an overview of empirical studies see Réquillart (2007). 
Our contribution is the first to consider three types of geographical origin labels with 
different levels of geographical differentiation: country-of-origin labels and two types of 
GIs, protected designations of origin (PDO) and protected geographical indications 
(PGI). As well, our study is the first to evaluate one of the primary motivations for 
greater promotion and utilization of GIs by European producers and regulators - 
expanding exports outside of the EU area. Specifically, we consider consumer 
preferences and demand for European GIs in a third-party country outside of the EU and 
not involved in the production chain. In order to disentangle and assess the value of these 
  
 
105
origin labels, a stated-choice experiment was constructed and administered to a sample of 
adult Canadian consumers. The focus product, extra virgin olive oil, was selected because 
this type of oil represents a value-added product for which COOL and GI-labeling 
(specifically in the form of appellations) are a potentially powerful information and 
marketing tool.4  
Our empirical findings correspond with the outlined theoretical framework of 
geographical origin labels. We find that consumers' willingness to pay for oils varies by 
country of origin, and that with regard to the oils from a given country consumers have a 
greater willingness to pay for GI-labeled than non-GI labeled products. We also find 
evidence that consumers value PDOs more than PGIs, but the result is not as strong as 
that found for GI versus non-GI.  
Our findings provide evidence that country of origin and GI labels can assist 
consumers in making optimal consumption choices (i.e., what to buy and whether to buy 
a GI product or not) by improving the matching between consumers and products. 
Though the potential welfare gains due to more desirable resource allocations can only 
materialize when labels are credible and misleading information and counterfeited 
products are prevented. Hence, as a whole our finding are supportive of consumer 
protection policies and policy initiatives aimed at providing protection for geographical 
based labels. In addition, our finding that consumers are interested in and willing to pay 
                                                 
4
 We are not aware of extra virgin olive oil commercialized in Canada under a GI label in 
the form of a certification mark. Given the predominance of GIs in the form of 
appellations we limit our attention to this type of GIs. Moreover, a significant share of the 
extra virgin olive oil imported into Canada is from countries that extensively use GIs in 
the form of appellations.    
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for GI-labeled products supports the recent surge of interest by both developed and 
developing nations in protecting GIs and harnessing them as a marketing tool for 
expanding shares in export markets. 5 
In what follows, we first briefly present background information on the focus 
product, extra virgin olive oil. Then, we outline the choice experiment methodology 
employed for assessing consumers' valuations for geographical origin labels. The core of 
the article presents a discussion of the estimation results from a Bayesian mixed logit 
model with correlated coefficients using the full sample and three sub-samples obtained 
by partitioning consumers based on their purchasing location. Then, we conclude. 
 
4.3 Researched product 
There are several different governing bodies that establish standards for different types of 
olive oil.  The International Standards under resolution COI/T.15/NC no. 3-25 (revised 
June 2003) lists nine grades of olive oil in two primary categories, olive oil and olive 
pomace oil.  Extra virgin is the highest grade of olive oil.  It is obtained solely from the 
                                                 
5
 The EU and member States have been at the forefront in investing substantial resources 
to sponsor the GI certification system and to promote specific GIs in international 
markets, including the United States, Russia and China (see e.g., the Italian ministry of 
Agriculture’ website at http://www.agricolturaitalianaonline.gov.it). However, while the 
EU may have a longer history with GIs, other countries are introducing or expanding 
their own GI systems and promotion programs.  Examples include China (Xiaobing and 
Kireeva 2007), India (Rao 2006), South Korea (Suh and MacPherson 2007), Colombia 
(Teuber 2007). Kenya and Switzerland have an ongoing project aimed at developing a GI 
system of protection in Kenya and at raising awareness on GIs in the East African 
Community member states (see the Swiss Institute of Intellectual Property’s website at 
https://www.ige.ch/en.html). 
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fruit of the olive tree (Olea europa L.) with a chemical-free process that involves only 
pressure and is characterized by a natural level of low acidity (0.8%) (IOOC 2007).   
As a traditional component of the Mediterranean diet, olive oil consumption has 
historically been significant in the Mediterranean countries.  But, as this diet has gained 
popularity worldwide, consumption has grown considerably in many countries including 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Japan, and the United States (global demand has risen at an 
annual rate of about 5.3% since 1995/96 according to Türkekul et al. 2007).  According 
to the International Olive Oil council, imports of olive oil in Canada and the United 
States have increased from 64 million pounds in 1982 to 563 million pounds in 2005 
(IOOC 2006). 
Global olive oil production is concentrated in the Mediterranean countries with 
Italy, Greece, and Spain accounting for more than 70% of worldwide production.  
Smaller producing countries include Morocco, Portugal, Syria, Turkey, and Tunisia.  In 
2008, 23,074 tons of virgin and extra virgin olive oil were imported by Canada of which 
86% were from either Italy, Spain or Greece (Italy alone represents about 70% of the 
total import in quantity), with a total average Free on Board (FOB) price of 3280 
Euro/ton. The average price for Italian, Spanish, and Greek oils were 3258, 3469, and 
3808 Euro/ton respectively (Ismea – Gtis).  
Several empirical studies, all of which were conducted with domestic European 
consumers, have specifically considered consumer preferences for olive oil.  Krystallis 
and Ness (2005) find that GIs are relevant cues for several consumer segments in Greece.  
Freitas Santos and Cadima Ribeiro (2005) find that Portuguese consumers are willing to 
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pay up to a 30% price premium for GI-labeled olive oil. Van der Lans et al. (2001) find 
for Italian consumers of extra virgin olive oil that PDO labels influence preferences only 
indirectly through perceived quality. Finally, a study by Scarpa and Del Giudice (2004) 
on extra virgin olive oil in Italy finds that origin matters differently across cities and that 
there is a bias in preferences towards local products.  
 
4.4 Experimental procedure 
The data for this study was collected via face-to-face interviews of consumers in the 
Toronto area of Ontario, Canada. Respondents were interviewed based on a convenience 
sample with each interview lasting approximately 15 minutes.  Participants were screened 
for inclusion in the study based on two questions: whether they had (1) purchased and (2) 
consumed olive oil in the previous six months and three months respectively. Only those 
who answered both questions positively qualified for the study. Interviews were 
conducted during the course of a week at four food retail stores including one gourmet 
store, two medium-sized grocery stores and a farmers market in three different cities 
(Guelph, Hamilton, and Toronto). Different store types were chosen to capture different 
consumer segments.   
A total of 207 individuals completed the full interview process and provided 
complete responses. Table 1 summarizes participants’ socio-demographics.   
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Table 1. Socio-economic characteristics of sample 
Variable Variable definition Count % of Sample 
Gender Male 
Female 
83 
124 
40 
60 
Age in years 19 – 34 
35 – 50 
51 – 60 
Older than 60 
38 
82 
49 
38 
18 
40 
24 
18 
Education Primary / Secondary 
Undergraduate 
Graduate 
51 
113 
43 
24 
55 
21 
Income Less than CAD $ 49,999 
CAD $ 50,000 – 99,999 
More than CAD $ 100,000 
No Answer 
40 
86 
52 
30 
19 
42 
25 
14 
Household Size 1 Person  
2 Persons  
3 Persons  
4 Persons  
More than 4 Persons  
46 
82 
34 
34 
11 
22 
39 
17 
17 
5 
 
The core section of the interview consisted of a stated-choice experiment, 
following standard procedures (Louviere, Hensher and Swait 2000; Street and Burgess 
2007), in which the surveyed customers were shown sets of alternative product 
descriptions and asked to select the one they would purchase.  Specifically, in each of ten 
product scenarios, each participant was asked to select between two different olive oils 
and the “none-of-them” alternative, providing a total of 2070 responses. Each alternative 
olive oil was defined by a full set of characteristics (full-profile) including price, 
appearance, color, packaging size, production method (organic vs. non-organic), country 
  
 
110
of origin and GI-labels.6 Following van der Lans et al. (2001), color and appearance were 
chosen as attributes describing olive oil visually. They are search quality attributes used 
by consumers to evaluate the product before purchase (Nelson 1970). Specifically, two 
colors (green, yellow) and two types of appearances (opaque, clear) were included. Three 
bottle sizes (0.5 lt., 0.75 lt. and 1 lt.) were also included. Based on the actual price range 
of extra virgin olive oils in the Canadian market, minimum and maximum price levels 
were identified. While usually the price spread should not be too large (Green and 
Srinivasan 1978), because of the presence of both conventional and organic olive oils, GI 
and non-GI labeled olive oils, as well as different bottle sizes, a price spread from 7 to 35 
CAD $ was considered.7  
With regard to credence attributes, two production methods (organic and non-
organic) and several COOL and GI labels. COOL labels included oils from the three 
main olive oil producer countries: Greece, Italy and Spain were considered. GI-labels 
included three Italian GI oils: Terra di Bari PDO, Garda PDO and Tuscany PGI. As our 
study includes several attributes and levels, we employed a fractional factorial design to 
define the set of alternatives used in the experiment applying the SAS macro as described 
in Kuhfeld (2001).  
 
 
                                                 
6
 Profiles are characterized by unbalanced levels. Related studies (Van der Lans et al. 
2001; Scarpa and Del Giudice 2004) also rely upon unbalanced profiles. 
 
7
 For example, organic olive oils in Spain capture a price premium varying from 30-35% 
for loose oil to 100% for bottled oil (Medicamento and De Gennaro 2006). 
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4.5 A mixed logit model of consumers’ choices 
Consumers’ choices of olive oils are modeled utilizing a random utility based discrete 
choice model, the multinomial mixed logit (MXL) with random and correlated 
coefficients. The MXL model is selected because, unlike the fixed coefficient 
multinomial logit (and related variants), it allows for taste heterogeneity unconditional on 
socio-economic covariates. Previous studies have shown that taste variation is only 
partially linked to, and poorly explained by, demographics such as age, education, 
gender, and income (Baker and Burnham 2001; West et al. 2003).  Moreover, as Scarpa 
and Del Gudice (2004) note, a correlation structure across tastes for different attributes is 
typically present in the case of gourmet foods (such as extra virgin olive oil). This 
supports consideration of a correlated, over independent, distribution of taste parameters.  
 
4.5.1 Model specification and estimation 
Each of the study participants, i  ( 1,..., ;i N= 207N = ), faced ten choice situations 
( 1,..., ;t T=  10T = ). At each choice situation, the consumer was presented with a set of 
alternatives. Each set contained three elements: two olive oils and the “none-of-them” 
alternative.  In total, there were twenty-one alternatives, indexed by j  ( 1,..., ;j J= 21J = ), 
including twenty olive oils and the “none-of-them” option. Let tJ  represent the set of 
alternatives at choice situation t . The utility of person i  from alternative j , in choice 
situation t  is specified as  ijt ijt ijtU V ε= +  where 
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( )Oi j Ai j Yi j Ii j Ki j Gi j Ni j P jijt jO A Y I K G N pV Sizeβ β β β β β β β+ + + + + + +=
 
(1) 
where ijtε  is distributed iid extreme value over individuals, alternatives and time, jp
 
is 
the price per liter in CAD$ of alternative j  and jSize
 
is the size of the bottle in liters.8 
All remaining variables are dummies and described in table 2. In addition to the 
coefficients capturing the olive oil attributes (organic, appearance, country-of-origin and 
GI labels), we included one dummy variable capturing the “none-of-them” alternative 
(Hu, Veeman and Adamowicz 2005). In addition to the main model in equation (1) we 
estimated two additional alternative models (model 2 and model 3), that differ from the 
model in (1) with regards to their classification of the GI variable. The variables included 
in all the models are summarized in table 2.  
 
Table 2. Summary of other variables used in the analysis 
Variable Variable definition 
 O 1 if organic 
A 1 if clear, 0 if opaque 
Y 1 if yellow, 0 if green 
Ia 1 if Italian oil 
Ka 
N 
1 if Greek oil 
1 if “none-of-them” 
   
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 GI variable definition 
G   1 if any GI (Tuscany, Terra di Bari, Garda) 
 PGI  1 if PGI Tuscany 
 PDO  1 if PDO Terra di Bari or PDO Garda 
  T 1 if PGI Tuscany 
  B 1 if PDO Terra di Bari 
  R 1 if PDO Garda 
a
 An indicator for Spanish olive oil is omitted. 
                                                 
8
 For the estimation purposes, the size of the “none-of-above” alternative is set to one 
(Alfnes et al. 2006). 
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The utility specification, where size multiplies all attributes coefficients, implies a 
proportional increase in utility with an increase in size (Alfnes et al. 2006). To investigate 
the effect of bottle size per se on consumer choices, we also test an alternative utility 
specification that includes size as an additional explanatory variable but rejected the 
model via a likelihood ratio test. Let 1 ,...,i i iTy y y=
 
denote individual i ’s sequence of 
choices. Conditional on , ,{ ,..., }i O i N iβ β β= , and given the independent error structure, the 
probability of i ’s sequence of choices is equal to 
 
1
( | )
iy tit
ijt
t
VT
i V
t
j J
e
L y
e
β
=
∈
 
 
=
 
  
∏
∑
     (2) 
which corresponds to a product of logits. The unconditional probability of individual i ’s 
sequence of choices is the integral of the expression ( | )iL y β  over β , 
( | , ) ( | ) ( | , )i iL y b W L y f b W dβ β β= ∫ , where ( | , )f b Wβ  is the multivariate distribution of 
the parameters. Summing the logarithm of the unconditional probabilities gives the log-
likelihood function, ln ( | , )ii L y b W∑ . We assume a fixed price coefficient and 
multivariate normally distributed coefficients for the remaining variables in the model 
(Bonnet and Simioni 2001; Scarpa and Del Giudice 2004). The normal distribution, 
having support on both the negative and positive range, implies that some consumers like 
and some consumers dislike the considered attributes. With a fixed price coefficient, the 
willingness to pay is equal to the ratio of the attribute’s coefficient to the price 
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coefficient. For example /O Pβ β  is the additional WTP for one liter of organic oil 
compared to an otherwise equivalent but not organic oil.  In addition, with a fixed price 
coefficient, the distribution of WTP corresponds to the scaled distribution of the 
attribute’s coefficient. 
Parameter estimates for βP , b and W can be obtained by simulated maximum 
likelihood methods or via a hierarchical Bayesian procedure following the approach 
developed by Allenby (1997) and generalized by Train (2001). We use the second 
method.9 Specifically, we estimate the mixed logit model using Matlab code written by 
Train for panel data with correlated coefficients based on hierarchical Bayes.10 The 
Bayesian approach has been used in previous studies of consumers’ preferences for food 
products (e.g., Hu et al. 2006). 
 
4.6 Empirical results 
As a baseline set of estimates, Table 3 presents results for the fixed coefficient 
multinomial logit and MXL with random (normal) independent coefficients for the utility 
specification in (1).  
                                                 
9 For readers who may be less familiar with Bayesian methods, the Bernstein-von Misen 
theorem guarantees that the estimators resulting from the Bayesian procedure has the 
same properties as the large sample maximum likelihood estimator. “The researcher can 
therefore use the Bayesian procedures to obtain parameter estimates and then interpret 
them as if they were maximum likelihood estimates” (Train 2003: 287), where “…the 
mean of the posterior provides the point estimate and the standard deviation of the 
posterior provides the standard error” (Train 2003: 294).  
 
10
 Available at Train's webpage http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~train/software.html. 
  
 
115
 
Table 3. MNL and independent coefficient MXL parameter estimates 
 
 Independent coefficient MXL  
 
MNL 
 Mean coeff. Variance coeff.  Mean coeff. 
Price -0.253*** 
(0.023) 
-  -0.194*** 
(0.017) 
Organic 2.385*** 
(0. 515) 
7.495*** 
(1.987) 
 2.525*** 
(0.359) 
Clear -0.179 
(0. 174) 
1.699*** 
(0.600) 
 -0.039 
(0.099) 
Yellow 0.340 
(0. 218) 
1.260*** 
(0.588) 
 0.489*** 
(0.149) 
Italy  2.391*** 
(0. 292) 
4.192*** 
(1.222) 
 1.485*** 
(0.151) 
Greece 0.114 
(0. 275) 
1.127 
(0.850) 
 0.353 
(0.192) 
GIs 1.015*** 
(0. 262) 
4.282*** 
(1.263) 
 0.790*** 
(0.159) 
None-of-Them -9.494*** 
(1.162) 
17.787*** 
(6.902) 
 -3.778*** 
(0.253) 
Log-Likelihood    -1263   -1433 
                        The asterisks indicate the level of significance at 1% for ***, 5% for **, and 10% for *. 
 
  
Based on the likelihood ratio test we reject both models in favor of the MXL model with 
random correlated coefficients that is presented in Table 4 (model 1).  
 
Table 4. Parameters estimates of  mixed logit models with random correlated coefficients 
 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 
Mean 
coeff. 
Variance 
coeff. 
S>0a WTPb 
 
Mean 
coeff. 
Variance 
coeff. 
S>0a WTPb 
 
Mean 
coeff. 
Variance 
coeff. 
S>0a WTPb 
Price -0.306*** 
(0.029) 
- - -  -0.373*** 
(0.046) 
- - -  0.393*** 
(0.053) 
- - - 
Organic 2.576*** 
(0.617) 
5.227*** 
(2.064) 
77% 8.42  3.096*** 
(0.638) 
4.967*  
 (2.584) 
91% 8.30  5.187*** 
(0.983) 
7.043*** 
(2.726) 
97% 13.20 
Clear 0.041 
(0.245) 
2.977*** 
(0.858) 
67% 0.13  -0.202 
(0.543) 
 6.710*** 
(2.074) 
67% -0.54  0.486 
(0.630) 
6.139*** 
(2.213) 
53% 1.24 
Yellow 0.000 
(0.303) 
3.089*** 
(1.048) 
51% 0.00  0.054 
(0.367) 
5.074*** 
(1.644) 
64% 0.14  1.009* 
(0.490) 
4.784*** 
(1.659) 
67% 2.57 
Italy  2.899*** 
(0.415) 
9.558*** 
(2.951) 
86% 9.48  2.915*** 
(0.449) 
10.750*** 
(3.231) 
85% 7.81  3.017*** 
(0.596) 
11.801*** 
(3.786) 
81% 7.68 
Greece 0.368 
(0.395) 
5.826*** 
(2.120) 
60% 1.20  0.016 
(0.412) 
6.489*** 
(2.353) 
54% 0.04  0.128 
(0.442) 
8.355*** 
(3.197) 
52% 0.33 
GIs 1.451*** 
(0.284) 
3.955*** 
(1.263) 
70% 4.74  
- - - -  - - - - 
PGI Tuscany 
- - - - 
 1.669*** 
(0.296) 
3.321*** 
(1.209) 
76% 4.48  1.612*** 
(0.327) 
3.499*** 
(1.255) 
78% 4.10 
Other GIs c 
- - - - 
 2.109* 
(1.278) 
20.611*** 
(7.045) 
57% 5.66  
- - - - 
PDO Terra di Bari 
- - - - 
 
- - - - 
 -0.769 
(1.825) 
17.963 
(12.500) 
82% -1.96 
PDO Garda 
- - - - 
 
- - - - 
 1.535 
(1.533) 
30.083* 
(14.506) 
60% 3.91 
None-of-Them -9.185*** 
(1.070) 
24.452*** 
(7.771) - - 
 -10.904*** 
(1.857) 
38.647*** 
(16.217) - - 
 -
8.673*** 
(2.059) 
24.336 
(15.836) 
96% 
- 
Log-Likelihood -1232  
  
 -1215  
  
 -1204   
 
The asterisks indicate the level of significance at 1% for ***, 5% for **, and 10% for *. 
a
 S > 0 denotes share of consumers with positive preferences. 
b
 Willingness to pay is measured in Canadian dollars per Liter. 
c
 Other GI denotes a PDO Terra di Bari or PDO Garda olive oil (i.e. not a Tuscan GI) 
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Table 4 also presents estimates for two alternative models that differ with regards to their 
classification of the GI variable(s).1  In the base model (model 1), a single dummy variable 
“GIs” is included (equal to 1 for PDO Terra di Bari, PDO Garda or PGI Tuscany oils). In 
model 2, two dummy variables are used to separate the two types of GIs, PDO and PGI (one 
dummy equal to 1 for PGI Tuscany and one dummy equal to 1 for PDO Terra di Bari or PDO 
Garda oils).  Finally, model 3 includes three dummy variables, one for each of the considered 
GI labels (Tuscany, Terra di Bari and Garda). 
 In all three models price is negative and statistically different from zero as one would 
expect. With regard to COOL, in each of the three models the posterior mean for the Italy 
coefficient is found to be positive and statistically different from zero.  The estimates reveal 
that Canadian consumers (81-86% depending upon the model) prefer Italian olive oils over 
Spanish oils and are willing to pay a considerable premium (ranging from 7.68 to 9.48 
CAD$/Liter) for Italian oils.2  As well, the variance coefficient for Italy is found to be 
significant and sizable indicating that consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences for 
Italian oils.  The posterior mean of the Greece coefficient is not found to be significant 
indicating that the sample of Canadian consumers does not prefer Greek over Spanish oils or 
vice versa. 
 In model 1, the coefficient for the single included GI dummy variable is positive and 
significant indicating that consumers respond to and are willing to pay a premium for GI 
olive oils. But, when comparing the estimates for Italian labels and GI labels, an interesting 
                                                 
1
 Estimates of the variance-covariance matrix for the three models are available upon request 
from the authors. 
 
2
 This corresponds with the “informal notion” that Italy enjoys an unrivaled international 
reputation for olive oil (Lusk et al. 2006; Anania and Pupo D’Andrea 2007).   
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result emerges. For both types of oils, Italian and Italian GI, a large percentage of consumers 
are estimated to have a positive preference, but the percentage is greater for Italian oils over 
GI oils (86% versus 70%). As well, the average WTP for Italian oils is twice that of the GI 
oils (9.48 versus 4.74 CAD$/Liter). This indicates that, while consumers are willing to pay a 
premium for Italian COOL and GI labels, the country-of-origin label captures much of the 
premium. This result is found to be consistent across the three models. 
 To test the hypothesis that consumers value PDO more than PGI, in model 2 dummy 
variables are included to separate the PGI (Tuscany PGI) from the PDO labels (Terra di Bari 
PDO and Garda PDO). Consistent with expectations, we find that consumers are willing to 
pay slightly more on average for the PDO than for the PGI oils (5.66 versus 4.48 
CAD$/Liter). While this result provides evidence that PDOs are considered superior to PGIs 
(in fact, PDOs require a stronger geography-quality link in order to obtain certification than 
PGI), particularly given that the PGI used in this study is from a well-known tourist region 
associated with fine food products while the PDOs are from lesser known regions, it presents 
only part of the picture.  We also find that for the PDOs, the estimated variance coefficient is 
quite large indicating sizable heterogeneity among the sample’s preferences for these GIs.  
As well, the estimated share of consumers with positive preferences is only slightly more 
than half (57%).  Conversely, for the Tuscan GI, the variance is magnitudes less and a larger 
share has positive preferences (76%).  These results combined indicate that Tuscany is a 
more recognizable and widely valued GI, even though the premium consumers are willing to 
pay is lower than for the less recognized, but higher geography-quality linked, PDO oils. 
 Of the other considered attributes, neither of the two appearance features (opaque vs. 
clear and yellow vs. green) are found to play a significant role in determining consumers’ 
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choices of oils.  This falls in line with expectations that visual attributes of olive oils are not 
reliable cues for quality.3 
 The estimates across the three models provide strong evidence that consumers have 
favorable views of organic olive oils.  In models 1 and 2 the estimated percentage of 
consumers with positive preferences for organic olive oils is 77% and 91% respectively.  
These results straddle the findings by Scarpa and Del Giudice (2004) that about 80% of their 
sample of Italian consumers prefer organic olive oils.  For the two models, we estimate that 
consumers are willing to pay a sizable premium for organic olive oils of between 8.30 and 
8.42 CAD$/Liter. 
 
4.6.1 Taste variation based on consumer shopping location 
While the results presented in the previous section provide strong evidence that consumers 
value both COOL and GI labels (with a greater value for the former), the models also 
indicate that there is significant taste heterogeneity among individuals. In lieu of considering 
commonly available socio-economic attributes (e.g., gender or age), which have been shown 
to be poor explanatory variables for taste heterogeneity, we consider differences in 
preferences based upon consumer shopping locations. Under the assumption that attributes 
unobserved by the researcher result in consumer self-selection in terms of their shopping 
locale, we can exploit this to compare preferences across consumer segments. 
As discussed in the experimental procedure section, the sample for this study was 
drawn from three store types: supermarkets, gourmet stores, and farmers markets. One would 
                                                 
3
 The appearance (opaque vs. clear) and the color of olive oil widely depend on the olives’ 
variety and the transformation techniques (settling and filtration) and are generally not 
reliable indications of the quality of olive oil. 
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expect preferences and unobserved individual level attributes to be related to consumers’ 
selection of their primary shopping markets. For example, one might postulate that an 
individual who chooses to shop at a gourmet store would have a greater preference for ethnic 
or traditional products.  As well, one might expect that individuals who choose to shop at 
farmers markets would have stronger preferences for natural, local and fresh foods when 
compared to shoppers at other locations. 
To compare estimates across shopping locations, model 1 from the previous section 
was re-estimated using data from three sub-samples of consumers partitioned based upon 
their interview location.  Table 5 presents, for each of the shopping locations, the ratio of the 
estimated posterior means for three measures comparing relative valuations: Italy COOL / 
Organic, GI / Organic, and Italy COOL / GI. 
 
Table 5. Ratio of mean estimates 
Shopping location Sample size Italy/Organic GI/Organic Italy/GI 
Gourmet store 57 3.42 1.78 1.92 
Supermarket 101 0.79 0.46 1.71 
Farmer market 49 0.58 0.35 1.65 
 
From the ratios presented in table 5, it is evident that there are significant differences 
in preferences across the three shopping location sub-samples.  Ceteris paribus, gourmet store 
patrons prefer Italian over organic olive oils by a significant factor of 3.42. Conversely, for 
supermarket and farmers market shoppers, the ratios are less than one indicating that they 
prefer organic over Italian oils. When considering GI versus organic olive oil, the picture is 
similar with gourmet store patrons preferring the former and supermarket and farmer market 
patrons preferring the latter.  Interestingly, the relative preference for Italy versus GI is fairly 
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similar across the three shopping locations and ranges from a factor of 1.65 to 1.92.  This 
indicates that preference for Italy COOL over Italy GI labels is consistent across consumers 
in different shopping segments. As a whole, the results presented in table 5 tend to support 
the hypothesis that consumers who self-select in terms of their shopping location do have 
varying preferences. But the greatest variation is found to be between gourmet and non-
gourmet shoppers in terms of their relative valuations for geographical origin labeled olive 
oils and organic olive oils. 
 
4.7 Conclusions 
Motivated by the recognition that geography is often correlated with, or an important 
determinant of, the overall quality of agricultural products – the concept of terroir (Barham 
2003; Josling 2006) – regulators, consumer groups, and industry representatives have 
increasingly considered the potential role of geographical origin labels as consumer 
information and marketing tools. In this article we investigate whether consumers indeed 
recognize and value the informational content of a variety of nested geographical origin 
labels. In particular, this study has disentangled three types of geographical origin labels with 
different levels of geographical differentiation: country-of-origin labels and two types of GIs, 
protected designations of origin (PDO) and protected geographical indications (PGI).  
Furthermore, in contrast to previous studies addressing European GIs, we have considered 
their potential in an important export market; thus facilitating an assessment of the value and 
potential for GIs as a tool for expanding export share. 
 We find that, within the context of a high quality value-added commodity such as 
extra virgin olive oil, consumers' willingness to pay for oils from different countries varies, 
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ceteris paribus, across countries, and that within a country consumers have a greater 
willingness to pay for GI-labeled than non-GI labeled products. We also find evidence that 
consumers value PDOs more than PGIs, but the result is not as strong as that found for GI 
versus non-GI. Finally, to better account for taste heterogeneity among consumers, we 
partition the sample on the basis of consumers' choice of shopping location and find that 
different consumer groups vary to a large degree in their valuations for COOL, GI, and 
organic olive oils. 
 As a whole, our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that geographical origin 
labels are valued by consumers for their ability to provide information regarding the quality 
of the product and that the value is increasing with the informational content. Nevertheless, 
as the data show, the additional premia for GIs and PDO are relatively smaller than the 
premium for COOL, indicating that there might be decreasing returns to geographical 
labeling. Therefore, given that pursuing and receiving protected geographical indication 
status and meeting the required standards is not without cost, producers considering further 
geographical differentiation of their products beyond the country of origin level should 
interpret our findings with caution.  
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CHAPTER 5: STRENGTH OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION FOR 
GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS: PROMOTION INCENTIVES AND  
CROSS-BORDER WELFARE EFFECTS 
 
5.1 Abstract 
This paper addresses the question of how a strengthening of current international intellectual 
property (IP) provisions for geographical indications (GIs) would affect the market outcomes 
and the distribution of welfare. We explicitly considers the role of promotion in expanding 
market demand when consumers lack information regarding either the existence or the 
features of GI and GI-like products. The model highlights the diverging interests of GI-
exporting and GI-importing countries with regard to GI provisions in international markets 
and provides a key to interpret the current controversy over GIs among WTO members. 
 
5.2 Introduction 
Geographical Indications (GIs) are names of places or regions used to brand goods with a 
distinct geographical connotation. Many GIs pertain to wines (e.g., Champagne and 
Burgundy), and agricultural and food products (e.g., Boseong’ green tea and Parmigiano-
Reggiano cheese). The characterizing feature of GI products is that some quality attribute of 
interest to consumers is considered to be inherently linked to, or determined by, the nature of 
the geographic environment in which production takes place (e.g., climate conditions, soil 
composition, local knowledge, traditional production methods)—i.e., to the notion of 
“terroir” (Josling 2006). GIs are similar to trademarks in that they identify the origin or the 
source of the good and help differentiate individual products among similar goods by 
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communicating the “specific quality” that is due to the geographical origin (Kireeva 2009). 
As a result of these important economic functions, GIs have gained recognition as a distinct 
form of intellectual property (IP) rights in the TRIPS agreement of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).  
Whereas the TRIPS agreement requires WTO member countries to provide a 
minimum level of protection for GI names,1  the form and strength of IP protection granted to 
GIs varies greatly among countries. In the European Union (EU), GI laws require that only 
products genuinely originating in a given area can be labeled with the area’s geographic 
name (i.e., the rights over the use of GI names for branding are exclusive to the producers 
operating in the designated production areas). The strong protection of GI names enforced in 
the EU is not mirrored by many countries internationally where it is legally permissible to 
use GI names to label products that do not originate within the denoted geographical region 
(i.e., IP rights are not exclusive). For example, in the United States it is permissible to label 
sparkling wines produced in California as Champagne and to label a cheese made in 
Wisconsin as Romano.2   
These conflicting forms and strengths of IP protection among countries is a source of 
ongoing controversy internationally and is a topic of current debate among WTO members. 
Some countries, predominantly those with large stocks of GI products, are in favor of more 
stringent IP policies for GIs. They are requesting for IP rights over GIs to become exclusive, 
                                                 
1
 Specifically, the TRIPS agreement requires WTO member countries to provide legal means 
to prevent any use of GI names “which constitutes an act of unfair competition” (TRIPS 
Art.22.2). 
 
2
 This branding practice is subject to some restrictions including the fact that the “real origin” 
of the product must be specified on the label. 
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effectively reallocating IP rights from producers outside to producers inside the GI regions. 
Countries in opposition, including the United States, have made efforts to block measures to 
strengthen IP provisions for GIs. This paper represents the first contribution that formalizes 
the open economy implications of GIs and addresses the timely question of how a change in 
the current IP policy for GIs would affect market outcomes and the distribution of welfare 
internationally.  
The focus of our analysis is on the “strength” of IP protection. Specifically, we 
analyze how the strength of IP protection affects the incentives of producers to promote (i.e., 
to provide information to consumers about products) and, in turn, how it affects the 
distribution of welfare among producer groups and consumers, and across international 
markets. The polar case of strongest IP rights is represented by EU regulations on GIs which, 
as explained above, guarantee protection in any labeling context. To comply with EU 
regulations, labels used by producers outside a given GI area must be significantly different 
from the area’s geographical name so as to avoid even the “evocation” of the GI in the minds 
of the consumers. For example, the trademark Cambozola for blue cheese, which arguably 
sounds similar to Gorgonzola, was challenged on the basis of evocation of the protected 
designation of origin Gorgonzola. The other polar case is represented by the lack of any 
protection for GI names, a hypothetical case in which (plain) counterfeiting is allowed. 
Currently, US laws fall in between these two polar cases. As discussed earlier, US law 
allows, under certain conditions, the use of a GI name (or similar-sounding names) to label 
products independently of the product’s origin.   
In line with existing literature on GIs (e.g., Zago and Pick 2004; Anania and Nisticó 
2004; Lence et al. 2007; Moschini, Menapace and Pick 2008), our analysis is based on the 
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assumption that GI products possess some “specific quality” valued by consumers that is due 
to the geographical origin and cannot be replicated elsewhere, and that consumers value, 
albeit to a lesser extent, a “generic version” of the product that can be produced anywhere but 
is devoid of the “specific quality.” Moreover, our analysis complements and adds to existing 
studies by explicitly considering the role of promotion. When consumers lack information 
regarding the existence or the features of a product, there is scope for producers to expand 
market demand through promotion. Promotion, in this context, has an “informational 
function” similar to the “extending reach” function of advertising discussed by Norman, 
Pepall and Richards (2008). In their words, advertising (here promotion) “…informs 
consumes how to extract utility from the product, either by telling them of its existence in the 
first place or, instead, how properly to make use of it” (Norman, Pepall and Richards 2008 p. 
720). 
By affecting the labeling options for producers, the strength of IP rights indirectly 
affects the ability of promotion to inform consumers in two possible ways. First, weak IP 
rights might favor spillovers of information across products. For example, a promotional 
effort that informs consumers that “Pecorino Romano” is a “hard, salty and sharp” cheese 
also informs consumers that all Romano labeled cheese is “hard, salty and sharp.” Hence, 
promotion by either GI or GI-like-product producers expands the demand facing all firms 
when products share similar labels. Other things equal, the presence of spillovers increases 
the amount of information generated by each dollar spent in promotion, but also creates the 
potential for free-riding behavior. Second, weak IP rights might favor the dilution of the 
“specific” informational content of GI promotion. When products share the same name, it 
might be more difficult for GI producers to successfully inform consumers about the 
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distinctive features of the GI so that, with some probability, the piece of information 
regarding the GI “specific quality” goes unnoticed. Ceteris paribus, dilution reduces the 
amount of information produced by each dollar spent by GI producers, thereby reducing the 
incentive of GI producers to promote. 
In this market environment, producers of the GI-like product have two types of 
incentives to use brand names that resemble the GI. One consists of the counterfeiting 
motive, i.e., firms producing a lesser quality product have the incentive to pass off their 
products as that of a better quality competitor to capture the price premium associated with 
the better quality. A second motive—a  novel feature of our paper in the GI literature—is that 
firms can free ride on information spillovers (and information dilution) of the promotion of a 
substitute good. Therefore, even when consumers are not confused or misled by the generic 
firms’ labels into believing that the their product is a GI, producers of the GI-like product 
might still be better off by choosing labels that are as similar as legally permissible to the GI. 
In this paper, we limit ourselves to the second of these two motives and assume that the 
strength of the IP policy effectively determines the labeling choice of the firms producing the 
GI-like product thereby determining the degree of information spillover and information 
dilution. 
The presence of information spillovers/dilution in the absence of exclusive IP rights 
has been ignored in previous research and, hence, implicitly assumed to be of no value/cost 
for producers or consumers. As is explored in this article, this omission in previous research 
has a significant impact on welfare analysis of IP protection policies for GIs.  
In what follows, we specify a model that parsimoniously captures the key elements of 
the IP policies concerning GIs and the critical elements that characterize GI markets. 
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Specifically, with regard to the supply of GIs, our model allows for the existence of both 
economies of scale at the industry level due to the collective behavior of the GI producers 
(i.e., GI producers share fixed costs), and diseconomies of scale at the industry level that 
could arise from the geographic limitations characterizing GIs. In line with empirical 
literature documenting the existence of market power in oligopolistic food markets, with 
regard to the GI-like (or substitute) product we consider an oligopolistic industry. The effects 
of different IP provisions for GIs are then analyzed in a two-stage game framework. In the 
first stage, producers decide how much to promote and, in the second stage, firms compete in 
quantities.  
We show that GI-importing and GI-exporting countries have divergent interests when 
it comes to the degree of IP protection to afford to GIs in international markets. Specifically, 
we show that exporting countries would likely benefit from a strengthening of current GI 
provisions. Stronger IP provisions for GIs, in fact, favor the expansion of the GI industry and 
increase the ability of GI producers to extract rents from the presence of scarce factors owned 
by producers within the GI area. Importing countries, on the other hand, stand to lose from a 
further strengthening of current IP provisions. We show that, for importing countries, the 
largest gains from IP rights are achieved by granting an intermediate level of protection that 
maximizes GI producers’ incentives to provide consumer information through promotion. 
The information provided through promotion benefits the producers of the GI-like good by 
expanding the demand for their product. For producers of the GI-like good stronger IP rights 
are likely to yield losses for two reasons. First, with stronger IP rights we find that GI 
producers tend to reduce the amount invested in promotion. Second, the promotion by GI 
producers is less likely to expand the demand for GI-like products because the degree of 
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substitutability between GI and GI-like products declines in consumers’ eyes as IP rights 
strengthen. Finally, we show that domestic consumers in the GI-importing country also might 
have relatively little to gain from stronger GI policies, especially when the domestic sector 
has limited market power. 
In the next section, we present the structure of the model and derive equilibrium 
conditions. Next, we discuss the welfare implications of various degree of IP protection for 
GIs for producer groups, consumers, GI-importing and GI-exporting countries. Finally, we 
conclude. 
 
5.3 Structure of the model 
We consider a market with two goods, G and S.  Good G
 
represents a GI product and good S 
represents the GI-like product (S stands for substitute). Both products G and S are 
characterized by the same basic attributes measured by the parameter 0u > . Product G, in 
addition, is characterized by a “specific quality” that is measured by the parameter 0h > . 
Both u  and h  are exogenous. 
Good G is assumed to be produced by a competitive industry with free entry, 
characterized by numerous potential firms and diseconomies of scale at the industry level 
(Moschini, Menapace and Pick 2008). Specifically, we assume that each potential firm either 
produces at an optimal efficient scale, equal to 0>ℓ , or stays out of the market. Firms are 
heterogeneous with respect to their production cost, which is determined by the inefficiency 
parameter η . We let the variable cost of a firm of type η  be equal to ( )c v δηη = + . For 
simplicity, we assume that the distribution of producers types is uniform over the interval, 
η ∈ ∞[0, )U . 
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Active firms also incur promotion costs. Whereas firms act as independent profit-
maximizers when deciding whether to produce or not (i.e., whether to join the industry) and 
take prices and promotion costs as given, the decision of how much to promote is made 
collectively by the producer association representing the industry so as to maximize the 
aggregate industry profit (Lence et al. 2007; Moschini, Menapace and Pick 2008). Promotion 
costs are shared equally on a per-firm (or, equivalently, per-unit) basis. We denote by 0F ≥
 
the aggregate investment in promotion by sector G. 
We assume that good S is produced by an oligopolistic industry. The presence of 
oligopolistic instances and market power in the food sector has been extensively documented 
by a rich empirical literature (e.g., Gisser 1982; Bhuyan and Lopez 1997; Sexton 2000; 
Buccirossi, Marette and Schiavina 2002; Connor 2003). Specifically, we assume that good S 
is produced by an oligopolistic industry with N∈ℕ
 
firms and a constant marginal cost of 
production equal to 0c ≥ . Each firm 1,...,j N=  invests an amount 0jk ≥  in promotion. We 
denote the aggregate amount of promotion invested by firms producing good S by 0K ≥ . 
Hence, 1 ... ...j NK k k k= + + + + .  
 
5.3.1 Promotion, consumer information and the strength of IP rights 
We assume that, before promotion takes place, consumers have no knowledge regarding the 
products’ characteristics, u  and h . Hence, before promotion takes place, all consumers are 
in the “no information” set (information set 1 in table 1). Consumers can nevertheless 
become informed about u  and h
 
through promotion.  
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The promotional message of the S-producers consists of one piece of information 
regarding u .  The message of group G consists of two pieces of information regarding u  and 
h . Given the aggregate dollar amount invested in promotion by the producer group of good 
G and by the firms producing good S, 0F ≥  and 0K ≥ , the shares of the potential market, 
[0,1]α ∈  and [0,1]β ∈ , reached by the promotion of good G and good S are assumed to be 
equal to  
    
21 t Feα −= −                 (12) 
    
21 Ke τβ −= −
    
            (13) 
respectively. Functions (12) and (13) are increasing and globally concave in their arguments, 
F
 
and K . This means that larger shares of consumers can be reached by increasing the 
amount of promotion but at a decreasing rate. In addition, as F  and K
 
tend to zero, the 
marginal share of the potential market that can be reached by promotion tends to infinity. 
Ceteris paribus, greater values of the parameters 0t ≥  and 0τ ≥
 
correspond to larger shares 
of the potential market reached by promotion. Finally, we assume that each consumer is 
equally likely to be reached by either promotional message. 
After promotion has taken place, consumers will be in one of the information sets in 
table 1. With regard to product S, consumers have either no knowledge (information sets 1, 2 
and 3) or consumers know that the product is characterized by u  (information sets 4, 5 and 
6).  With regard to product G, consumers can either have no knowledge (information sets 1 
and 4), or consumers know that the product is characterized by u
 
(information sets 2 and 5), 
or that the product is characterized by both u
 
and h
 
(information sets 3 and 6). With regard 
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to product G, we rule out the possibility that consumers know about the “specific quality” but 
do not know about the basic attributes of the product. 
 
Table 1. Possible information sets 
  Product G 
 
 
 
Product S 
 No Info u  u h+  
No Info 1 2 3 
u  4 5 6 
 
The strength of IP rights for product G affects the ability of promotion to inform consumers 
about the products’ characteristics. Specifically, for given values of α
 
and β , the strength of 
IP rights determines the shares of the potential market that reach each of the information sets 
of table 1. The strength of IP rights is measured by the parameter [0,1]γ ∈ , where a higher 
value of γ
 
corresponds to stronger IP rights for the G-producers. The shares of the potential 
market in each information set after promotion has taken place are summarized in table 2. 
 
Table 2. Shares of potential market in each information set 
  Product G 
 
 
Product S 
 No Info u  u h+  
No Info ( )( )11 βα −−  0 ( )1γα β−  
u  ( )1γ βα−  ( )( )1 γ α β αβ− + −  γαβ  
 
 
To illustrate the content of table 2, we focus on two special cases, full IP protection, 
1γ = , and absence of IP rights, 0γ = . The case of 1γ =
 
represents a situation in which IP 
rights over GI names are exclusive to producers in the GI area so that competing producers 
are prevented from using GI-like labels that could generate spillovers of information across 
goods or the dilution of the information regarding the “specific quality” of the GI message. 
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When 1γ = , consumers are in one of the information sets 1, 3, 4, and 6. Consumers who 
have not been reached by either promotional message have no information about either 
product, and remain in information set 1. Given α
 
and β  and given the fact that each 
consumer is equally likely to be reached by either promotional message, the share of the 
potential market that is not reached by either message is equal to (1 )(1 )α β− − . Consumers 
who are reached by the promotional message of good S but not by that of good G, a share 
equal to (1 )α β− , learn that good S is characterized by u
 
but have no information regarding 
good G (they move to information set 4). Conversely, consumers who are reached by the 
promotional message of good G but not by that of good S, a share equal to (1 )α β− , learn 
that good G is characterized by u h+  but have no information regarding good S (they move 
to information set 3). Finally, consumers who are reached by the promotional message of 
both goods, a share equal to αβ , learn that good S is characterized by u  and that good G is 
characterized by u h+  (they move to information set  6).  
At the other extreme with 0γ = , in absence of IP rights for GI products, both the GI 
and the GI-like products bear identical looking labels and are therefore identical in the eyes 
of consumers. With identical labels across products, both spillovers of information across 
goods and the dilution of the “specific” information of the GI promotional message occur. 
When 0γ = , consumers can be in either information sets 1 or 5. As before, consumers who 
are not reached by either promotional message, a share equal to (1 )(1 )α β− − , have no 
information about either product and remain in information set 1. All other consumers 
instead move to information set 5. Consumers who are reached by the promotional message 
of good S
 
but not by that of good G, not only learn that good S is characterized by u  but also 
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learn that good G is characterized by u
 
because, since the labels are identical, the 
information spills over from good S to good G. Consumers who are reached by the 
promotional message of good G
 
but not by that of good S, learn that both products are 
characterized by u . This occurs because of the presence of both information spillovers and 
the dilution effect of identical looking labels. First, the “specific” content of the G
 
message is 
diluted, so that consumers learn that product G
 
is characterized by u  and learn nothing about 
h . Then, the information about product G spills over to product S
 
so that consumers learn 
that both goods are characterized by u . Finally, consumers who are reached by both 
promotional messages, learn that both goods are characterized by u  but do not learn 
anything about h
 
because of the dilution effect of similar labels. 
 
5.3.2 Consumer preferences 
We assume a population (i.e., potential market) of mass M + +∈ℝ  of heterogeneous 
consumers, with uniformly distributed types, ~ [0,1]Uθ  and unit demand (Mussa and Rosen 
1978). Consumer preferences under full information about both products (consumers in 
information set 6) are represented as follows 
 
 
 
( )   if one unit of product G is purchased
           if one unit of product S is purchased
0                      if nothing is purchased
G
S
u h p
U u p
θ
θ
 + −

= −


 
where Gp  and Sp
 
are the price of good G and S respectively. Consumers in all other 
information sets make purchasing decisions based on limited information they possess at the 
time of purchase. The only option for consumers in information set 1 is not to purchase the 
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product, yielding utility equal to zero. Consumers in information set 3 choose between 
purchasing product G and not purchasing anything based on the following options 
  
( )   if one unit of product G is purchased
0                      if nothing is purchased
Gu h pU
θ + −
= 

 
Consumers in information set 5, who erroneously assign quality u
 
instead of u h+  to good 
G, make their purchase decisions based on the following options 
 
 
 
          if one unit of product G is purchased
           if one unit of product S is purchased
0                      if nothing is purchased
G
S
u p
U u p
θ
θ
 −

= −


 
Finally, consumers in information set 4 choose between product S and nothing based on the 
following options 
  
          if one unit of product S is purchased 
0                     if nothing is purchased.
Su pU
θ −
= 

 
 
5.3.3 Timing of the game 
The game develops in two periods. At the beginning of period 1 all consumers are in 
information set 1. In period 1, promotion by both sectors takes place simultaneously. Each 
producer of good S, 1,...,j N= , independently chooses jk  and the producer association 
representing sector G chooses F . At the end of period 1, consumers reach new information 
sets according to table 2.   
In period 2, production takes place. Each firm producing good G
 
decides whether to 
produce or stay out of the market. Firms producing good S compete in quantities in a 
Cournot game. There is no discounting between periods.    
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Figure 1. Timing of the game 
 
5.4 Equilibrium 
By backward induction, we solve for the pure strategy Nash equilibrium that is symmetric in 
the S market. First, we analytically solve the second-period production game, find 
equilibrium prices as a function of the shares of the potential market in each information set 
(which are determined in the first-period) and obtain the objective functions that each of the 
S-producers and the producer association representing good G maximize in period one. Then, 
we solve for the optimal first-period promotion numerically. Whereas our analytical and 
numerical computations take into consideration the fact that the demand functions for good G 
and good S take different functional forms depending on prices, in what follows, for 
expositional simplicity, we report the analytic solution only for the case in which prices 
satisfy the following condition:   
 1.S G S
p p p
u h
−
≤ ≤
 
(14) 
Condition (14) implies that G Sp p> . 
 
 
Consumers 
are in 
Information 
Set 1
Period 1 Period 2
Consumers 
Reach New 
Information 
Sets
Producers 
Promote 
Production 
and 
Consumption 
occur
time
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Period 2 – Consumer Demands 
Define  
 x γαβ≡  (15) 
 ( )1y γα β≡ −   (16) 
 
z α β αβ γα≡ + − −
 (17) 
Given the assumed preference structure and under the price restriction (14), then: (i) x is the 
share of the potential market for which producers of good G and S compete, (ii)  y  
represents the share of the potential market that is exclusively supplied by the producers of 
good G, and (iii) z  is the share of the potential market that is exclusively supplied by the 
producers of good S. Note that x , y
 
and z
 
are functions of the amounts invested in 
promotion
 
F , 1k ,…, Nk . Given x , y
 
and z , market demands for good G and good S can be 
written as, respectively 
1 1
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )1 SG G
p
Q M x F K y F K px F K y F K
h u hh
    
= + − ++    
+   
                
(18) 
      
1
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )GS S
p u h
Q M x F K z F K px F K z F K
h uh u
 + 
= + − +  
  
                    
(19) 
where, again, 1 ... ...j NK k k k= + + + + .  
 
Period 2 – The Production Decision of the Firms Producing Good S 
In period 2, each firm 1,...,j N=
 
producing good S chooses the quantity jq  to solve (20),  
       ( )max 0( )
j
jS S
q
qp Q c  ≥−
 
                                     (20) 
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where ( )S Sp Q
 
is the inverse market demand for good S and 
1
N
S j
j
Q q
=
= ∑ . In a symmetric 
equilibrium with j iq q=  for all , 1,...,i j N= , the price of good S, Sp , and the aggregate 
quantity supplied, SQ , are equal to  
                   
( , ) ( , )
1
( , , )
11
( , ) ( , )
G
S G
p
x F K z F K
hp F K p cN
u hN
x F K z F K
uh u
 
+ 
= + 
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    +
= +
−−    +    
                      (22) 
 
Period 2 – The Production Decision of the Firms Producing Good G 
With regard to sector G, a firm of type η  incurs a unit cost equal to Fv δη
η
+ +
ℓ
, the sum of 
the unit cost of production, v δη+ , and the unit cost of promotion, F
ηℓ
. Taking the price Gp
 
and the unit cost as given, all producer types who can make a non-negative profit enter the 
industry. The producer type who is indifferent between entering the industry and staying out, 
*η , is determined by  (23) 
    * .
*G
F
p v δη
η
= + +
ℓ
               (23) 
Equation (23) effectively defines the competitive industry supply function of good G. 
We rely on Marshallian stability to identify the larger of the two roots of the quadratic 
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equation in (23) as the indifferent producer type in a stable equilibrium.3 Hence, the 
indifferent producer type is 
   
( ) ( )2 2 4
* ,
2
G G Fp v p v δη δ
+ −− −
=
ℓ ℓ ℓ
ℓ
 
and the industry supply of good G
 
is  
          
( ) ( )2 2 4
* .
2
G G
G
Fp v p v
Q
δ
η δ
+ −− −
= =
ℓ ℓ ℓ
ℓ
                        
(24) 
Good G
 
is produced in equilibrium only if 
           ( )2 2 4 0G Fp v δ− ≥− ℓ ℓ . 
Setting demand, as given by equation (18) derived earlier, equal to supply, equation (24), 
yields a quadratic equation in the price of good G. Again, we rely on Marshallian stability to 
identify the stable equilibrium price as the smaller of the two roots. We denote this price by4 
                 ( , , )G Sp F K p .                                                             (25) 
The stable equilibrium is shown in figure 2. Finally, industry’s profit is equal to ( )2*
2
δ ηℓ . 
The shaded area in figure 2 represents the industry’s profit when the scale of production, ℓ , 
is equal to 1. 
 
                                                 
3
 We rely on Marshallian stability rather than on Walrasian stability to identify the stable 
equilibrium because of the nature of the forward-falling supply curve that reflects the 
existence of industry-wide economies of scale (see e.g., Moschini, Menapace and Pick 2008). 
The Marshallian stable equilibrium is the larger root in quantity space and the smaller root in 
price space. 
 
4
 ( , , )G Sp F K p  is a long expression that we do not report for the sake of space. 
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gf 
Figure 2. The market of good G ( 1=ℓ ) 
 
 
Finally, (21)
 
and (25) provide a system of two equations in the two unknown second-
period equilibrium prices, ( )ˆ ,Gp F K
 
and  ( )ˆ ,Sp F K . We explicitly solve for this price pair as 
functions of the 1N + -tuplet 1, ,..., NF k k . 
 
Period 1 – The promotion decision of firms producing good S  
In period 1, each of the N
 
firms producing good S maximizes expected profits by choosing 
the amount of promotion jk . Specifically, each firm solves problem (26) 
                    
( )2
2
1
max ...
11 ( , ) ( , )
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j
k
G
j
M
u hN x F K z F K
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 (26) 
where, again, 1 ... ...j NK k k k= + + + + .  
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The first order condition of problem (26) yields the best response function 
1 1 1( , ,..., , ,..., )j j j Nk F k k k k− + . We have N  such best response functions, one for each of the 
firms producing good S. 
 
First stage – The promotion decision of the producer association representing good G 
The producer association representing good G maximizes the expected profit of the industry 
by choosing F . Specifically, the producer association solves problem (27) 
 
( )( )22 21max 0.ˆˆ ( ( , ) ) 4( , )8 GGF p F K v Fp F K v δδ  ≥+ − −−  ℓ ℓ ℓℓ  (27) 
The first order condition of problem (27) yields the best response function ( )F K . 
 
Numerical solution and equilibrium types 
We numerically approximate the 1N +  best response functions ( )F K , 
1 1 1( , ,..., , ,..., )j j j Nk F k k k k− + , 1,...,j N= , and solve for a pure strategy equilibrium (symmetric 
in the S market) for several values of the policy parameter γ  (that cover the entire range, 
[0,1] ) and for given sets of values of the other parameters of the model.  
The discussion that follows focuses on the case in which, in equilibrium, the price of 
good G is higher than the price of good S. We believe this case to be the most representative 
for GI products. A competitive price of good G above the oligopolistic price of good S is the 
result of higher costs for the G-producers compared to the S-producers. That GI products are 
typically characterized by significantly higher costs compared to substitute products has been 
documented in empirical studies (e.g., Belletti et al. 2007) and is a typical assumption of the 
existing theoretical investigations of GIs (e.g., Zago and Pick 2004; Anania and Nisticó 
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2004). The higher costs of GI products can be in part attributed to more expensive raw 
materials and/or ingredients and/or more “difficult” production conditions (e.g., marginal and 
mountain areas where topography and climatic conditions limit the possibilities for 
mechanization), and in part to additional costs associated with monitoring and certification of 
the GI product. 
For any given set of the parameter values that we have considered in the numerical 
analysis, we find the “type of equilibrium” to vary with the value of the IP parameter. 
Specifically, for the sets of parameter values that we have considered we find that in the 
upper range of values of γ  the prevailing prices satisfy the restrictions imposed by condition 
(14). The corresponding equilibrium is one in which producers of sectors G and S compete 
for consumers who have full knowledge of both goods (i.e., S-producers supply the share z , 
G-producers supply the share y  and both S- and G-producers supply the share x ). In the 
lower range of values of γ  instead the prevailing prices are such that producers of good G 
supply all the consumers that know h , the “specific quality” of good G (i.e., G-producers 
supply both the shares y  and x  and S-producers supply the share z ). The properties of the 
equilibrium and the welfare implications of the strength of IP rights are discussed next. 
 
5.5 Welfare effects of IP rights 
A first general result that emerges from our numerical analysis is that the S-producers tend to 
be better off with weak IP rights and G-producers tend to be better off with strong IP rights. 
Although this is not a surprising result, it is not fully in line with intuition. Weak IP rights, in 
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fact, decrease the return on promotion in terms of the ability to expand demand of both G- 
and S-producers, with a potential adverse effect on the profitability of both sectors.  
Specifically with regard to sector G, as IP rights get weaker (i.e., γ
 
is smaller), less 
expansion of demand can be achieved through an increase in the promotional effort by sector 
G (i.e., by an increase in α ) for any given level β  of promotion in sector S. Recall that 
(1 )y γα β≡ −  is the share of the market that is exclusively supplied by good G, and x γαβ≡  
is the share of the market in which both goods S and G are considered by the consumer.  
Then, holding β  constant, we find  
(1 ),
.
y
x
γ β
α
γβ
α
∂
= −
∂
∂
=
∂
 
Note that as γ  gets smaller (IP rights get weaker), the effectiveness of α  for the purpose of 
expanding demand (through the market shares x  and y ) diminishes. Also note that two 
factors contribute to reduce the return on the amount of promotion α  by the G-producers. 
First, weak IP rights favor spillovers of information about good G’s basic attributes to good 
S, so that a larger fraction of consumers who become informed about good G through 
promotion also learn about good S being a substitute for good G. Second, weak IP rights 
dilute the informational content of the promotional message of good G so that fewer 
consumers learn about good G’s specific quality for each dollar spent in promotion by sector 
G. In the model, information spillovers and dilution result in a “reallocation” of consumers 
from information set 3 to 5 (i.e., a decrease in y  through the information spillovers from 
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good G to good S and contemporaneous dilution of the G-message) and from information set 
6 to 5 (i.e., a decrease in x  through the dilution effect).  
Even though spillovers of information are symmetric across products, no gains come 
to sector G from information spillovers from the promotion of good S as long as the 
prevailing prices are such that G Sp p> . When G Sp p> , G-producers are unable to exploit the 
potential windfall of demand resulting from the promotional effort of the S-producers 
because learning the basic attributes of good G (i.e., u ) through spillovers of information 
about good S is not sufficient to convince consumers to purchase good G, a product that is 
more expensive but has the same quality as good S in the eyes of those consumers who do 
not know the specific quality (i.e., h ).  
But, the negative effect on the return on promotion of weak IP rights is not limited to 
the G-producers. Recall that z α β αβ γα≡ + − −  is the share of the market that is exclusively 
supplied by good S, and x γαβ≡  is the share of the market in which both goods S and G are 
considered by the consumer. Then, holding α  constant, we find 
1 ,
.
z
x
αβ
γαβ
∂
= −
∂
∂
=
∂
 
Note that as γ  gets smaller (IP rights get weaker), the effectiveness of β  for the purpose of 
expanding demand through the market shares x diminishes.  
But, in spite of the negative effect of weak IP rights on the return on promotion of 
both sectors, we find that in equilibrium sector G’s investment in promotion and sector’s S 
profits tend to increase as IP rights weaken (over a large – even though not the entire – range 
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of values of the IP parameter γ ). As extensively discussed in the next section, both the 
increase in promotion by sector G and the increase in the profits of sector S are mainly 
brought about by the existence of industry-level inefficiencies in sector G. For given levels of 
promotion, sector G faces a smaller demand when IP rights are weak, hence, because of the 
presence of diseconomies of scale in sector G, weaker IP rights tend to be correlated with a 
smaller, more efficient G-sector. Only the most efficient firms (i.e., firms with lowest 
production costs) are active when sector G contacts so that the sector’s marginal production 
cost associated with an increase in promotion is smaller when sector G is smaller. As a result, 
as sector G contracts under weaker IP rights, it expands promotion, while the sector’s 
aggregate profits fall. Concurrently, sector S enjoys a windfall of profits from expanded 
demand and reduced demand elasticity that occur because of the increased promotional effort 
in sector G. Specifically, the share of the potential market over which S-producers can exert 
monopolistic power (in the sense that sector S is not competing with sector G for the share 
z ) increases as IP rights become weaker, partially at the expense of the share of the potential 
market that is exclusively supplied by the producers of good G (i.e., share y ) and partially at 
the expense of the share of the potential market over which producers of good G and S 
compete (i.e., share x ). 
 
5.5.1 The form of the best responses in promotion 
In this section, we discuss how the strength of IP rights affects the firms’ first-period best 
responses in promotion, i.e., the optimal amount of promotion by the G- and S-producers for 
the other sector’s anticipated promotion. Our model yields a system of 1N +  best responses 
as implicit functions of the dollar amount spent in promotion by group G (i.e., F ) and the 
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dollar amount spent in promotion by each producer of good S ( jk , for 1,...,j N= ). Assuming 
symmetry in the S market (i.e., jk k=
 
for all 1,...,j N= ), the system of best responses 
reduces to two equations in two variables F
 
and K  (where K Nk= ), one best response for 
sector G and one for sector S. For convenience, instead of representing the best responses in 
the unbounded promotion space in dollars, we represent the best responses in the bounded 
promotion space expressed in shares of the potential market reached by promotion, 
2( , ) [0,1]α β ∈ , where α  is related to F  via equation (12) and β  to K  via equation (13).  
In the ,α β  space, the best response of the G-producers, ( )α β , represents the optimal 
share of the potential market reached by the promotion of sector G for any given share 
reached by the promotion in sector S. Similarly, the best response of the S-producers, ( )β α , 
represents the optimal share of the potential market reached by the promotion of sector S for 
any given share reached by the promotion in sector G. 
Figure 3 represents the first-period best responses for several values of the IP rights 
strength,
 
γ ; continuous curves represent the best response of sector G and the dashed curves 
the best response of sector S.5 The shape (slope and position) of the best responses varies 
depending on the type of equilibrium and the value of the IP parameter.  
For low values of γ , when at the prevailing prices all consumer types who know h  
prefer good G over good S, the best response of sector G is insensitive to the value of β  (in 
figure 3 the best response of sector G is vertical). In addition, as the IP rights strength 
increases, the best response of sector G shifts to higher levels of promotion (it shifts to the 
                                                 
5
 The parameter values used to plot all figures are 10u = , 10h = , .11δ = , 7.5v = , 5c = , 
1000M = , 1=ℓ , 2N = , .1t τ= = . 
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right as γ  increases). Here, an increase in the IP rights strength increases the ability of the G-
producers to expand demand through promotion (for given levels of promotion by sector S) 
because the G-producers can capture more of the consumers they reach with promotion as 
spillover of information and dilution decrease. Over the same range of values of γ , the best 
response of sector S is insensitive to the value of γ  (note that the return on promotion of 
sector S is independent of γ ), but the optimal amount invested in promotion by sector S 
decreases as sector G promotes more (i.e., as α  increases). Consumer information provided 
through the promotion by sector G in fact spills over to sector S and reduces the incentive of 
sector S to provide information. 
For all other values of γ , when the prevailing prices satisfy the restrictions imposed 
by condition (14) so that producers of sectors G and S compete for consumers who have full 
knowledge of both goods, the best responses of both sectors slope down, i.e., promotional 
efforts are strategic substitute (Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer 1985). As the IP rights 
strength increases starting from low values of γ , the best response of sector G tends to shift 
first to higher levels of promotion and then to revert and move back to lower levels of 
promotion (the best response of sector G shifts to the right and then to the left as γ  
increases).  
This non-monotonic behavior is the result of two counteracting forces. First, an 
increase in the IP rights strength increases the ability of the G-producers to expand demand 
through promotion (for given levels of promotion by sector S) because of less spillover of 
information and less dilution. Second, as demand expands with stronger IP rights, it is 
satisfied, at the margin, by less and less efficient producers. Holding promotion constant (i.e., 
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for given α
 
and β ), as γ  grows larger the demand of good G expands and, with free-entry, 
sector G also expands. But, because of the presence of industry-level inefficiencies, 
measured by the parameter δ , the sector’s expansion can only occur through progressively 
less efficient firms. Hence, not only the marginal benefits of expanding promotion but also 
the marginal costs are higher with stronger IP rights.  
These two counteracting forces, the increased ability and cost of expanding demand 
that are associated with an increase in γ  cause the best response function of sector G to 
move in a non monotonic fashion as the strength of IP rights increases: when IP rights are 
relatively weak, an increase in their strength induces the producer association to promote 
more at first, as the net effect of promotion on the industry’s profits is positive, but, as the 
strength of IP rights increases and the sector expands, the negative effect of less and less 
efficient producers dominates and sector G reduces the promotional effort.   
Consistently, we observe that with higher values of δ , lower values of v  and larger 
values of M , i.e., when the negative effect of the industry-level inefficiencies on the return 
on promotion dominates at lower levels of the IP rights strength, the best response of sector 
G starts reverting to lower levels of promotion at smaller values of γ . A more concentrated S 
sector also favors, but to a lesser extent, the predominance of the negative effect of the 
industry-level inefficiencies at lower values of γ . Industry concentration in the S sector, in 
fact, affects the best responses only through the second-period production decisions. As a 
general pattern, as the S industry become more concentrated, reduced competition in the S 
sector leads to a higher ability for S producers to restrict output and to charge prices above 
marginal costs. Other things equal, this leads to a smaller surplus from consuming good S 
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and a larger demand facing sector G. The higher demand facing sector G, at the margin, is 
satisfied by less efficient producers. Hence, as concentration in sector S increases, the 
optimal investment in promotion by group G (for given β  and given γ ) increases (because 
the returns on promotion increase as more consumers would choose to purchase good G over 
good S), but the negative effect of the industry-level inefficiencies becomes dominant at 
lower values of γ . 
With regard to the slope, as γ
 
increases the optimal amount of promotion by sector G 
tends to become more responsive to a change in the value of the promotion in sector S, i.e., 
the slope of the best response in sector G increases. The decrease in the return on promotion 
in sector G in terms of expanding demand due to an increase in β
 
is larger with stronger IP 
rights (i.e., at bigger values of γ ). This is shown by the following derivatives, where we need 
to remember that each additional unit of x
 
expands demand for good G by a smaller amount 
than a unit of y .  
y
x
α γβ
α γβ
∂ ∂  ∂ 
= −
∂
∂ ∂  ∂ 
=
∂
 
With regard to sector S and for parameters values such that condition (14) is satisfied, 
a change in the strength of IP rights affects the position and slope of the S-producers’ best 
response in the following way. An increase in the strength of IP rights shifts the best 
response to higher values of promotion and makes the best response less responsive to a 
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change in the promotion by sector G (i.e., the best response of the S sector in figure 3 shifts 
upward and becomes flatter as γ increases).  
 
 
Figure 3. Best responses 
 
 
As the strength of IP rights increases (i.e., as the rights over GI names shift from S- to 
G-producers), S-producers are less able to free ride on sector G’s promotion and the only 
way they can expand demand is through their own promotion. Clearly, the free-riding effect 
is more pronounced for larger values of α  and vanishes at low values of α  (i.e., this is why 
the best responses of sector S fan out). Concurrently as the strength of IP rights increases, the 
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optimal promotion by sector S become less responsive to a change in promotion by sector G 
(i.e., the best responses in figure 3 become flatter) as the result of two counteracting forces. 
On one side, the return on promotion by sector S in terms of capturing consumers over whom 
sector S can exert market power (i.e., in terms of capturing z ) decreases with α  and the 
decreases are independent of the IP rights strength. On the other side, the return on 
promotion in terms of expanding market shares over which producers of good G and S 
compete (i.e., in terms of expanding x ) increases with α  and the increase is larger with 
stronger IP rights. Hence, as γ  increases, larger returns in terms of x  better counteract the 
negative effect of stronger IP rights on returns in terms of z , and the drop in the optimal 
amount of promotion by sector S as α  increases is less pronounced. These effects can be 
seen in the following derivatives. 
1
z
x
β
α
β γ
α
 ∂∂  ∂ 
= −
∂
 ∂∂  ∂ 
=
∂
 
Both effects of an increase in γ  on the best response of sector S (i.e., higher levels of 
promotion and reduced responsiveness to change in the promotion in sector G) are stronger 
as the number of firms in the industry, N , decreases (i.e., as concentration increases). The 
number of firms in the industry not only affects the ability of S producers to charge prices 
above marginal costs but also affects the intra-sector ability to free ride on each other's 
promotion (because of “generic advertising” nature of promotion). As concentration 
increases, market power increases and the incentives to free ride within sector S decrease 
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thereby pushing the best response of the S-producers to higher levels of promotion and 
reduces their sensitivity to a change in α .  
 
5.5.2 The equilibrium investment in promotion 
Figure 4 represents the equilibrium investment in promotion as a function of the IP rights 
strength in terms of shares of the potential market reached through promotion by sector. 
Figure 4 shows that the equilibrium promotional efforts of the two sectors tend to behave 
symmetrically. Symmetry emerges in part from the fact that the promotional efforts are 
strategic substitutes and in part from the fact that the S-producers react to the promotion in 
the sector G by reducing their own promotion as they can free ride on G-producers’ 
promotion.  
 f 
fj irufhu 
Figure 4. Equilibrium promotion 
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Figure 4 also shows that the equilibrium promotional effort of sector G (S) increases 
(decreases) with the strength of IP rights over the lower range of values of γ , i.e., the range 
in which the positive effect of stronger IP rights on the return on promotion in term of 
expanding demand by sector G dominates the negative effect of the industry-level 
inefficiencies of a growing – but still relatively small – G sector, and decreases (increases) 
with the strength of IP rights over the upper range of values of γ , where the negative effect 
of the industry-level inefficiencies dominates. This general pattern for α  and β  is invariant 
to the choice of parameters’ values, but the size of the range over which promotion by the 
sector G increases (and the promotion by sector S decreases) tends to contract with larger 
values of δ , smaller values of v , larger values of M  and smaller values of N .  
 
5.5.3 Equilibrium prices and profits 
With free entry in sector G, variations in the equilibrium price of good G with the strength of 
IP rights fully reflect the change in the unit promotion cost and the marginal production cost. 
Also with industry-level inefficiencies and free entry, an increase in the aggregate profits for 
sector G can only occur as a result of an increase in the size of the industry.  
In the upper range of values of γ  (i.e., the range over which the promotion of good G 
“smoothly” decreases in the strength of IP rights), the equilibrium price of good G increases 
with γ , a feature of the equilibrium price of good G that is invariant to the choice of the 
parameters’ values. In this range of values of γ , the sector’s aggregate profits as well as the 
industry’s marginal costs of production increase as sector G expands. In this range, the 
increase in the marginal cost of production more than compensate for the decrease in the unit 
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promotion cost leading to an increase in the equilibrium price of good G. Both the increases 
in the equilibrium price of good G and in the sector’s profits over the upper range of values 
of γ  are features that do not depend on the choice of parameter values. Equilibrium prices 
and profits are shown in figure 5 (right panel) and in figure 6 (left panel) respectively. 
At the other end of the range of values of γ , the behavior of the equilibrium price of 
good G and the behavior of sector G’s profits show more variability with the choice of 
parameter values. For the set of parameters’ values of figures 5 and 6, we observe the 
following. With very weak IP rights (i.e., in the range of γ
 
over which promotion by sector 
G rapidly increases), the equilibrium price of good G increases with γ . In this range, the 
sector does not significantly expand (hence, sector G’s profits remain substantially 
unchanged) and the increase in price is mainly the result of higher unit promotion costs. For 
slightly higher values of γ  (i.e., the range over which promotion by sector G drops sharply), 
the equilibrium price of good G also drops as a result of reduced unit cost of promotion while 
the sector’s size (and hence aggregate profit) remains substantially unchanged.  
As we increase the value of δ , i.e., with larger diseconomies of scale, we observe that 
the equilibrium price of good G tends to become monotonically increasing over the entire 
range of values of γ  (stronger diseconomies of scale cancel out the effect on price of 
decreasing promotion costs). The general behavior of the profits instead remains unchanged 
as we increase the value of δ . If we decrease the value of t  and τ  (we reduce the efficiency 
of promotion in reaching consumers), we observe that the profits of sector G tend to steadily 
increase over the entire range of values of γ  (instead of remaining substantially unchanged 
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over the lower range of values of γ ). The general behavior of the price instead remains 
unchanged as we change the value of t  and τ . 
With regard to sector S, figures 5 and 6 capture the characterizing features of good 
S’s equilibrium price and sector S’s profits. Specifically, the equilibrium price of good S 
decreases as the strength of IP rights increases, reflecting the more limited ability of the S-
producers to exert market power. Profits also decrease in the strength of IP rights with the 
exception of an initial increase over the bottom range of values of γ . The initial increase in 
the profits of sector S occurs in correspondence of the spike in promotion by sector G, where 
with weak IP rights S-producers enjoy a windfall of profits due to the expansion of their 
demand brought about by the spillovers of information from the promotion of sector G. 
 
5.5.4 Welfare effects of IP rights on consumers 
Thus far we have discussed how one main effect of a change in the strength of IP rights is to 
“reallocate” the promotional effort and profits across producer groups. For values of the IP 
rights strength below a given threshold, a small and efficient G-sector expands promotion in 
response to stronger IP rights protection, while sector S, which with weak IP rights is in a 
good position to free ride, captures the majority of the profits generated by the promotional 
expansion by sector G. For values of the IP rights strength above the threshold, a 
strengthening of IP rights induces a larger, less efficient G-sector to contract promotion while 
sector S, which with strong IP rights is no longer in a good position to free ride, has no other 
option than to expand its own promotion. In this range, stronger IP rights effectively transfer 
profits from producers in sector S to producers in sector G. But, how are consumers affected?  
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The effect of the strength of IP rights on consumer surplus stems from two sources. 
First, the strength of IP rights directly affects the “informational content” of promotion. 
Second, it indirectly affects the incentive of firms to promote (this, in turn, occurs through 
the effect of the strength of IP rights on the informational content). The effect of the strength 
of IP rights on the incentive to promote has been already discussed. With regard to the effect 
of the strength of IP rights on the informational content of promotion, weak IP rights have 
both a positive and a negative effect. The positive effect, i.e., an increase in the informational 
content, concerns the spillovers of information about the basic attributes of the goods, u . The 
weaker the IP rights, the more likely a consumer who learns about the basic attributes of one 
product also learns about the basic attributes of the other product. As already explained, in an 
equilibrium with G Sp p> , spillovers of information effectively “work” in only one direction 
from good G to good S. The negative effect, i.e., a reduction of the informational content of 
promotion, concerns the dilution of the G-message. As IP rights weakens, fewer of the 
consumers who are reached by the promotion of good G learn about the specific quality of 
good G. 
 
5.5.5 The size of the market and the ability to match 
By affecting the informational content of promotion directly and firms’ incentives to promote 
indirectly, the strength of IP rights affects consumer surplus through the following channels: 
(i) the “size” of the market, i.e., how many consumers manifest a “positive demand” for at 
least one of the two goods,  1 (1 )(1 )x y z α β+ + = − − −  (i.e., measured in terms of the share of 
the potential market reached by at least one of the promotional messages), and (ii) the ability 
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of consumers to match with the preferred product, x  (i.e., measured in terms of the share of 
the potential market who has full information about both goods).  
Figure 5 shows the “size” of the market, the “ability to match” with the preferred 
good (left panel) and equilibrium prices (right panel) as a function of the strength of IP 
rights. 
 
(a) Shares (b) Prices 
Figure 5. Equilibrium shares of the potential market and equilibrium prices 
 
Numerical analysis suggests that the number of consumers who can match with the 
preferred variety increases with the strength of IP rights. Figure 5 specifically illustrates how 
the increase in the “ability to match,” measured by x  as a share of the potential market, is 
monotonically increasing over the entire range of values of γ . Figure 5 also shows that the 
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number of consumers who are knowledge about good G (but do not know good S), measured 
by y , increases with the strength of the IP rights. To the contrary, the number of consumers 
who are knowledgeable only about the basic attributes of at least one of the products, 
measured by z , decreases in the strength of IP rights over all but the lower range of values of 
γ . The increase in z  over the lower range of values of γ , where IP rights are weakest, is due 
to the spike in the promotion by sector G which to a large extent spills over to sector S.  
Finally, the equilibrium “market size” ( x y z+ + ) tend to be relatively insensitive to a 
change in the strength of the IP rights. This relatively moderate effect of a change in the 
strength of IP rights on the “market size” (compared to the effect on the “ability to match”) is 
due to the fact that a change in IP rights strength predominantly changes the informational 
content of promotion and redistributes promotion across producer groups, whereas the 
aggregate promotion level remains relatively unchanged. The general patterns for x , y , z  
and their sum illustrated in figure 5 are robust to the choice of parameters’ values. 
 
5.5.6 Consumer surplus 
In addition to the two mentioned channels, the “size” of the market and the “ability to 
match,” consumer surplus is affected by the strength of IP rights through equilibrium prices, 
which, in turns, depend on the ability of the S-producers to exert market power, the presence 
of industry-level inefficiencies in sector G and the ability of producers to enter the G-
industry. The behavior of the equilibrium prices as a function of the strength of IP rights has 
been already discussed. 
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Given the multiplicity of channels through which consumers are affected by an 
increase in the IP rights strength it is a priori difficult to assess what the net effect on 
consumer surplus could be. Nevertheless, numerical analysis shows a clear pattern regarding 
the behavior for consumer surplus which is largely invariant to the choice of parameter 
values. First, there are gains from having some degree of IP protection. When 0γ =  (i.e., in 
absence of IP protection) the only possible equilibrium entails only good S and consumers 
surplus reaches its minimum value. On the other extreme with strong IP rights, a change in 
the strength of IP rights has a moderate effect on consumer surplus. For large values of γ , 
the main positive effects of stronger IP rights –  an increase in the “ability to match” and a 
decrease in the market power of sector S (i.e., a decrease in the price of good S) – are 
mitigated or eliminated by the negative effect on consumer surplus of a higher price of good 
G. Over the upper end of values of γ , depending on the concentration of sector S, the net 
effect of stronger IP rights on consumer surplus tends to be positive (as concentration 
increases) or negative (as concentration decreases). 
Most of the change in consumer surplus in response to a change in the strength of IP 
rights occurs for the lower and/or intermediate range of values of γ .  With regard to the 
specific set of values of the parameters represented in figure 6, consumer surplus shows a 
rapid increase with the strength of IP rights over the lower range of values of γ , where IP 
rights are weakest. Within this range of values of γ , we can distinguish two sub-ranges. In 
the sub-range corresponding to a rapid expansion in the promotion by sector G, i.e., for the 
smallest values of γ , the positive effect on consumer surplus of an expansion in “market 
size” (i.e., the number of people that have some information about the products) more than 
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compensates the negative effect of a steep increase in the price of good G. In the sub-range 
corresponding to the fall in the promotion by sector G, the positive effect on consumer 
surplus of an increase in the “ability to match” and a decrease in the price of good G more 
than compensates the negative effect of a contracting market size.  
 
 
 
(a) Welfare (b) Quantities 
Figure 6. Welfare and equilibrium quantities 
 
For other sets of values of the parameters, the range of values of γ  over which 
consumer surplus grows “significantly” might also include the intermediate range of values 
of γ . According to what intuition suggests, an increase in the value of δ , the parameter 
measuring the industry-level inefficiencies of sector G, reduces consumer surplus and 
consumers’ gains from increasing the strength of IP rights. Also, as sector S becomes less 
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concentrated, the gains in consumer surplus from stronger IP rights tend to be smaller in 
relative terms. Intuitively, as concentration increases, market power by the S-producers 
increases as well as their propensity to invest in promotion (because of less free riding among 
S-producers). Therefore, stronger IP rights mostly benefit consumers when they limit the 
excessive market power of a concentrated industry while sector S’s promotion remain high.  
 
5.6 Cross borders implications of the strength of IP rights 
Our model provides a framework to analyze the open economy implications of IP protection 
for GIs and allows us to address the question of how a change in the current IP policy for GIs 
could affect the distribution of welfare internationally. To this end, we reinterpret our setup 
as a two-country model in which sector G, the sector supplying the GI product, is located in 
the exporting country (i.e., exports the GI product) and sector S, as well as consumers, are 
located in the importing country (i.e., imports the GI product). In this context, we interpret 
equation (24), which represents the industry G’s supply, as the residual supply of sector G 
net of the exporting country’s domestic demand.  
With this interpretation, the optimal IP policy from an importing country’s point of 
view is represented by the value of γ  that maximizes domestic welfare, the sum of consumer 
and the S-producer surplus. Domestic welfare (DW) is represented in figure 6 (left panel). 
From an exporting country’s point of view the optimal IP policy is represented by the value 
of γ  that maximizes the aggregate profits of sector G. 
Our analysis reveals that, from the exporting country’s perspective, domestic welfare 
is maximized when 1γ = , i.e., with the strongest possible form of IP rights for GIs. Stronger 
IP rights, in fact, favor the expansion of the GI sector and the farmers’ ability to extract the 
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rents associated with the presence of scarce factors in the GI area (e.g., land). This finding 
helps to explain the current position in the WTO negotiations over GIs hold by the group of 
countries lead by the European Union. These countries, the majority of which are exporters 
or have the potential to become exporters of GI products, favor more stringent international 
IP policies for GIs than those currently provided under the TRIPS agreement (see the group’s 
“Joint Proposal” – document TN/C/W/52 – available at http://www.wto.org). 
Our analysis also reveals that the strongest possible form of IP rights for GIs does not 
maximize the domestic welfare of an importing country. As IP rights for GIs grow strong 
(above a given threshold), consumers’ gains from additional protection tend to be moderate, 
nil or even negative while domestic producers’ losses are sizable and increasing with the 
strength of IP rights. At the other extreme, starting from a situation in which GIs receive 
essentially no protection, a “small” increase in the strength of IP rights benefits both 
consumers and domestic producers. Consumers gain from the availability of a higher-quality 
product whereas producers gain from the ability to free ride on the consumer information 
provided by the GI group. From the point of view of an importing country, therefore, 
domestic welfare is likely maximized by an intermediate level of IP protection. This finding 
sheds light on the current position hold by the group of countries led by the United States, 
primarily net importers of GIs, that oppose any further strengthening of GI provisions. These 
countries deem that the “basic” level of protection provided to all types of GIs by article 22 
of the TRIPS agreement is sufficient to protect consumers’ interests, whereas an “extension” 
of the “higher” level of protection (currently reserved to only wines by article 23) to all GI 
products would mainly benefit European producer groups of specialty products at the 
expenses of the domestic food industry and consumers (see the group’s “Joint Proposal” – 
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document TN/IP/W/10/Rev.2 – available at http://www.wto.org). Our findings are largely 
consistent with this view at least in the case in which the domestic industry supplying the GI-
like product is not too concentrated.  
Finally, from a global welfare point of view, our analysis suggests that the larger 
welfare gains to be expected from providing IP protection for GIs might have already been 
achieved with the introduction of some basic level of IP protection. Additional gains are 
possible by further strengthening the international provisions for GIs, but these gains might 
be modest. 
 
5.7 Conclusions 
This paper represents the first formal analysis of the open economy implications of IP 
protection for GIs. Specifically, we aim to shed light on the current controversy over GIs 
among WTO members by investigating the incentives of GI-exporting and GI-importing 
countries to strengthen the current TRIPS provisions for GIs.   
This paper also contributes to fill the void left by existing literature on GIs which 
exclusively focuses on the specific case in which GIs are either afforded full IP protection or 
no protection at all. Our analysis shifts the emphasis to the “strength” of IP protection by 
allowing for intermediate (or partial) degrees of IP protection. It is precisely this 
generalization that allows us to address the ongoing WTO debate on GIs that primarily 
focuses on how much protection to provide to GIs (rather than on whether or not to provide 
protection at all). 
Our analysis also complements and adds to existing studies in this area by 
considering the role of promotion in expanding market demand when consumers lack 
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information regarding either the existence or the features of the GI and GI-like products. 
Specifically, we analyze how the strength of IP protection afforded to GIs in international 
markets affects the incentives of producers to provide information to consumers and, in turn, 
how it affects the distribution of welfare among producer groups and consumers, and across 
international markets. 
Our main findings confirm the conjecture that GI-importing and GI-exporting 
countries might have divergent interests when it comes to the degree of IP protection to 
afford to GIs in international markets. We find that the welfare of GI-exporting countries is 
monotonically increasing with the strength of IP rights. These countries would clearly benefit 
from a strengthening of current GI provisions. Stronger IP provisions for GIs, in fact, favor 
the ability of GI producers to extract rents from the presence of scarce factors owned by 
producers within the GI area.  
GI-importing countries, on the other hand, stand to lose from a strengthening of 
current IP provisions. The model shows that, for importing countries, a significant share of 
the gains from IP rights for GIs are achieved by granting a minimum level of protection that 
provides sufficient incentives to induce GI producers to export. Also, an additional but 
moderate strengthening of IP protection beyond this minimum level might benefit domestic 
producers of GI-like products (as well as consumers) because it increases the incentive for GI 
producers to provide consumer information which spills over to GI-like product producers.  
But, as IP rights strengthen even further domestic producers are more likely to lose. 
As IP rights become stronger and the GI sector expands, the marginal ability of GI producers 
to provide information declines (because of the presence of industry-level inefficiencies) so 
that less information is provided on which producers of the GI-like products can free ride. As 
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well, the information provided by GI producers is less likely to expand the demand for GI-
like products because the degree of substitutability between GI and GI-like products declines 
in consumers’ eyes as IP rights strengthen. Finally, the analysis shows that also domestic 
consumers might have little to gain from a further strengthening of GI policies, especially 
when the domestic sector has a low level of concentration (and hence limited market power). 
Whereas it is hoped that this paper helps clarifying the current contrasting positions 
of the WTO members with regard to GIs, the modeling approach that we proposed has some 
limitations. In particular, we have not explicitly modeled the labeling choice of producers. 
Specifically, we have assumed that GI-like product producers choose product labels/brands 
that resemble GI names as much as possible (as the law permits) – in order to free ride on the 
information spillovers from the promotion of the GI – and hence that the labeling choice of 
the GI-like product producers is constrained by IP laws. IP laws, therefore, effectively 
determine the degree of information spillovers and dilution. A possible extension of this 
paper would entail endogeneizing the labeling choice of the producers of the GI-like product. 
The IP policy (which in the present model works as an equality constraint) would be modeled 
as an inequality constrain with the following interpretation: The strength of IP rights limits 
how similar to GI names labels used on GI-like products can be. Hence, the stronger the IP 
rights the more limited are the labeling options available to producers outside the GI area and 
the smaller is the likelihood of information spillovers and information dilution. Concretely, 
the strength of IP rights could be measured as the maximum allowed likelihood that 
consumers “confuse” and/or “associate” the GI-like product labels with the corresponding GI 
label. Measures of the likelihood of consumer confusion are used by courts to determine 
cases of trademark infringement or trademark dilution (Landes and Posner 2003).  
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A possible modeling strategy would be to add an initial period to the game discussed 
in this paper during which the producers of the GI-like product choose their labeling strategy 
so as to maximize profits subject to the IP policy. Thereafter, the game would remain 
unchanged. For the special case of an S-sector with a single monopoly, the extension is 
straightforward. We would treat γ  as the labeling choice variable of the monopolist 
(deciding how distant to locate its brand from the GI-name, or equivalently the amount of 
information spillovers and dilution) subject to the constraint ɵγ γ≥  where ɵγ , the IP policy 
parameter, represents the minimum allowed distance (i.e., the largest share of consumers who 
would be “confused” by the monopolist’s brand). As long as the IP policy parameter is above 
a given threshold, ɵ 0.1γ ≃  for the parametric case used to illustrate the model’s results, the 
monopolist would choose to locate its brand as close as possible to the GI name (since its 
profits are monotonically decreasing in γ ) and the IP policy would be binding. If the IP 
policy parameter is below the threshold, the monopolist would instead choose its brand in 
such a way to limit the amount of information spillovers so as to induce the GI producers to 
increase their promotional effort. For the general case with 1N > , the generalization is not as 
straightforward and to verify the existence of an equilibrium with a binding IP constraint we 
would need to verify that producers have no incentives to change their labeling policy given 
that the other producers locate their brand as close as possible to the GI name.  
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CHAPTER 6: GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
The overarching topic of this dissertation concerns the economics of geographically-
differentiated food and agricultural products and the role of intellectual property (IP) 
protection in the provision of quality in food and agricultural markets. Specifically, this 
dissertation addresses three questions concerning the economics of geographical indications 
(GIs).  
The first essay (Chapter 3) expands the existing literature on geographical indications 
by considering the economic implication of the different instruments (i.e., alternative 
certification schemes and trademarks) used to provide IP protection for GIs. Specifically, the 
proposed model can differentiate the two primary certification schemes currently used for 
GIs, the European-style sui generis scheme based on appellations and the American-style 
scheme based on certification marks. These schemes differ substantially with regard to (i) the 
eligibility conditions for geographic names to receive IP protection and (ii) the requirements 
for certification. In a second-best world with asymmetric information, these differences are 
relevant because they affect the collective reputation of certified products and hence the cost 
of providing quality.  
From a policy perspective, this essay offers specific recommendations concerning the 
current ongoing debate and negotiations on GIs at both the WTO and the EU levels. With 
regard to the type of IP protection instrument for GIs, the model indicates that a sui generis 
scheme based on appellations is preferable to standard instruments, such as certification 
marks, that are currently used in many important markets, including the United States. The 
model allows us to identify a feature of certification marks (i.e., the fact that eligibility for 
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registration is not conditioned upon the presence of a demonstrable link between the 
characteristics of a geographic region and the quality of the product) that limits their ability 
to convey information to consumers regarding the quality of GIs and lowers the cost of 
building reputation (in this sense, certification marks are no better than trademarks). In 
addition, the model shows that even if the current certification mark system were to be 
adapted to include an initial screening of products seeking IP protection based on the 
presence of a demonstrable quality/geography nexus, a sui generis scheme, which combines 
geography and quality requirements, would still provide larger welfare gains than 
certification marks.  
The second essay (chapter 4) investigates whether consumers recognize and value the 
informational content of a variety of nested geographical origin labels. In particular, this 
study disentangles three types of geographical origin labels with different levels of 
geographical differentiation: country-of-origin labels and two types of GIs, protected 
designations of origin (PDO) and protected geographical indications (PGI). Furthermore, in 
contrast to previous studies addressing European GIs, this essay considers the potential of 
geographically-based labels in an important export market, thus facilitating an assessment of 
the value and potential for GIs as a tool for expanding export share. Consumer data show 
that, within the context of a high-quality value-added commodity such as extra virgin olive 
oil, consumers' willingness to pay for oils from different countries varies, ceteris paribus, 
across countries, and that within a country consumers have a greater willingness to pay for 
GI-labeled than non-GI-labeled products. We also find evidence that consumers value PDOs 
more than PGIs, but the result is not as strong as that found for GIs versus non-GIs. As a 
whole, the findings are consistent with the hypothesis that geographical origin labels are 
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valued by consumers for their ability to provide information regarding the quality of the 
product and that the value is increasing with the informational content. Nevertheless, as the 
data show, the additional premia for GIs and PDO are relatively smaller than the premium for 
COOL, indicating that there might be decreasing returns to geographical labeling.  
The third essay (chapter 5) specifically aims to shed light on the current controversy 
over GIs among WTO members by investigating the incentives of GI-exporting and GI-
importing countries to strengthen the current TRIPS provisions for GIs. This essay extends 
the existing literature on GIs (which exclusively focuses on the specific case in which GIs are 
either afforded full IP protection or no protection at all) by allowing for different “strength” 
or different degrees of IP protection. It is precisely this generalization that makes this essay 
suitable to address the ongoing WTO debate on GIs that primarily focuses on how much 
protection to provide to GIs (rather than on whether or not to provide protection at all). This 
essay also complements and adds to existing studies in this area by considering the role of 
promotion in expanding market demand when consumers lack information regarding either 
the existence or the features of the GI and GI-like products.  
The model shows that GI-exporting countries would benefit from a strengthening of 
current GI provisions. Stronger IP provisions for GIs, in fact, favor the ability of GI 
producers and their associations to extract rents from the presence of scarce factors owned by 
producers within the GI area. GI-importing countries, on the other hand, stand to lose from a 
strengthening of current IP provisions. The model shows that, for importing countries, the 
majority of the gains from IP rights for GIs are achieved by granting an intermediate level of 
protection that maximizes GI producers’ incentive to promote. As IP rights strengthen even 
further domestic producers are more likely to lose. As IP rights become stronger and the GI 
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sector expands, the marginal ability of GI producers to provide information declines (because 
of the presence of industry-level inefficiencies) so that less information is provided on which 
producers of GI-like products can free ride. As well, the information provided by GI 
producers is less likely to expand the demand for GI-like products because the degree of 
substitutability between GI and GI-like products declines in consumers’ eyes. Finally, the 
analysis also shows that domestic consumers might have little to gain from a further 
strengthening of GI policies, especially when the domestic sector has a low level of 
concentration (and hence limited market power). 
